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1 INTRODUCTION
Imperatives are linguistic devices used by an authority (speaker) to express wishes, re-
quests, commands, orders, instructions, and suggestions to a subject (addressee).1 This
essay’s goal is to tentatively address some of the following questions about the imperative.
• Imperative Metasemantics. What is the menu of options for understanding fun-
damental semantic notions like satisfaction, truth-conditions, validity, and entail-
ment in the context of imperatives? Are there good imperative arguments, and,
if so, how are they to be characterized? What are the options for understanding
the property that an account of good imperative arguments is supposed to track?
What constraints on a semantic analysis of the imperative do different positions
on the metasemantic issues impose?
• Imperative Semantics. How might we implement metasemantic postures in a
rigorous formal system? How much can we do using familiar tools from deontic
modal logic? How much leverage over semantic questions can we gain by intro-
ducing tools from natural language semantics—ordering sources, dyadic modal
1. This is a crude conception of the function of the imperative in natural language, but it will do for our
rather limited purposes. A more sophisticated treatment may be found in Hamblin (1987).
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operators, salient alternatives, and the like—into a formal semantics for an im-
perative object language? How much leverage can we gain by introducing tools
from rather less-utilized areas of modal logic—devices for representing actions
and planning in time, modal operators constructed from action-terms, and the
like—into the analysis?
• Imperative Dynamics. How do imperatives succeed in performing the speech-
acts they are used to perform? How do imperatives update discourses? How
can we leverage an account of imperative discourse update in giving a dynamic
semantics for the imperative? Is there anything about the imperative that demands
a dynamic semantic treatment?
Before jumping in, a very quick overview of the structure of the essay and general
approach we will take to answering the above questions. In §2, we address metasemantic
questions about the imperative, outlining in some detail three different tacks one might
take in response to them. Very roughly: fulfillment-oriented logics regard the fundamental
semantic relation—the imperative analogue of satisfaction—as fulfillment of the require-
ment expressed by an imperative. Content-oriented logics treat the fundamental semantic
relation as requirement in view of an authority’s desires. And planning-oriented logics
treat the fundamental semantic relation as requirement in view of “prior” constraints on
an agent’s practical reasoning and intention formation. Each tack is naturally adopted to
an idiosyncratic conception of validity in imperative argument. Depending on implemen-
tation, taking one tack over another naturally manifests in different predictions about the
validity of certain argument patterns.
The rest of the essay is devoted to brass tacks—implementing different positions on
the metasemantic questions in a formal semantics (both static and dynamic) for a formal
imperative language. In §3, we develop a logic of content in terms of a slightly embel-
lished, but otherwise fairly standard, deontic modal logic. We show that this setup is
well-suited to handling an array of phenomena about the imperative—conditional, quali-
fied, or otherwise hedged imperatives and the Ross Paradox, in particular—and we devote
a significant amount of effort to exploring the intricacies surrounding each of these is-
sues. The analysis of conditional imperatives is argued to benefit from the introduction of
dyadic modal operators (and corresponding dyadic imperative operators) with restriction
arguments and a novel version of an ordering-source semantics, rather than a simple acces-
sibility relation semantics. The Ross Paradox is argued to benefit from the use of alterna-
tive semantics (although a Montague-Scott approach is also considered and rejected). We
show that the setup can, with a rather minimal conceptual sleight of hand, avoid the trap of
construing imperative operators in the imperative language as literally deontic modal oper-
ators, and thereby sidestep the problem of assigning formulas of the imperative language
literal truth-conditions. Although the analysis is at bottom a treatment of an imperative
logic of content in terms of the model theory for deontic modal logic, it is neither elimina-
tivist nor reductionist.
In §4, we shift our attention to modeling how imperatives constrain the planning be-
havior of their subjects at a given point in time. Some of what we want to model in this
area can be handled with a rather simple change to the apparatus of §3: replacing the
authority-oriented ordering-source with a subject-oriented ordering-source—a To-Do List
for an agent, roughly in the sense of Portner (2004, 2008)—although the shift introduces
several complexities that are without direct parallel in the logic of content. Other theoreti-
cal goals demand a genuine elaboration of the apparatus. In shifting our focus to planning,
it is natural—and, as we see, extremely useful—to have at our disposal a dynamic lan-
guage that is capable of talking explicitly about actions and the hypothetical impact of the
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performance of certain actions on the constraints impinging on the agent’s future planning.
We adopt such a language—an embellishment of the Propositional Dynamic Language of-
ten used in providing a logic of programs—and proceed to rewrite the semantics from the
ground up. The setup is shown to be extendable to a resolution of arbitrarily complex
versions of the Ross Paradox, somewhat along the lines of that given in the prior section,
as well as a perspicuous analysis of temporal imperative constructions and temporal con-
straints on planning that present difficulties when the imperative object language is non-
dynamic. We close by suggesting a perspective—the perspective of “constraint semantics”
in the sense of Swanson (2006, 2008a)—from which the logic of planning presented in this
section could just as well be construed as a logic of content.
In §5, we turn to genuine dynamics, in particular modeling imperative effects on
discourse. We do several things in this section. First, we introduce a new discourse
parameter—a Rights List—to keep track of permissions, entitlements, and freedoms accu-
mulated by an agent over the course of a discourse, and we explain the sort of work it can
be used to do. Second, we define a set of update potentials—functions mapping from dis-
courses into updated discourses—for the enriched, dynamic imperative object language.
The update potentials are designed to make good on a particular conception of imperative
force in discourse, on which imperatives both introduce constraints and grant rights with
respect to the agent’s future planning behavior. The result is an account of imperative
effects on discourse that (i) handles a much wider array of imperative constructions than
tackled in recent literature on the subject and (ii) offers a rather more subtle treatment of
imperative force than what is offered in contemporary accounts. We use these definitions
of update potentials to define irreducibly dynamic analogues of imperative satisfaction and
entailment. We close with a defense of static semantics of the imperative in terms of the
model theory for deontic modal logic against attempts to assert dynamic hegemony. The
thesis we advance here can be read as the implicit and overarching theme of this paper:
much of what we want to model about the imperative can be modeled using just the well-
understood model theory for modal languages.
2 FOUNDATIONS
2.1 Motivating Imperative Logic
There is something undeniably compelling about the following argument patterns.
(1) Brush your teeth and go to bed!
∴ Brush your teeth!
(2) Pet every kitty!
∴ Pet Fluffy!
(3) If you go to Harlem, take the A-train!
Go to Harlem!
∴ Take the A-train!
(4) Use an axe or a saw!
Don’t use an axe!
∴ Use a saw!
What precisely makes these argument patterns compelling—indeed, what it even means
to describe the inference of an imperative conclusion from a set of imperative premises
as compelling—is for now a bit of a mystery—one which will occupy our attention for
much of the first part of this essay. But no matter. The pull which these arguments exert
on us constitutes prima facie reason for thinking that there is a such a thing as good im-
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perative arguments—and, therefore, a difference between good imperative arguments and
bad imperative arguments.
It is the task of the imperative logician to characterize this difference, both semanti-
cally and syntactically. Semantically by attempting to define an imperative analogue of
semantic validity or truth-preservation (and perhaps, although not necessarily, an imper-
ative analogue of the model theories used to interpret non-imperative formal languages).
Syntactically by attempting to develop a proof theory for a logical imperative object lan-
guage. In this essay, we focus our attention on the semantic dimension of the project, and
leave the proof theory for another occasion.
My own interest in imperatives stems from an interest in modeling the role of natural
language imperatives in communication and individual/group practical reasoning. But,
though we devote a large amount of time to developing a model for updating discourses
and cognitive states in accordance with imperative utterances, our focus in this essay will
not be on natural language—not directly anyway. Rather, we take the advice of Bar-
Hillel (1966) and confine our attention to defining, interpreting, and developing a rough
semantics and pragmatics for a formal imperative object language (with the customary
expectation that insights from our intuitive understanding of the behavior and function of
natural language imperatives will inform the formalism, and that a carefully designed and
implemented formalism will enrich our understanding of imperative discourse).
For most of our purposes in this essay, an expressively poor imperative language built
on top of the Boolean propositional language suffices. LetLP be the Boolean propositional
language. Then the Basic Propositional Imperative LanguageLPI is defined as the smallest
set such that:
(5) If φ ∈ LP, then φ ∈ LPI
If φ ∈ LP, then !φ ∈ LPI
The imperative “operator” p!q may be read as “see to it that.” Note that in limiting our-
selves to a propositional language, we prevent ourselves from saying anything about the
argument in form in (2). Nevertheless, there are, as we will see, plenty of interesting im-
perative arguments we can represent in LPI and, once we have a semantics on the table,
evaluate for validity. The following are natural LPI logical forms for the arguments in (1),
(3), and (4):
(6) !(φ∧ψ) / !φ
(7) !(φ→ ψ), !φ / !ψ
(8) !(φ∨ψ), !¬φ / !ψ
A note on LPI: it is natural (and customary) not to allow an imperative operator to take
scope over another imperative operator, and we follow that custom here. More generally,
we prohibit any embeddings of expressions containing the imperative operator. In view
of the following sorts of constructions, this might be thought an intolerable expressive
limitation on our language.
(9) If he doesn’t stop, shoot!
(10) Stop, or I’ll shoot!
A natural first pass at conditional imperatives like (9)—and, for that matter, the first
“premise” imperative of (3)—and imperative threats like (10) would involve represent-
ing them with the logical forms ¬φ→ !ψ and !φ∨ψ respectively. Such logical forms do
not count as well-formed formulae of LPI . We will take up this issue again in our dis-
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cussion of conditional imperatives, but a small piece of motivation for this decision might
be in order. Sanctioning such logical forms seems to mean either interpreting imperative
formulae as bearers of truth-values or devising non-truth-functional interpretations of their
main Boolean connectives. Both options seem less than ideal. We avoid making the choice
by provisionally supposing that these constructions are to be handled in some other way.2
With a basic imperative language in place, we now consider different possibilities for
characterizing the property that distinguishes good imperative arguments from bad—viz.,
different proposals for understanding the imperative analogue of the entailment relation
. Note that the menu of possible options is more diverse than represented here. Those
presented here have been selected in view of their connection to the main themes of this
essay (and interests of the author).
2.2 Logics of Fulfillment
The earliest proposal for conditions on imperative entailment was formulated in Jørgensen
(1937-8), which proposed a reduction of imperative to “ordinary” (i.e., non-imperative)
logic, along the following lines. (Note: we reserve  for the imperative analogue of the
entailment relation .)
(11) !φ1, ..., !φn  !ψ iff φ1, ...,φn  ψ
This analysis predicts the argument patterns in (1), (3), and (4) valid, on their suggested
LPI renderings. References that, with qualifications (to be discussed shortly), defend this
basic picture include Hare (1949, 1952, 1967), and, more generally, any analysis of the
imperative operator as a species of deontic necessity modal (and, potentially—depending
on how the details of his idea are developed—Geach (1958)). Customarily, the proposal is
motivated by appeal to fulfillment-conditions, which are the imperative analogue of truth-
or satisfaction-conditions. Along these lines, the basic semantic relation in imperative
logic—the imperative analogue of satisfaction—is conceived as fulfillment. We under-
stand an imperative sentence !φ as being fulfilled (in a model) iff its complement indicative
φ is true (in that model). If, and only if, a sequence of formulae φ1, ...,φn entails ψ is it
the case that the fulfillment of !φ1, ..., !φn guarantees the fulfillment of !ψ. The final step
in motivating the logic is the proposal that imperative entailment should be understood in
terms of a guarantee of fulfillment: a “premise” sequence of imperatives entails a “conclu-
sion” imperative iff the fulfillment of each premise imperative guarantees the fulfillment
of the conclusion imperative. The parallels to the ordinary understanding of the entailment
relation (in terms of a guarantee of truth) are obvious and will not be belabored.
The account is incomplete, along several dimensions. Most obviously, a statement of
conditions on an imperative entailment relation is not a fully worked out semantics. In
particular, we are missing an explicit account of the semantic contribution (if any) of the
imperative operator to the meanings of imperative formulae. The proposal is, as it stands,
compatible with treating the imperative operator as a species of deontic necessity modal or
semantically null speech-act operator (among sundry other possibilities). We bracket the
issue for now, but take it up again later.
Additionally, we lack any account of the proper interaction between imperatives and
indicatives in argument; we have only stated necessary and sufficient conditions on when
2. We spend a good deal of time on imperative truth (§3.3) and how to interpret Boolean connectives in
an imperative logic (§3.4.3). To preview: truth-conditional analyses of the imperative are not totally out of the
question. But the semantic apparatuses that accompany such analyses are rich enough to handle conditional
imperatives in other ways, and there are reasons for preferring them. (Imperative threats are trickier, and we will
have nothing to say about them in this paper.)
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an imperative conclusion follows from a sequence of imperative premises. So, for instance,
we have nothing to say about whether the following sorts of arguments ought to be counted
as valid or invalid.
(12) Use an axe or a saw! [!(φ∨ψ)]
You will not use an axe. [¬φ]
Then use a saw! [!ψ]
(13) See to it that: if you go to Harlem, you take the A-train! [!(φ→ ψ)]
You are going to Harlem. [φ]
Then take the A-train! [!ψ]
Although I argue shortly for a form of skepticism about such arguments, they have some
prima facie appeal. Noticing this, we might try to fill part of the gap in our proposal by
strengthening it.3
(15) {!φ1, ..., !φn}∪{ψ1, ...,ψm} !π iff {φ1, ...,φn}∪{ψ1, ...,ψm}  π
There are definite difficulties doing so. For one, endorsing the strengthened proposal
means giving up any hope for an analysis of the imperative operator as a species of de-
ontic necessity modal. On none of the standard semantical treatments of deontic logic do
we have, for example, that either O(φ∨ψ),¬φ Oψ or O(φ→ψ),φ Oψ. But, while the
prospect of effecting a full-scale reduction of imperative logic to deontic logic might have
looked appealing, this might be thought a small concession. Other things equal, it would
be preferable, for example, to avoid an analysis on which imperatives are given modalized
truth-conditions.
Agreed, but it would nevertheless be surprising for the valid argument forms of im-
perative and deontic logic to diverge so radically. And, indeed, we find that the sorts of
considerations that tell against the corresponding deontic argument forms can be lever-
aged against their imperative kin. The deontic prohibition on detachingOψ from premises
O(φ→ ψ) and φ is made palatable by noting that an obligation to make a material im-
plication φ→ ψ true might have been best discharged by falsifying the antecedent (and
similarly for the inference of Oψ from O(φ∨ψ) and ¬φ) (cf. Broome 1999). Similarly,
in issuing an order of the form !(φ∨ψ), an authority might reasonably prefer that her ad-
dressee fulfill her command by seeing to it that φ, and demur from endorsing the command
!ψ in the event that ¬φ.4 The fact that φ, combined with the fact that she has issued the
3. This isn’t quite right. We want to rule out the validity of an argument from a sequence of non-imperative
formulae to an imperative conclusion—e.g., from φ and φ→ ψ to !ψ. (15) does not. This brings up the thorny
question of whether/when imperatives and indicatives might imply each other. In this vein, Hare (1952: 28)
defends a proposal along these lines:
(14) a. {!φ1, ..., !φn}∪{ψ1, ...,ψm}pi iff {ψ1, ...,ψm} pi
(Γ implies an indicative iff the indicatives in Γ do.)
b. {!φ1, ..., !φn}∪{ψ1, ...,ψm} !pi only if {!φ1, ..., !φn} 6= ∅
(Γ implies an imperative only if Γ contains at least one imperative.)
The statement of conditions on  in (15), then, presupposes the correctness of (14b). Geach (1958) rejects
both claims. Concerning (14a), he notes a case where !(φ→ ψ), !¬ψ, and φ seem inconsistent, so that !(φ→
ψ), !¬ψ ¬φ (If you are loyal, rise up! But do not rise; stay on your knees! Hence: you are disloyal). This
case is puzzling, but Geach is wrong about it: an agent can utter each of these commands without thinking her
addressee disloyal; indeed, she might be enjoining her addressee to be disloyal. What is more mysterious is that
the command Be disloyal! does not seem to follow from the other two commands, although the proposal we are
considering predicts that it should. Geach’s argument against (14b), on the other hand, looks airtight. There are
ways to finesse this issue (see, e.g., Castaneda 1958) but they are not our concern here.
4. This is not to say that such an authority will view ψ as impermissible. Only that she might reserve positive
endorsement (of the sort expressed by an imperative !ψ) for those ways of fulfilling the original command that
are, by her lights, both permissible and best. We say much more about the issues raised here in the next section.
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command !(φ∨ψ), in no way commits her to endorsing the command !ψ. Similar remarks
could be made about the conditional case.
The question of how precisely to constrain the interaction of imperatives and indica-
tives in argument is vexed, and we will bracket it for now (although, as we will see, en-
dorsing a definite semantic proposal about the imperative usually involves taking a definite
position on the issue). For now, we note that there is a prima facie tension between the
intuitive, deontic logic-inspired argument against the strengthened statement of conditions
on and conceptualizing imperative entailment as an inclusion relation among fulfillment
conditions. On the assumption that ¬φ, a disjunctive imperative !(φ∨ψ) is fulfilled if and
only if ψ. To put it differently: the satisfaction of ¬φ and fulfillment of !(φ∨ψ) (say,
with respect to a valuation) guarantees the fulfillment of !ψ. Similarly for the conditional
case. More generally, when (and only when) φ1, ...,φn,ψ1, ...,ψm  π, the fulfillment of
!φ1, ..., !φn and the satisfaction of ψ1, ...,ψm will guarantee the fulfillment of !π. So, a
natural extension of the motivation for the original statement of conditions on  in (11)
appears to positively recommend the strengthened statement in (15).
There are two ways to react to this fact (as well as other facts that the logic of imper-
ative fulfillment finds difficult to explain, which we present in the following section). One
is to conclude that the correct imperative logic—or, at least, the correct way of concep-
tualizing imperative logic—is not to be found in the logic of imperative fulfillment. The
other is to take this fact to motivate the development of (i) alternative conceptualizations
of what imperative entailment might amount to, so that we might have some rationale for
resisting the strengthened statement of conditions on  in (15), and/or (ii) alternative im-
perative logics. I will take the latter tack. I take it that the logic of imperative fulfillment is
a reasonable logic of something or other, and different imperative logics can be conceptu-
alized, designed, and used to model different phenomena about the imperative. The logic
of fulfillment simply does not appear up to the job of accounting for the sense in which the
argument forms in (12) and (13) are invalid.
2.3 Logics of Content
A different approach to the logic of imperatives is what I will term the “logic of content.”
There is undoubtedly a sense in which a logic of imperative fulfillment is a logic of content:
logics of fulfillment pay attention to what is required or commanded by an imperative
sentence, and construe an imperative conclusion as following from a set Γ of formulas just
in case the content of the conclusion (what the conclusion requires) follows from what the
imperatives in Γ require (together with the facts that the non-imperatives in Γ describe).
But I wish to identify the content of an imperative sentence with something other than
what the sentence requires. What precisely imperative content amounts to will depend on
the specific sort of semantic theory one endorses. But what I have in mind generally is the
denotation assigned by a semantic theory to an arbitrary imperative formula !φ of LPI .
Logics of content may (and do) differ significantly from one another. Some (e.g.,
those that identify the denotation of !φ with that of Oφ, where O is a species of de-
ontic necessity operator), will endorse the statement of conditions on  given in (11).
Others will not. What distinguishes logics of content as a class is a particular concep-
tualization of imperative logic: as normative for commanding (or, more precisely, the
endorsement of commands). Ordinary propositional logic is often held to be norma-
tive, in some nebulous sense, for assertion and belief: if φ1, ...,φn  ψ, then asserting
(or believing) that φ1, ...,φn commits an agent to endorsing an assertion (or belief) that
ψ. Similarly, logics of content conceptualize imperative logic as normative for endorse-
ment of commands: if {!φ1, ..., !φn}∪{ψ1, ...,ψm} !π, then endorsing each member of
8
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{!φ1, ..., !φn}∪ {ψ1, ...,ψm} commits an agent to endorsing !π.5 Logics of content gen-
erally implement this conceptualization of imperative logic by developing novel theories
of the semantic content of imperative formulae (hence their name). This is, of course, a
rather crude sketch. Although we could say a good deal more by way of filling it in (and
illustrating with example accounts), we will save those words now. Logics of content will
be a focus of our attention in this paper. Instead, we turn to applications.
Endorsing a logic of content gives one a foothold in resisting the arguments in (12)
and (13) that troubled the logic of fulfillment. Indeed, it is easy to see that the deontic
logic-inspired argument against their validity assumes the conceptualization of imperative
logic characteristic of logics of content.6 It is, of course, only a foothold. Genuine leverage
over these arguments comes only with the development of a bona fide semantics. More
interestingly, logics of content are well-positioned to handle the famous “paradox” about
imperative logic of Ross (1941). (Indeed, doing so seems to inspire most examples of
logics of content in the literature on imperatives.)
(16) !φ 6 !(φ∨ψ) (Post the letter! 6 Post or burn the letter!)
It is well-known that the way logics of fulfillment conceptualize imperative entailment is
incompatible with the felt invalidity of the Ross inference—indeed, this point goes back
to Ross himself. Since any valuation fulfilling !φ also fulfills !(φ∨ψ), any reasonable
implementation of a logic of fulfillment will have it that !φ  !(φ∨ψ). By contrast,
conceptualizing imperative logic as a logic of content supplies a rationale for formulating
a logic (and theory of imperative content) in which the Ross inference is predicted invalid:
intuitively, endorsing !φ (e.g., issuing a command to post a letter) does not per se commit
an agent to endorsing !(φ∨ψ).
It is worth refining this point further. We can do so by comparing the Ross inference
to the following argument.
(17) See to it that if you read the book, you come see me. [!(φ→ ψ)]
Read the book! [!φ]
∴ Come see me! [!ψ]
Castaneda (1958)—applying apparently the same sort of conception of imperative entail-
ment we take to characterize logics of content—argues that the argument form illustrated
in (17) is invalid:
[A] teacher who [issues the premise commands in (17)] has not thereby
ordered or told his student to come to see him, regardless of the student’s
reading of the book (Castaneda 1958: 43-44).
Similar reasoning might be thought to explain why logics of content should not endorse
the inference of !(φ∨ψ) from !φ: if teacher commands student to post the letter, teacher
has not thereby committed herself to endorsing the command to post or burn it, regardless
of the student’s posting it.
There are two things to note here. First, if Castaneda’s argument against the argument
form in (17) succeeds, it appears to rule out an entire class of proposals about the semantic
content of imperatives—namely, any analysis of the imperative operator as a species of
5. Endorsement is conceived as a generic pro-attitude. Endorsement of non-imperative formulas is some-
thing like belief in them. We leave the notion of imperative formula endorsement vague for now, but take up the
issue again below.
6. This isn’t to say that logics of content must invalidate (12) and (13), only that they supply a rationale for
doing so. See the end of §3.2 for some discussion.
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deontic necessity modal—as possible implementations of the conceptualization of imper-
ative entailment that is characteristic of logics of content. Consider the deontic version of
the K axiom.
(18) O(φ→ ψ)→ (Oφ→Oψ)
K is valid in the class of all frames for Standard Deontic Logic. The following is an easily
proved metatheorem of SDL.
(19) Γ∪{φ}  ψ iff Γ  φ→ ψ
Together with K, this implies that O(φ→ ψ),Oφ  Oψ. If Castaneda is right about the
invalidity of (17), and we aim to analyze the imperative operator as the deontic necessity
operator O of SDL, we are saddled with an obvious contradiction. (Noticing that Oφ→
O(φ∨ψ) is valid in the class of all frames for deontic modal logic, if Castaneda-esque
reasoning about the Ross Paradox is correct, we have an even more direct argument to the
same conclusion.)
Second, and more interestingly, Castaneda’s argument involves a tacit commitment to
a definite view about the content of imperatives. The order φ regardless of ψ locution is
most naturally interpreted as expressing that both φ∧ψ and φ∧¬ψ are permitted (when
possible), and at least one required. The reason that the conclusion imperative of (17)
is held not to follow from the premise imperatives is that the content of the imperative,
according to Castaneda, is given, roughly, by a command to come see teacher regardless
of the student’s reading of the book. In other words, Castaneda seems to think that the
conclusion imperative expresses a requirement to come see teacher and a permission to
do so with or without having read the book. Since a speaker who endorses the premise
imperatives of (17) in no way commits herself to permitting her addressee not to read the
book (indeed, quite the opposite), a logic of content ought to dictate that the argument
is invalid. (The adaptation of Castaneda’s argument to the Ross inference holds that a
disjunctive imperative !(φ∨ψ) expresses a requirement to make it the case that φ∨ψ and
a permission to do so without making it the case that φ (assuming this to be possible).
Since a speaker who issues the command !φ in no way commits herself to endorsing such
a permission, a logic of content should dictate that the Ross inference is invalid.)
The notion that imperatives bear permissions as part of their content has a signifi-
cant degree of historical (see, e.g., Williams 1963; Hare 1967) and contemporary (see,
e.g., Aloni 2007) appeal, and there is undoubtedly something right about it. It is impos-
sible to consistently endorse a command without being disposed to endorse some sort of
permission—minimally, a permission that the command be fulfilled.7 What sort of per-
missions should be written into the content of imperatives (consistent with the concep-
tualization of imperative logic characteristic of logics of content) is, however, a different
matter. I want to suggest that there are ways of integrating the notion of permission into a
theory of imperative content that sanction the validity of the inference in (17) and which
are consistent with the shared motivations of logics of content. (There are also, as we will
see shortly, ways of integrating the notion of permission which sanction the validity of
the Ross inference, but they involve commitments to questionable assumptions about the
permissive content of choice-offering disjunctive imperatives.)
From the vantage of a logic of content, it is clear that inferring an order to see teacher,
regardless of your reading, from the premises of (17) is fallacious. Here we are in agree-
ment with Castaneda. But glossing the conclusion of (17) with the locution come see me
regardless of your reading of the book involves badly misrepresenting its content: what-
7. This requirement is the imperative logic analogue of the D axiom of SDL: Oφ→¬O¬φ.
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ever its permissive content, it is obvious that the conclusion is silent about whether failing
to read the book is permitted. On the minimal assumption that an imperative formula !φ
expresses a permission that it be fulfilled, Castaneda appears to predict that the conclusion
of imperative of (17) expresses a permission that is, loosely speaking, inconsistent with
the requirement of the premise imperative Read the book!. This is problematic ground for
a logic of content to occupy. Consider the following imperative argument, which any logic
of content ought to rule valid.
(20) Read the book! [!φ]
Come see me! [!ψ]
∴ Read the book and come see me! [!(φ∧ψ)]
If the command Come see me! expresses a permission to do so without having read the
book, then no logic of content could sanction (in view of its conceptualization of imper-
ative entailment) the validity of this argument: agents are never committed to endorsing
a command which requires that φ while permitting that ¬φ. And yet it is clear that any
agent who endorses the premise commands in this argument is committed to endorsing the
conclusion.
There is a better way of presenting a worry about (17)—one which is actually con-
sonant with the motivation for logics of content. An agent who endorses the premise
imperatives of (17) might reasonably refrain from endorsing its conclusion. In, for exam-
ple, a situation where her addressee fails to read the book, an agent who endorses both
premise commands might reasonably demur about issuing the further command Come see
me!. This is a reasonable thing to say, but note that it is tied to a particular understanding
of endorsement—one concerned with an agent’s communicative dispositions: roughly, an
agent endorses an imperative !φ at time t if she would have no complaint, in view of her
desires and beliefs at t, about issuing !φ at t.8
Although this is a natural way of understanding endorsement (and presumably will
characterize a reasonable subclass of imperative logics of content—e.g., that endorsed by
Castaneda), I want to employ a rather different sense of endorsement. The reason is simple:
the logics of content we consider in this paper appear to be exploiting this different sense
of endorsement, in that they all predict the inference in (17) valid. The relevant sense of
endorsement is this: an agent endorses an imperative !φ at time t if the content of !φ is
a suitable expression of her desires at t. Distinguish the state of affairs required by an
imperative !φ (its command content, i.e., the state of affairs expressed by φ) from the
states of affairs permitted by !φ (its permissive content). Then, very roughly, !φ is a
suitable expression of an agent’s desires at t iff the agent desires its command content at t
and its permissive content is compatible with what she desires at t.
This is, as it stands, so abstract as to be almost useless. We clarify with examples.
Suppose it is important to an agent that you read the book, and she desires that you do
so. Such an agent will not endorse a command whose content is glossed as Come see
me, regardless of your reading of the book. Such a command expresses a permission that
conflicts with her desire that you read the book, and, so, does not count as a suitable
expression of her desires. An agent who utters the premise commands in (17), on the
other hand, desires (or at least is committed to desiring) a future in which her addressee
comes to see her (indeed, if she is rational, strictly prefers one such future—the one where
her addressee reads the book—to any future in which the addressee does not come to see
8. The complaint would have to concern the content of !φ, as opposed to, say, the logistics of performing the
utterance. This is a good time to note that much of what’s going on in this section is quite rough, but generally, I
hope, precise enough to enable us to draw the relevant distinctions. We’re not doing conceptual analysis here—
only trying to roughly taxonomize imperative logic.
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her). So the content of the conclusion imperative of (17) counts as a suitable expression of
her desires, although tokening that content in an utterance might not.9 Supposing an agent
endorses the premise imperatives in (17), then, it follows that she is committed to endorsing
the conclusion imperative. Which is to say: pairing this conception of endorsement with a
logic of content means endorsing the validity of the argument form illustrated in (17).
What about the Ross inference? Here we have options, depending on how we un-
derstand the permissive content of disjunctive imperatives. If we hold that the imperative
Post or burn the letter! semantically expresses a permission to burn the letter (and more
generally that an imperative of the form !(φ∨ψ) expresses a permission to bring it about
that φ and to bring it about that ψ), the class of logics of content we are considering will
rule the Ross inference invalid. This is because the content of an imperative !φ being a
suitable expression of an agent’s desires fails to imply that the content of an imperative
!(φ∨ψ) is as well. The latter will express a permission (to bring it about that ψ) that may
fail to be compatible with the desires of the agent. So endorsing !φ does not commit an
agent to endorsing !(φ∨ψ).
Alternatively, we may hold that !(φ∨ψ) somehow conveys, without semantically ex-
pressing, a permission to bring it about that φ and that ψ. If that is the case, then both the
permissive and command contents of !(φ∨ψ) are exhausted by φ∨ψ, and the content of
!(φ∨ψ) will count as a suitable expression of the desires of an agent who endorses !φ. An
agent who desires that φ desires, inter alia, that φ∨ψ, in which case the permissive content
of !(φ∨ψ) is compatible with her desires. It follows that the content of !(φ∨ψ) will count
as a suitable expression of her desires whenever !φ does. Endorsing !φ will commit an
agent to endorsing !(φ∨ψ).
It seems to me overwhelmingly plausible that a permission to burn the letter is part of
the permissive content of Post or burn the letter!. So, an adequate theory of the semantic
content of disjunctive imperatives should predict their free choice readings by appeal to
non-pragmatic mechanisms. I will not spend a great deal of time arguing for this position
in this essay, although it would be possible to.10 I will only try to provide some basic
motivation for the semantic tack.
In response to the claim of Williams (1963) that the felt permissions of disjunctive
imperatives are part of their semantic content (Williams suggests treating them as presup-
positions), Hare (1967) argues they are in fact conversational implicatures—apparently
(although he is not explicit about the point) something rather like quantity implicatures.
The reasoning by which the implicatures are derived is presumably something like this:
i. If an agent desires some π such that π  φ∨ψ but φ∨ψ 2 π (and it is reasonable
to expect that π may be fulfilled by her addressee), then, if she is cooperative,
she will not endorse the imperative !(φ∨ψ). (Practical analogue of the Maxim of
Quantity (Grice 1989): be neither more nor less action-restrictive than required.)
ii. Suppose the agent endorses !(φ∨ψ). Then, assuming cooperativity (and that
φ∨ψ 2 φ and φ∨ψ 2 ψ), she desires φ∨ψ and it is not the case that: she desires
φ or desires ψ.
iii. If the agent desires ¬φ, then her desires are inconsistent unless she desires ψ. But
9. Green (1997) draws a similar distinction, although to a different purpose.
10. There exist a number of sophisticated accounts whose sole purpose is to explain free choice effects (in
particuar, free choice permissions) using exclusively non-semantic (pragmatic) mechanisms. See, e.g., Kratzer &
Shimoyama (2002); Schulz (2003, 2005) for sophisticated recent examples. The predominant view in the seman-
tics literature is that free choice permissions are entailments (see, e.g., Aloni 2007; Geurts 2005; Zimmermann
2000), and presumably that view will extend to cover free choice interpretations of imperatives with disjunctive
complements.
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she does not desire ψ, so she does not desire ¬φ. Similarly, she does not desire
¬ψ. So, both φ and ψ are compatible with what she desires.
iv. So the agent desires φ∨ψ, but does not desire any particular way of fulfilling
!(φ∨ψ). So both bringing it about that φ and bringing it about that ψ are accept-
able ways of fulfilling !(φ∨ψ).
The reasoning isn’t either precise or airtight, but it seems plausible enough—even,
dare I say, Gricean in spirit. But there are reasons for worrying about conversational
implicature accounts of free choice readings of disjunctive imperatives. Note, e.g., the
badness of (21a) (and the “dual” command (21b)).
(21) a. ?Post or burn the letter. But you may not burn it!
b. ?Post or burn the letter. But do not burn it!
These sorts of constructions are nearly always marked. This is surprising if the permission
to burn the letter is merely a conversational implicature of the imperative. For, as Grice
notes, conversational implicatures may, in general, be felicitously cancelled. Proponents of
conversational implicature accounts of free choice permissions in disjunctive imperatives
owe us an explanation of why permission implicatures of disjunctive imperatives are not
generally felicitously cancelable.11
As we see below, accommodating the sort of permissive content we are defending here
need not require explicitly building permissions into the imperative logic and semantics (al-
though it is far preferable, I will argue, to do so). Permissive content can, in principle, serve
as a rationale for a logic that invalidates the Ross inference, but that does so without giving
any sort of account of or making any explicit commitments to the permissive dimension
of imperatives. (See §3.5 for further discussion in connection with a Montague-Scott-style
resolution of the Ross Paradox.)
2.4 Logics of Planning
Hare (1967) attempts to characterize the motivations of those who reject the statement of
conditions on  given in (11), for reasons having to do with the Ross Paradox. Although
Hare’s project is to reveal the rejection as without basis, it is clear enough that he is pre-
supposing the conceptualization of imperative entailment that is characteristic of a logic of
fulfillment, and noting that the motivations of his envisioned target diverge from it. What
is interesting about Hare’s argument is that the motivations he attributes to his opponents
might be used to characterize an alternative conception of imperative logic—a conception
common to what I will term “logics of planning.”
Hare takes it that dissatisfaction with the Ross inference stems from the (he thinks
mistaken) assumption that in saying that an imperative conclusion !ψ follows from a series
of imperative premises !φ1, ..., !φn, we say that fulfilling !ψ is a necessarily satisfactory
way of fulfilling the obligations issued by the premise imperatives. (According to Hare
and other proponents of logics of fulfillment, of course, this gets things exactly backward.)
11. Hare (1967: 315) appears to gives a dialogue in which permissions are felicitously canceled, but the case
is artificial—designed to bring out the no choice interpretation of the imperative, on which the permissive content
of the imperative is exhausted by φ∨ψ. I am not claiming that no choice interpretations do not exist. Rather, I
claim, with Aloni (2007), that (i) there is a semantic difference between no choice and free choice interpretations;
(ii) disjunctive imperatives are sometiems ambiguous between free choice and no choice interpretations; (iii)
no choice interpretations of !(φ∨ψ) are entailed by !φ, while free choice interpretations are not. No choice
readings are generally dispreferred, probably for Gricean reasons, and they will not occupy a central place in our
discussion. Dealing with the ambiguity will, however, require complicating the semantics and/or object language.
See §3.5.
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On this conception of imperative entailment, it makes sense to reject the Ross inference as
invalid: since fulfilling !(φ∨ψ) is not necessarily a satisfactory way of fulfilling !φ, we
should endorse a logic in which !φ 6 !(φ∨ψ). More generally, conditions on imperative
entailment should receive the following statement:
(22) !φ1, ..., !φn  !ψ iff ψ  φ1 and ... and ψ  φn
The primary proponent of this sort of view in the literature is Anthony Kenny (see,
e.g., Kenny 1966).12 The properties of the logic associated with the statements of condi-
tions on  in (22) are not particularly interesting (as is the case with the conditions given
in (11) and (15)).13 The logic will, of course, be non-monotonic—in that Γ  !φ will not
generally imply Γ∪{!ψ} !φ—but not so in any interesting way. Non-monotonicity is
just the natural consequence of reversing the direction of the entailment relation, which is
essentially all that has been done here.
More interesting, for our purposes, are the intuitions that might be used to animate
this approach. Kenny’s general perspective on imperative logic—one common to logics of
planning as a class—is essentially agent-oriented, in that it regards imperatives as primar-
ily encoding information that agents use to structure their practical reasoning (planning).
Compare logics of content, which are essentially issuer-oriented: they treat imperatives as
primarily encoding information about the desires of agents who issue them. There are a
variety of ways to implement this general perspective. Kenny does so as follows.
The logic of satisfactoriness consists of the rules which ensure that in
practical reasoning we never pass from a fiat [i.e., plan] which is satis-
factory for a particular purpose to a fiat which is unsatisfactory for that
purpose (Kenny 1966: 72).
According to Kenny, a proper logic of imperatives allows drawing an imperative conclu-
sion !φ from a set Γ of imperative premises just in case the plan associated with !φ (roughly,
the plan to bring it about that φ) is a satisfactory implementation of the plans associated
with Γ. Intuitively, what we have here is a logic designed to model the implementation
of general, higher-order plans by way of specific, lower-order plans in a rational agent.
It is clear enough why we would want such a logic to be non-monotonic: some plan Π
may be a satisfactory implementation of a plan Π′, although strengthening (i.e., adding
requirements to) Π′ might easily destroy this.
There is, however, a class of natural agent- and planning-oriented logics that (i) do
not focus their attention on the implementation of plans and (ii) preserve the monotonicity
of . What I have in mind are conceptions of imperative logic that characterize it as
in the business of expressing or generating higher-order constraints (and freedoms) on
planning activities—or on the mathematical structures we use to model such activities—
of rational agents.14 On such conceptions, the fundamental semantic relation is something
like requirement (or being in force) in view of constraints in force on an agent’s planning.
An imperative conclusion !φ may be drawn from a set Γ of imperative premises just in
case, roughly, Γ contains at least as much practical planning content as !φ. Just in case,
that is to say, whenever the constraints on planning expressed by the premise imperatives
are required or in force, the constraints on planning expressed by !φ are required or in
force.
12. Geach (1966) also voices his support.
13. The matter of integrating non-imperatives into the logic remains, but we will not pursue it here.
14. In particular, I have in mind the dynamic approaches of Mastop (2005); Charlow (2008a); Veltman (2008).
I will present such an account in §5 of this essay.
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This is a vague sketch and all of the key notions remain undefined. But, since we
develop an account along these lines in the second half of the paper, we will save precision
for later. Three brief notes, however. First, how such an account handles the Ross Paradox
will obviously depend on how the notion of practical content gets cashed out. An account
which builds free choice permissions into practical content will make different predictions
about the (in)validity of the Ross inference than one which does not. Second, I think it is
clear enough that the entailment relation characterized by such a logic will be monotonic.
Third, and most interestingly, although it is clear that logics of planning and logics of
content (as I have characterized them) have divergent motivations, it is not clear that a con-
crete example of a logic of planning would have to be distinct, in any deep sense, from a
concrete example of a logic of content. Differences in motivation need not manifest as dif-
ferences in the semantic analysis of imperative formulae, and the class of argument forms
predicted valid by a logic of content might coincide perfectly with the class predicted valid
by a logic of planning. Differences will tend to depend on two factors: how the logical for-
malisms of the respective classes ultimately (i) cash out the notions of content that figure
in their motivations (command/permissive content for logics of content; practical content
for logics of planning) and (ii) characterize the behavior of non-imperative formulas in
imperative inference.
Concerning (i): the logics of planning we develop in this paper will be dynamic, in
one of two senses: they focus on planning behavior in time or on the changes that updating
a cognitive state with a series of formulas (imperative and otherwise) induces. Insofar as
these incarnations of logics of planning direct their focus at the planning behavior of the
imperative “addressee” (either the constraints that “in force” commands impose on plan-
ning behavior or the changes that imperatives have the capacity to induce in an agent’s
cognitive state), they may appear to be essentially planning-oriented. Nevertheless, I shall
argue (§4.13) that there are ways of effecting a rapprochement between the conception of
imperative logic as a logic of content and the conception of imperative logic as a logic
of planning (although things get a bit trickier when we shift our attention to update se-
mantics, on account of the peculiarities of imperative inference in an update logic). Com-
mand/permissive content and practical planning content can be seen as two sides of the
same coin. Because the formalism we develop in the course stating a logic of planning is
rather more sophisticated than the formalism we develop in the course of stating a logic of
content (capable of representing ordered commands, accounting for the contrast between
stable/ephemeral commands, giving a semi-realistic treatment of action and planning in
time), rapprochement will appear to recommend using the more sophisticated formalism
in stating a logic of content.
Concerning (ii): it is natural in certain logics of planning—those concerned with mod-
eling cognitive update in accordance with commands—to treat the argument forms of (12),
(13), and (17) as valid. Consider (12): updating a cognitive state with a command to bring
it about that φ→ ψ and the information that φ constrains the plans of the agent. To obey
the command, in view of what she knows, the agent will have to bring it about that ψ. But
this is not an inference a logic of content is necessarily comfortable with: as argued above,
endorsing !(φ→ψ) and φ does not necessarily commit an agent, qua issuer of imperatives,
to endorsing !ψ. While subjects are constrained to obey, authorities are not constrained to
prefer obedience. Or consider (17): updating a cognitive state with !(φ→ ψ) and !φ also
constrains the agent’s plans. If she fails to see to it that ψ, she violates at least one of her
obligations. While there are conceivable logics of content that validate all of these argu-
ment patterns (see the end of §3.2), the primary examples of such do not. Nevertheless,
this is not, I shall suggest, a difference to be accounted for by appeal to the distinction
between logics of content and logics of planning. Certain logics of planning—those which
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are dynamic in the sense of focusing on planning behavior in time, rather than on mod-
eling cognitive update—fail to validate precisely these argument patterns. The difference
is more naturally accounted for by the special properties of update-semantic treatments
of the imperative. What the difference means, if anything, is that it may not be possible
to construe the logic that arises from the update-semantic treatment of the imperative as
anything but a logic of planning.
2.5 Conclusion
We have spent a large amount of time taxonomizing imperative logics according to their
understandings of the subject matter of imperative logic and the nature of imperative entail-
ment. We did so informally (and at times with a good deal of imprecision). Nevertheless,
we were able to draw out some interesting logical properties shared by certain classes of
imperative logics. There is a fairly clear menu of options for the imperative logician to
choose from. The remainder of this paper is devoted to examining concrete logics that
implement the motivations we have been detailing (with the exception of those that char-
acterize logics of fulfillment). We begin by considering a group of logics of content, the
primary examples of which give a semantics for the imperative operator in terms of a
semantics for a deontic modal operator.
3 IMPERATIVE LOGIC AS DEONTIC LOGIC
Deontic modal analyses of the imperative—by which I mean to include both analyses that
treat the imperative operator as literally a deontic modal operator, and those which regard
the operators as merely having similar inferential properties—have a good deal to recom-
mend them. As we shall see, when suitable technical complications are introduced, they
can furnish analyses of conditional imperatives (Schwager 2006) and the Ross Paradox
(Aloni 2007) which (i) handle the semantics in terms of a relatively familiar and well-
understood model theory and (ii) appear to be consonant with the motivations of logics of
content. In short, developing a deontic modal analysis of the imperative is an attractive
and perspicuous way of implementing the logician of content’s conception of imperative
logic.
3.1 Technical Preliminaries
We begin with some familiar technical apparatus, developing it and adding more along the
way as needed. This development is rigorous (in a way that existing accounts of impera-
tives as modals often are not) and pieces are added gradually and with care. The gain in
precision is, I hope, worth the technical expense. Much of the apparatus is self-explanatory,
and, in the interests of brevity, expository remarks are kept to a minimum.
3.1.1 Kripke Semantics
The Basic Deontic Propositional Language LDL is defined in the usual way. (We take
the deontic necessity operator O as primitive, so that the deontic permissibility operator
P := ¬O¬.) Models for LDL are defined standardly, as follows.
(23) M= 〈W,R,V 〉
W is the universe (world-space)
R⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation on W
V is an assignment of subsets of W to the atoms of LDL
16
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The accounts we consider in this section interpret O bouletically, so that Oφ reads roughly
as it must, in view of what is desired, to be that φ. Intuitively, 〈w,v〉 ∈R iff v is compatible
with what is desired at w. The set {v ∈W | wRv} gives the set of ideal (in view of what
is desired at w) worlds. We adopt for now the standard axiomatization (KD) of SDL. The
semantics for Boolean formulas is classical, the semantics for modal formulas standard.
Let M= 〈W,R,V 〉. Then:
(24) a. M,w LDL p iff w ∈ V (p)
b. M,w LDL ¬φ iff M,w 2LDL φ
c. M,w LDL φ∨ψ iff M,w LDL φ or M,w LDL ψ
d. M,w LDL Oφ iff ∀v ∈W : wRv⇒M,v LDL φ
3.1.2 Satisfaction at Contexts
For the logician of content’s purposes, it is handy to view satisfaction as relative to con-
texts, in addition to models and worlds. The logician of content, as I have described her, is
interested in formalizing authority (speaker) commitments in view of authority (speaker)
desires. Contexts are natural bearers of information about the identity and desires of their
speakers. Implementing this vision requires a concomitant revision in the semantics. Mod-
els are reconceived as follows:
(25) M= 〈D,W,R,C,V 〉
D = {i1, ..., in} is a set of individuals
R= {Rj ⊆W ×W | ij ∈D} is a set of accessibility relations for ij ∈D
C ⊆D×D×R is a set of contexts
(26) A context c ∈ C = 〈sc,ac,Rsc〉
sc is the speaker of c
ac is the addressee of c
Rsc is the accessibility relation for sc
A logician of content, interested as she is in speaker commitments, will naturally endorse
the following revision of the satisfaction conditions.
(27) a. M, c,w LDL p iff w ∈ V (p)
b. M, c,w LDL ¬φ iff M, c,w 2LDL φ
c. M, c,w LDL φ∨ψ iff M, c,w LDL φ or M, c,w LDL ψ
d. M, c,w LDL Oφ iff ∀v ∈W : wRscv⇒M, c,v LDL φ
The key clause is the clause for modal formulas: Oφ is satisfied in a modelM at a context-
world pair 〈c,w〉 just in case φ is required by what the speaker of c desires at w. (Note the
following convention: if M= 〈D,W,R,C,V 〉, then whenever we write M, c,w  φ, it is
understood that c ∈ C and w ∈W .)
3.1.3 Ordering-Source Semantics
The accessibility semantics, as stated above, is a bit too coarse for our purposes. Most
obviously, the semantics presupposes that for any context-world pair 〈c,w〉, there is in the
set of “admissible” worlds (i.e., W ) at least one w-accessible world v, i.e., at least one
world that is ideal in view of the desires at w of the speaker of c. (Indeed, this is precisely
what the KD axiomatization of the logic guarantees.) This idealization is harmless in
giving a semantics for the basic deontic language. It is a special case of the so-called “Limit
Assumption” (Lewis 1973), but I will be happy to work within the Limit Assumption in
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the confines of this paper (see fn17). Nevertheless, complicating our languages (and the
semantics for those languages) to handle conditional imperatives will motivate abandoning
it. See §3.4.4 for further discussion.15
It goes without saying that the ordering-source semantics formulated here is in all of
its essentials drawn from the classic semantics for modals developed in Kratzer (1981).
We reconceive models by eliminating accessibility relations and complicating the context
parameter:
(28) M= 〈D,W,C,V 〉
C ⊆D×D×B×B is a set of contexts
B = {b | b : W 7→ 22W } is a set of conversational backgrounds
(29) A context c ∈ C = 〈sc,ac,fc,gc〉
fc ∈ B is the modal base in c
gc ∈ B is the ordering-source in c
Modal bases and ordering sources are typed as functions from worlds to sets of proposi-
tions. Together they define the domain over which the deontic modal O quantifies. Taking
the intersection of the set of propositions in the modal base will characterize a set of ad-
missible worlds (admissible in view of the information relevant at a context). Ordering
sources, on the other hand, are used to rank admissible worlds in view of the desires of
the speaker at a context: gc(w) yields the set of propositions that the speaker of c desires
to be true at w. The modal’s domain of quantification is the set of best (rather than ideal)
admissible worlds, relative to the ordering source.
Formally, we use the ordering-source to define a preorder on W .
(30) v ≤gc(w) u iff {p ∈ gc(w) | u ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ gc(w) | v ∈ p}
The domain of the operator O at a context-world pair 〈c,w〉, min(fc(w),≤gc(w)),16 is
defined as the set of admissible worlds v such that no admissible world u is strictly better




fc(w) | ∀u ∈
T
fc(w) : u≤gc(w) v⇒ v ≤gc(w) u}













P and v ∈ min(P ′,≤gc(w)), then v ∈ min(P ,≤gc(w))
Realism means the selection of best worlds (according to the ordering source) never takes
us beyond admissible worlds. Monotonicity means that if a world is best (according to an
ordering source) in a set of admissible worlds, it remains best in a smaller set (according to
the same ordering). Reducing competition cannot worsen a world’s position in the ranking.






Satisfaction conditions for Boolean formulas are given as before. The satisfaction
15. We could give an ordering-source semantics with accessibility relations, but it’s cleaner if we do not.
16. This handy notation is cribbed from Gillies (2007).
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conditions for modal formulas receive the following statement:17
(35) M, c,w LDL Oφ iff ∀v ∈ min(fc(w),≤gc(w)) :M, c,v LDL φ
On the ordering-source semantics, Oφ is satisfied in a model M at a context-world pair
〈c,w〉 just in case φ is satisfied at all the best (in view of what the speaker of c desires at
w) admissible worlds.
Before moving on, a final piece of handy notation: the introduction of an interpretation
function J·KL yielding the set of worlds satisfying a formula of language L in a model at
a context: if M = 〈D,W,C,V 〉, then JφKLM,c = {w ∈W | M, c,w L φ}. The language
superscript will generally be omitted.
3.2 Semantics for LPI
Giving the semantics for the Basic Propositional Imperative Language in terms of the
semantics for the Basic Deontic Propositional Language is, for the most part, trivial: we
give satisfaction conditions for formulae of LPI in terms of satisfaction conditions for
formulae of LDL. (We bracket conditional imperatives for now.) We interpret LPI using
an ordering-source semantics and identify the class of models for LDL with the class of
models for LPI . Satisfaction conditions are formulated as follows.
(36) For all φ ∈ LPI :
a. If φ is Boolean, M, c,wLPI φ iff M, c,w LDL φ.
b. If φ= !ψ (for ψ ∈ LP), M, c,wLPI φ iff M, c,w LDL Oψ
Imperative validity is defined in terms of satisfaction-preservation in all models and at all
context-world pairs. Let φ1, ...,φn,ψ be arbitrary formulae of LPI . Then:
(37) φ1, ...,φn LPI ψ iff ∀Mcw :
M, c,wLPI φ1∧ ...∧φn⇒M, c,wLPI ψ
It is obvious that the logic will endorse the statement of conditions on  given in (11),
although not the statement of (15), which is what we would expect (so far, anyway) from
a logic of content.
For certain purposes, however, we might want to formulate a logic of content sat-
isfying (15). One way of conceiving of imperative necessity consistent with a logic of
content is necessity in view of what the speaker desires and knows to be true (as opposed
to what she merely desires). Such a logic could be rather easily developed by dynamicizing
the entailment relation, so that non-imperative formulae on the left of  are “added” to
the modal base against which the satisfaction of imperative formulae is checked. Taking
this tack involves representing non-imperative formulae on the left of  hypothetically as
epistemic necessities—as holding at all worlds compatible with the relevant information.
(38) Definition. Fix M= 〈D,W,C,V 〉, and let c= 〈sc,ac,fc,gc〉. Then:
c+Γ =df 〈sc,ac,f ′c,gc〉, where f ′c(w) = fc(w)∪{JφKM,c}, for all w ∈W , φ∈ Γ.
17. This is a simplified presentation. The official statement of Kratzer (1981) is this:
(33) I≤
g(w)
(fc(w), v) =df {z ∈
T
fc(w) : z ≤g(w) v}
(34) M, c,w Oφ iff ∀u ∈ Tfc(w) : ∃v ∈ I≤
g(w)
(fc(w),w)) : ∀t ∈ I≤
g(w)
(fc(w), v)) : M, c, t φ
The official view avoids the Limit Assumption—that min(fc(w),≤gc(w)) 6= ∅. See Swanson (2008b) for dis-
cussion. For simplicity, we assume that W is finite, so the Limit Assumption does no harm. See Kolodny &
MacFarlane (2008: 18) for a defense of the Limit Assumption in the deontic context.
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(39) Let Γ! = {!φ1, ..., !φn} be a set of imperative formulae of LPI ,
Γ∗ = {ψ1, ...,ψm} be a set of non-imperative formulae of LPI ,
π be an arbitrary formula of LPI .
Then Γ!∪Γ∗ LPI π iff ∀Mcw :
M, c+ Γ∗,wLPI Γ!∪Γ∗ ⇒ M, c+ Γ∗,wLPI π
The entailment relation can be glossed as follows: Γ! and Γ∗ entail !φ iff φ is required
by the speaker’s desires everywhere that Γ∗ is satisfied (cf. the notion of “quasi-validity”
defined in Kolodny & MacFarlane (2008: 25)). We won’t investigate the properties of such
a logic, although it is easy to check that it entails (15). It is a virtue of the modal semantics
we have given that it is flexible enough to handle these divergent ways of developing a
logic of content.18
3.3 Interlude: The Incredulous Stare
Deontic modal analyses of the imperative appear to give imperatives literal truth-conditions—
an imperative formula !φ can be either true or false, depending on whether φ is in fact
obligatory, in view of some obligation-determining object. Specifically, the family of anal-
yses we are considering apparently has it that an imperative formula !φ of LPI serves to
state a claim about the desires of its speakers: roughly that φ must, in view of the speaker’s
desires, to be the case.
Writers too numerous to cite regard any truth-conditional semantics for imperative
formulae as a non-starter. Arguments for this stance are not as common as one would
hope. It is often treated as a basic, Moorean fact that imperative formulae just could not
have truth-conditions. No matter how much a truth-conditonal logic for imperatives did for
us, there would be a strong presumption against it. This is a dogmatic way of presenting
what is a prima facie legitimate suspicion, and we can do better.
For example: suppose imperative formulae (and their analogues in natural language)
have the same sort of semantic content as run-of-the-mill indicatives. The fact that indica-
tives express propositions allows us to do a lot of neat stuff with them. For example:
• Embed them freely under the scope of truth-functional operators.
• Embed them freely under the scope of intensional operators.
• Assert the propositions they express.
• Target the propositions they express with linguistic assent and denial.
If imperatives are also in the business of expressing propositions, the argument goes, we
might expect to be able to do these same things with them. Clearly, though, we cannot.
(40) *It’s not the case that: please come see me right away.
(41) *He knows that please come see me right away.
(42) *I affirm that please come see me right away.
(43) a. Please come see me right away!
b. ?That’s true. I really must do that, given what you want.
c. ?That’s false. I really mustn’t do that, given what you want.
18. While we will not bother dynamicizing the entailment relation that is associated with later revisions
of the semantics for imperative formulas, the basic idea employed here—having the domain of the modal be
progressively restricted by non-imperative formulae to the left of the turnstile—can be easily extended to those
cases.
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What these examples seem to show is that imperatives are not interpretable (by human
language processors) as expressing propositions.19 The opponent of the truth-conditional
analysis will continue that if they did express propositions, then they would be so inter-
pretable. Conclusion: imperatives do not express propositions.
Grant that imperatives (or, more precisely, utterances thereof) are not interpretable as
expressing propositions. (For short, we will say that imperatives have essentially perfor-
mative interpretations. What precisely we mean by this will be clarified below, but roughly
this means that imperatives are capable of receiving only obligation-imposing, rather than
obligation-describing, interpretations.) There is yet room for resistance.
To illustrate: Schwager (2006), which endorses a speaker-relative bouletic modal se-
mantics for the imperative operator, contends that lexical presuppositions of the imperative
operator explain why natural language imperatives have exclusively performative interpre-
tations. The crucial presupposition, by her lights, is that the speaker of an imperative at c
affirms gc as a good source of rules for acting.20 This unfortuantely raises more questions
than it answers. What, for example, does this sort of affirmation involve? It cannot, of
course, be the sort of affirmation (i.e., of the truth of a proposition) involved in assertion.
Presumably Schwager intends affirmation as its own type of speech-act—a speech-act of
the sort that is incompatible with an assertoric interpretation of an utterance used to per-
form it. Perhaps there is something to this. But ultimately the proposal fails to explain the
explanandum: imperatives are claimed to have exclusively performative interpretations
because they can only be tokened in a performative sort of speech-act (affirmation).
While Schwager’s proposal is unpersuasive, it is suggestive. Whatever the right ac-
count of the performative force of imperatives—in terms of lexical presupposition or some
other pragmatic mechanism (e.g., the To-Do Lists of Isaacs & Potts (2003); Potts (2003);
Portner (2004, 2008), which we tackle at length below)—it seems likely that it will be,
at a minimum, compatible with the semantics of imperatives we have on offer. Perfor-
mative force is a pragmatic notion and it is not unreasonable to think that it will have a
purely pragmatic explanation—one orthogonal to a semantic account of imperative valid-
ity. Whatever the right account of performative force, we can expect to be able to graft it
onto a reasonable semantics for imperatives without inconsistency, thereby combining our
semantic cake-having and pragmatic cake-eating.
In this vein, it seems clear that Portner (2008) is misguided in his objections to analy-
ses which treat the imperative operator as a modal.
A modal which only had a performative use might as well not be called
a modal at all. The performative aspect of its meaning, modeled as the
addition of its prejacent to the To-Do List or in some other way, would
explain everything that needs to be explained about its meaning. (Port-
ner 2008: 363).
Portner illustrates the point by appeal to the cases of Ninan (2005) chronicling perfor-
mative uses of root modals with exclusivity presuppositions (must, have to, ...). In such
19. This is actually complicated. It may be that the asterisked constructions subcategorize for complement
IPs with non-null specifiers (i.e., overt subjects). If that were right, the badness of these constructions could be
explained non-semantically. I do not know enough about the syntactic issues to pursue them with any seriousness
here.
20. Schwager (2006) makes hay over another putative presupposition borne by the imperative operator: that
the speaker is an epistemic authority about fc and gc (in a very technical sense not relevant for our purposes
here). This presupposition is designed to induce the further presupposition that the speaker “cannot be mistaken”
about whether or not the modal sentence giving the content of an imperative utterance is true—equivalently, that
the speaker is an authority on what her desires require (with respect to the modal base). Schwager does not say
what this has to do with performative force. There are many subject matters about which I cannot be mistaken
and yet still felicitously state facts. See §5.2 for further discussion of Schwager’s proposal.
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cases, it seems clear that the truth-conditional semantics of the modals does not factor in
the correct account of the performative force of the utterances.21 So the truth-conditional
semantics of modals is, in the relevant sense, pragmatically inert. Since, according to Port-
ner, there is nothing to explain about the meaning of imperatives beyond their performative
aspect (in contrast with root modals), the truth-conditional semantics does no theoretical
work and ought to be abandoned. More generally, Portner is objecting to any account of
imperative meaning—truth-conditional (or not), modal (or not)—that is not a theory of (or
built on top of a theory of) imperative aspect.
This strikes me as shortsighted. Quite clearly, there is a good deal to explain about im-
perative meaning beyond performative aspect. In particular, we need a semantic account of
the imperative—a characterization of the fundamental semantic relation for an imperative
language and an account of imperative validity. If construing imperative operators in terms
of deontic modality helps us with these tasks, from the vantage of one of the conceptions
of imperative entailment we have described, then there is good, if defeasible, theoretical
reason for viewing imperatives as having modalized truth-conditions.
It is true that on some conceptions of imperative entailment—in particular, the sort
characteristic of logics of planning—it seems possible to use one and the same formal
apparatus to account for performative aspect and to characterize a satisfactory imperative
entailment relation, without giving imperatives modalized truth-conditions. (We develop
such an account at length in §5.) In which case, there might be no compelling reason for
endorsing a modal account: all the semantic heavy-lifting is done by the pragmatic appa-
ratus. Things are not so simple as that, however. For one, it isn’t obvious that a sufficiently
flexible logic of content could be given in terms of this apparatus. To preview, the state
of the art in accounting for imperatives’ performative aspect has it that imperatives add
to their addressees’ plans or commitments (the above-mentioned To-Do List approach).
Performative force is held to consist in constraining the plans of an addressee, and the
accompanying logic seems to be about modeling higher-order constraints on planning be-
haviors of the addressee, rather than speaker commitments to endorse, in view of their
desires. Even if we can give a logic-of-content rationale to the logic—and I will argue that
we can (§4.13)—it may turn out that treating imperative logic in terms of modal deontic
logic is the best way of implementing a logic of content. We argue the point in §5.5.
There is a way to mitigate the discomfort of a modal account: reconceive the meaning
of the imperative “satisfaction” relation LPI for imperative formulae, in terms of some
less truthy notion. In this vein, Lemmon (1965) suggests the notion of an imperative’s be-
ing in force, while Segerberg (1990) suggests requirement.22 Supposing we take this tack,
the semantics given in (36) and validity definition given in (37) will remain the same, but
carry a slightly altered meaning. When φ ∈ LP, a modelM and context-world pair 〈c,w〉
will require !φ (!φ is in force in M at 〈c,w〉) just in case they satisfy the corresponding
statement of obligationOφ. In brief: the imperative’s requirement conditions are identified
with its corresponding obligation-statement’s truth-conditions. To say Γ!∪Γ∗ φ (where
Γ! is a set of imperative formulae and Γ∗ a set of non-imperative formulae of LPI) is to say
that whenever a model M and context-world pair 〈c,w〉 require each member of Γ! and
satisfy each member of Γ∗, M and 〈c,w〉 require φ (if φ is imperative) and satisfy φ (if φ
is non-imperative). This strategy preserves close structural parallels between the impera-
tive logic and its deontic cousin. In particular, for any argument form (in)validated by the
former, its deontic cousin—the result of uniformly substituting deontic O for imperative !
in the argument—will be (in)validated by the latter. It also seems to tactfully sidestep the
21. This is actually much too quick. See §4.13 for discussion.
22. Lemmon’s suggestion is superior if we elect to accommodate permissions (which we have been ignoring).
It makes good sense to say that a permission is in force, considerably less sense to say that a permission is
required.
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issue about imperative truth. What we have, then, is a semantics for imperatives in terms
of the model theory for deontic modal logic, but which regards imperatives as expressing
requirements that are either in force or not, deontic formulas as expressing descriptions of
requirements that are true or not, depending on whether those requirements are in force or
not.
What it does not sidestep is a certain sort of hazy methodological worry, one which
someone like Portner would probably endorse: given the essentially performative nature
of imperatives, we have, other things being equal, reason to prefer a unified account of the
semantics and pragmatics of imperatives, and to disprefer semantic accounts which bear
no obvious connection to the performative aspect of imperatives. I share the worry (even
in its hazy state), and try to address it tentatively below. Interlude over. Now back to brass
tacks.
3.4 Conditional Imperatives
Conditional (qualified) imperative constructions like (44a), which we represent schemati-
cally as in (44b), are ubiquitous in natural language.
(44) a. If your boss comes, offer her a seat!
b. (if φ)(stit ψ)
We should like to have some way of representing conditional imperatives in an imperative
logic. The menu of options for doing so is as follows.
3.4.1 Wide-Scoping
A wide-scope treatment of the conditional imperative (if φ)(stit ψ) is any that represents it
with the LPI logical form !(φ→ ψ). Wide-scope treatments will fail to validate argument
forms like the following.
(45) If your boss comes, offer her a seat! [(if φ)(stit ψ)]
Your boss is coming. [φ]
So, offer her a seat! [stit ψ]
It is, for now, an open question whether a logic content should validate such argument
forms (although we try to close it below). More generally, it is an open question whether
modus ponens for conditional imperatives should be validated in a logic of content—
whether a logic of content should have it that stit ψ follows from φ and (if φ)(stit ψ).
Formally, a modus ponens rule for conditional imperatives amounts to the following se-
mantic constraint: if (the logical forms of) φ and (if φ)(stit ψ) are required at w, then (the
logical form of) stit ψ is also required at w.
But no matter whether we endorse modus ponens for conditional imperatives, the
wide-scoper is in trouble. Suppose we endorse it. There are two ways for the wide-scoper
to accommodate this, consistent with the imperative logic we are considering. First, she
might axiomatize the logic or constrain the model theory so that O(φ→ ψ),φ LDL Oψ.
But we have this only on the assumption that, for any M = 〈D,W,C,V 〉, w ∈W , c ∈ C:
v ∈ min(fc(w),≤gc(w)) ⇒ v = w. Adopting this assumption would be disastrous—for
starters, φ→Oφ would be valid in the class of all models for the logic. Obviously this is
a non-starter.
Second, she might utilize the dynamicized entailment relation (“quasi-validity”) de-
tailed at the end of §3.2. This is also a non-starter. Adopting the dynamicized entailment
relation would mean always characterizing the inference of !ψ from !(φ→ ψ) and φ as
23
24 / NATE CHARLOW
valid. But this would be too extreme. Qua logicians of content, and assuming the valid-
ity of modus ponens for conditional imperatives, we would like to have available a logic
which represents inferences of the form (if φ)(stit ψ),φ/stit ψ as valid, without having
it that !ψ should always follow from !(φ→ ψ) and φ. Recall cases (12) and (13). If we
wide-scope, it seems there is no such logic to be had.
3.4.2 Interlude: Modus Ponens
The wide-scoper can object: as Gillies (2008); Kolodny & MacFarlane (2008) show,
modus ponens is not in general valid for natural language conditionals. So we should
not expect its imperative analogue to be valid, in which case the wide-scoper might think
she is off the hook. Consider the following case.
Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but we don’t
know which. Flood waters threaten to flood the shafts. We have enough
sandbags to block one shaft, but not both. If we block one shaft, all
the water will go into the other shaft, killing any miners inside it. If we
block neither shaft, both shafts will fill halfway with water, and just one
miner, the lowest in the shaft, will be killed (Kolodny & MacFarlane
2008: 1).
In such a case, it is reasonable for an authority to endorse any of the imperatives in (46)
(indeed, all of them simultaneously), while failing to endorse any of the imperatives in
(47).23
(46) a. Block neither shaft. [stit(¬bl_A∧¬bl_B)]
b. If they’re in A, block A. [(if in_A)(stit bl_A)]
c. If they’re in B, block B. [(if in_B)(stit bl_B)]
(47) a. Block A. [stit bl_A]
b. Block B. [stit bl_B]
c. Block one of the shafts. [stit(bl_A∨bl_B)]
The lesson of the case is that a logic of content’s analysis of conditional imperatives should
not have it that any of the following semantic relationships hold.
• When φ1 and φ2 partition the set of worlds compatible with the modal base at any
world of evaluation, (if φ1)(stit ψ1) and (if φ2)(stit ψ2) entail stit ψ1 or stit ψ2
or stit(ψ1∨ψ2)
• (if φ1)(stit ψ1), (if φ2)(stit ψ2), φ1∨φ2 entail either stit ψ1 or stit ψ2 or stit(ψ1∨
ψ2)
Violating the first of these relationships is in direct tension with intuitions about the miners
case. Violating the second would mean that adding the premise in_A∨ in_B to premises
(if in_A)(stit bl_A) and (if in_B)(stit bl_B) would allow inferring one of the imperatives
in (47). In which case, on a logic of content, endorsing in_A∨ in_B, (if in_A)(stit bl_A),
and (if in_B)(stit bl_B) would commit an agent to endorsing one of the imperatives in
(47). And this also violates intuitions about the miners case.
23. Interpreting the data in this case is actually a complicated endeavor. I assume one plausible interpretation
here. Kolodny and Macfarlane do a good job disposing of resistance to similar intuitions about sentences identical
save for the uniform replacement of the imperative stit with the deontic ought. I won’t recapitulate here, but it’s
clear that their arguments can be applied mutatis mutandis in defense of the intuitions I am insisting on here.
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Alas, modus ponens for conditional imperatives predicts the second of these rela-
tionships to hold. Suppose (if φ1)(stit ψ1) and (if φ2)(stit ψ2) are required and φ1 ∨φ2
satisfied at w. Thenw satisfies either φ1 or φ2. In either case modus ponens for conditional
imperatives has it that one of stit ψ1 or stit ψ2 is required at w. So it cannot be right.
A fair point—one we return to below—but it does not help the wide-scoper. Suppose
φ1 and φ2 partition the set of worlds compatible with the modal base at any world of
evaluation (we may suppose this is what is going on in Kolodny and MacFarlane’s case)
and O(φ1 → ψ1) and O(φ2 → ψ2) are satisfied. It follows that O(ψ1 ∨ψ2) is satisfied.
Why? When all the best worlds satisfy φ1 → ψ1, φ2 → ψ2, and φ1∨φ2, all the best worlds
satisfy ψ1∨ψ2. In which case O(ψ1∨ψ2) is satisfied and, by the imperative clause of (36),
!(ψ1∨ψ2) is required. A logic of content’s analysis of conditional imperatives should not
have it that, when φ1 and φ2 partition the set of worlds compatible with the modal base at
any world of evaluation, (if φ1)(stit ψ1), (if φ2)(stit ψ2), and φ1∨φ2 entail stit(ψ1∨ψ2).24
Here is the state of play. It seems likely that modus ponens for conditional imperatives
is not generally valid—that we cannot always have it that (if φ)(stit ψ),φ entail stit ψ.
(Whether or not this is right, the wide-scoper is out of luck.) It may yet be possible to
characterize the inference in (45) as valid, in some sense or other, without presupposing
the general validity of modus ponens for conditional imperatives. We return to the issue in
§3.4.4.
3.4.3 Narrow-Scoping
A narrow-scope treatment of the conditional imperative (if φ)(stit ψ) is any that represents
it with the logical form φ→ !ψ. Recall that such formulae are not well-formed formulae
of the Basic Propositional Imperative Language. So adopting a narrow-scope analysis of
the conditional imperative will require redefining the object language. There are several
options for doing so.
Implicitly, we have been taking→ to be defined in terms of¬ and∨: φ→ψ :=¬φ∨ψ.
If, in redefining the imperative language, we elect to keep things this way, the logical form
of the conditional imperative (if φ)(stit ψ) will abbreviate the formula ¬φ∨ !ψ. Earlier,
we provisionally objected to this sort of design, on the grounds that it would be committed
to the ambiguous interpretation of Boolean connectives. But this point needs to be re-
fined, since understanding the imperative analogue of satisfaction in terms of requirement
involves assuming the ambiguity into the metalanguage (in particular, into the meaning of
). The semantic interpretation of ∨ is constant and unambiguous: for all φ, ψ ∈ LPI ,
M, c,w  φ∨ψ iff M, c,w  φ or M, c,w  ψ. What this metalinguistic condition ac-
tually amounts to will depend on the syntactic types (imperative or non-imperative) of φ
and ψ, but it is not clear why that would be worrisome.
But there is a related worry. The semantics may interpret∨ uniformly, but interpreters
do not. When φ and ψ are non-imperative, it is natural to interpret φ∨ψ in terms of its
metalinguistic (English) satisfaction conditions: what φ∨ψ expresses is that φ and/or that
ψ. In contrast, suppose thatψ= !π. We cannot interpret φ∨ψ in terms of its metalinguistic
requirement conditions. There is no accessible reading of φ∨ !π on which it expresses that
φ and/or !π; indeed, there is no accessible reading of this disjunction at all.25
24. Can an account of the permissive content of !(ψ1 ∨ψ2) save the wide-scoper? No. The problem stems
from the command, not the permissive, content of the imperative. It commands something that an authority may
often reasonably demur from commanding.
25. Due to the fact that performatives are not embeddable under the scope of sentential connectives in any
natural language (with the possible exception of negation in languages like Dutch; see Veltman (2008)). Portner
(2008: 379-80) cites examples of embeddings of imperatives under verbs which take a sentential complement in
Korean. While interesting, this is not germane to the issue here.
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I assume it as condition of adequacy on the imperative object language that it not
contain formulas which human language processors are unable to interpret according to
their intended interpretations (and especially that object language representations of nat-
ural language imperative constructions not be uninterpretable in this way). Other authors
(e.g., Segerberg 1990) do not make this assumption, allow imperative formulae to embed
relatively freely, and are happy with treating hypothetical imperatives in terms of Boolean
→. Their primary interest, however, is not in designing a language and model theory
for the eventual purpose of doing serious, formal analysis of natural language. Insofar as
ours is, it is reasonable to restrict the embeddability of imperative formulae in the object
language in this way.
For a narrow-scoper, this means designing an imperative language and semantics with
the following properties: (1) → is not defined in terms of other Boolean connectives, nor
other connectives in terms of it; (2) imperative formulae cannot occur in antecedent posi-
tion26; (3) φ→ !ψ is assigned a non-Boolean interpretation, since there is no accessible
reading of φ→ !ψ on which it expresses that ¬φ and/or !π. This is a daunting project,
and will apparently involve either failing to treat→ univocally (or else failing to treat it as
a Boolean connective altogether). There are dynamic accounts that implement something
like the narrow-scoper’s approach (Asher & Lascarides 2003; Mastop 2005; Potts 2003),
according to which → receives a uniform update potential—one which constrains infor-
mation states so that worlds satisfying the antecedent and compatible with is known meet
a certain condition—satisfying or requiring the consequent, as the case may be. But I have
no idea whether the project could be carried out in a reasonable way in the sort of static,
speaker-focused, model-theoretic framework we are currently working within.27
3.4.4 Two-Place Imperative Operators
Wide-scoping and narrow-scoping have empirical and conceptual drawbacks, respectively.
A different approach—one which analyzes imperatives in terms of the standard account
of modals in natural language as two-place generalized quantifiers—can do better. Our
concern is, as we have said, primarily with formal languages in this paper. Taking this cue
from the semantics of natural language turns out, however, to have tangible benefits.
Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1991) present data suggesting that the general function of
if-clauses in natural language conditionals is to restrict the domain of a two-place gener-
alized quantifier occuring (sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly) in then-clauses. The
surface syntax of natural language conditionals is misleading:
The history of the conditional is the history of a syntactic mistake. There
is no two-place if ... then connective in the logical forms for natural
languages. If-clauses are devices for restricting the domains of various
operators. Whenever there is no explicit operator, we have to posit one
Kratzer (1991: 656).
In order to make the deontic logic we’re working with reflect this insight, we need to re-
construe O as two-place—its first argument restricts the set of accessible worlds, while its
second gives the condition that must be satisfied throughout the domain.
26. Possible complicating data: apparent only if imperatives, like Shoot only if ordered. There is a real
question about whether such constructions are really imperative; informants tend to hear Shoot only if ordered as
you may shoot only if you are ordered. Insofar as the sentence is interpretable as an imperative, though, we can
handle the sentence without sanctioning imperative antecedents: we apparently lose nothing by treating Shoot
only if ordered in the same way we treat If not ordered, do not shoot.
27. For a general critique of these sorts of approaches in the dynamic context, see Charlow (2008b).
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This change is most naturally effected syntactically, i.e., via a change in the language.
We replace the modal clause in the recursive definition of LDL with the following clause.
The resulting language is termed LDLK .
(48) If φ, ψ ∈ LDLK , then O(φ)(ψ) ∈ LDLK
A two-place permission operator P may be defined in terms of O, as follows: P (·)(·) :=
¬O(·)(¬·).
The idea is that a deontic natural language conditional with surface form (if φ)(must ψ)
will generally be associated with the LDLK logical form O(φ)(ψ). When no restrictor is
explicit—when we have a bare natural language modal of surface form must φ—the sen-
tence is associated with the LDLK logical form in which the domain of O is vacuously
restricted: O(⊤)(φ), where ⊤ is a classical propositional tautology.28 The satisfaction
conditions for modal formulas are restated as follows.
(49) M, c,w LDLK O(φ)(ψ) iff
∀v ∈ min(fc(w)∪ JφKM,c,≤gc(w)) :M, c,v LDLK φ
O(φ)(ψ) is satisfied in a modelM at a context-world pair 〈c,w〉 just in case ψ is satisfied
at all the best (in view of what the speaker of c desires at w) admissible φ-worlds.
Two quick notes about the new analysis. First, the accessibility-relation semantics
sketched above would have difficulty with the restrictor analysis of conditional antecedents.
Suppose the source of the ordering-source (the speaker) desires to vote for Obama in the
Democratic primary: she strictly prefers him to any of the other candidates. But she also
strictly prefers Clinton to any of the other candidates, save Obama. The following condi-
tional seems false of her.
(50) If I don’t vote Obama, I ought to vote Gravel. [≈O(¬vote-O)(vote-K)]
There are no worlds compatible with the speaker’s desires where she does not vote Obama,
so the accessibility semantics predicts O(¬vote-O)(vote-K) vacuously true.29 Because an
ordering-source semantics selects best worlds (worlds satisfying enough desires) rather
than ideal worlds (worlds satisfying every desire) for the domain of the modal, it avoids
this prediction.
Second, axiomatizing (constraining the class of models for) the logic is easy enough:
we replace K and D with the following axioms, respectively, and stipulate that they are
valid in the class of all models for LDLK .
(51) O(π)(φ→ ψ)→ (O(π)(φ)→O(π)(ψ))
(52) O(φ)(ψ)→¬O(φ)(¬ψ)
Making use of this logic requires revising the Basic Propositional Imperative Lan-
guage. We replace the imperative clause in the definition of LPI with (53) and term the
new language LPIK .
(53) If φ, ψ ∈ LP, then !(φ)(ψ) ∈ LPIK
28. Obviously, then, a one-place deontic necessity operator is LDLK-definable, in terms O(·)(·).
29. In point of fact, D forbids vacuous truth of deontic necessities. But it is not clear how to avoid it in the
accessibility relation semantics we have stated.
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Finally, following roughly the direction sketched in the analysis of conditional imperatives
of Schwager (2006), we replace the non-Boolean clause of the semantics in (36).30
(54) If φ = !(ψ)(π) (for ψ, π ∈ LP):
M, c,wLPIK φ iff M, c,w LDLK O(ψ)(π)
A restricted imperative !(φ)(ψ) is required/in force inM at 〈c,w〉 just in case ψ is satisfied
at all the best admissible φ-worlds. A conditional imperative (if φ)(stit ψ) will be gen-
erally analyzed as a restricted LPIK imperative—!(φ)(ψ)—while a bare imperative stit φ
will be analyzed as a vacuously restricted imperative—!(⊤)(φ).
Comparison with narrow-scoping. An immediate advantage of this approach over narrow-
scoping is obvious: the posited logical forms for conditional imperatives are directly in-
terpretable (i.e., by us) in terms of their requirement conditions. We may read !(φ)(ψ) as
expressing the restricted command In all the best φ possibilities, stit ψ.
There are also, however, illusory advantages, e.g., those claimed by Schwager (2006).
Schwager claims that this sort of modal semantics is uniquely well-situated to handling
conditional imperatives with overt quantificational material in consequent position. Con-
sider, for example, (55a), the salient reading of which is indicated in (55b):
(55) a. If I need aid, always give it to me!
b. stit(∀w ∈ {w | I need aid at w} : you give me aid at w)
Modeling such constructions is not difficult, given a suitable extension of LPIK . We would
introduce into the language a two-place (i.e., domain-restrictable) necessity modal α(·)(·)
corresponding to the denotation of the quantificational adverbial always (cf. Lewis 1975)
and represent (55a) with the following logical form.
(56) !(⊤)(α(φ)(ψ))
Schwager takes this to be a problem for narrow-scope analyses—and, more generally,
any so-called “hypothetical speech-act” analysis which treats a conditional imperative
(if φ)(stit ψ) as generating an unconditional imperative stit ψ when the antecedent in-
formation φ is, in some sense, available. Any such analysis will, Schwager argues, get
(55a) wrong. To illustrate, narrow-scope analyses are supposedly committed to represent-
ing (55a) with the following logical form.
(57) φ→ !α(⊤)(ψ)
This formula will be required in M at 〈c,w〉 just in case φ is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉
or !α(⊤)(ψ) is required in M at 〈c,w〉. Supposing that φ is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉, it
follows that !α(⊤)(ψ) is required there. But this is surely wrong: supposing I need aid,
the content of my command in (55a) does not require that you always give me aid.
But this is not convincing. Schwager is implicitly supposing that the narrow-scoper
must treat the imperative in (55a) as having the surface form in (58a). In fact, she could
30. While fairly close to the analysis in Schwager (2006), our approach differs materially in two respects. One,
Schwager thinks of natural language imperative operators as literally deontic necessity modals (with exclusively
performative interpretations); we do not. Two, Schwager identifies the modal base with a Stalnakerian Common
Ground (Stalnaker 1978, 2002). Although we regard the modal base as informational, we are agnostic about how
best to characterize it.
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(indeed should) treat it as having the surface form in (58b).
(58) a. (if φ)(stit always ψ)
b. stit((if φ)(always ψ)) [≈ !α(φ)(ψ)]
Nothing blocks the narrow-scoper from (i) distinguishing “genuine” conditional impera-
tives (those treated with surface form (58a)) from “pseudo” conditional imperatives (those
treated with surface form (58b)); and (ii) holding that only genuine conditional imperatives
are covered by her analysis. We will have to content ourselves with a merely conceptual
advantage over narrow-scoping.
Comparison with wide-scoping. Whether or not we endorsed the imperative analogue
of modus ponens, we saw that wide-scope analyses failed. But a wide-scoper might reason-
ably think that a restrictable imperative operator does no better on this score. Choose any
M= 〈D,W,C,V 〉, and suppose, as before, that φ1 and φ2 partition the set of worlds com-
patible with the modal base fc at arbitrary w ∈W . Suppose additionally that O(φ1)(ψ1)
[≈ (if φ1)(stit ψ1)] and O(φ2)(ψ2) [≈ (if φ2)(stit ψ2)] are satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉. It
follows that M, c,w  O(ψ1∨ψ2).
Proof. Choose v ∈
T
fc(w). In view of Monotonicity (32b):
• If v ∈
T
(fc(w)∪ Jφ1KM,c) and v ∈ min(fc(w),≤gc(w)), then
v ∈ min(fc(w)∪ Jφ1KM,c,≤gc(w))
• If v ∈
T
(fc(w)∪ Jφ2KM,c) and v ∈ min(fc(w),≤gc(w)), then
v ∈ min(fc(w)∪ Jφ2KM,c,≤gc(w))
Since φ1 and φ2 partition
T





(fc(w)∪ Jφ2KM,c). It follows that:
• min(fc(w),≤gc(w))⊆
min(fc(w)∪ Jφ1KM,c,≤gc(w))∪min(fc(w)∪ Jφ2KM,c,≤gc(w))
Since O(φ1)(ψ1) and O(φ2)(ψ2) are satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉, we have:
• min(fc(w)∪ Jφ1KM,c,≤gc(w))⊆ Jψ1KM,c
• min(fc(w)∪ Jφ2KM,c,≤gc(w))⊆ Jψ2KM,c
These facts together yield: min(fc(w),≤gc(w)) ⊆ Jψ1KM,c ∪ Jψ2KM,c.
Then, by the semantics for O(·)(·) of (49), O(ψ1∨ψ2) is satisfied in M
at 〈c,w〉.
Then !(ψ1∨ψ2) is requiredM at 〈c,w〉. This is precisely what we took to doom the wide-
scope analysis. No account of these sorts of conditionals on the market—e.g., the shifty
conditionals of Gillies (2008); Kolodny & MacFarlane (2008)—happens to fare any better,
so long as the semantics assumes Monotonicity.
3.4.5 Against Monotonicity
We are not wedded to Monotonocity. Indeed, insofar as there is a rational obligation on
agents to be expected utility maximizers, it seems plausible that we should not be. The
motivating intuition here is that, in ranking possibilities, an agent should, other things
equal, privilege those desires which she can reliably expect to be able to fulfill over those
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desires which she cannot. The more information available to an agent, the more desires
she can reliably expect to fulfill, and the stricter the criteria for remaining at the top of
the ranking. While it is true that a world’s competition in the ranking shrinks with the
addition of information, information acquisition also makes it harder for a world to meet
the demands of the privileged desires. The tension with Monotonicity is obvious.
As noted above, Monotonicity (in our sense) follows directly from the monotonicity
(order-preservingness) with respect to ≤gc(w) of a partial identity function mapping from
a set of worlds into one of its subsets. While we will want to preserve this lowercase
monotonicity—monotonicity of a partial identity function with respect to the preorder we
use to rank worlds—we can still avoid uppercase Monotonicity by letting the ordering-
source vary according to the information contained in a body of relevant information. We
will attempt a sketch of a semantics that implements this idea here.
Suppose we have a modal metalanguage built on top of the Boolean propositional
language LP in which δφ is a term of the language (when φ ∈ LP), roughly to be read as
the (action of) seeing to it that φ, and Ωδφ is a formula of the language, roughly to be read
as the (action of) seeing to it that φ occurs. We will save rigorous development of a modal
language of action and its semantics for our discussion of Propositional Dynamic Logic.
We only use it now to gesture at a way of jettisoning Monotonicity from an ordering-source
semantics.
The intuitive idea is to select the best worlds relative to both an ordering source and
relevant information. Let P ⊆ 2W be a set of propositions.
(59) ch(gc(w),P) is the set of propositions p such that, for some φ and δψ:
JφK = p
T
P ⊆ JΩδψ→ φK
T
P ∩ JΩδψK 6= ∅
To unpack: ch(gc(w),P) gives the set of propositions in gc(w) that are known (by the
lights of the information in P) to be fulfillable by a possible (by the lights of P) action.31
In the terminology of Kolodny & MacFarlane (2008), ch(gc(w),P) gives the set of choices
relative to an ordering source and body of information.32 We next define a preorder ac-
cording to the choices relative to an ordering source and body of information.
(60) v ≤ch(gc(w),P) u iff
{p ∈ ch(gc(w),P) | u ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ ch(gc(w),P) | v ∈ p}
Correspondingly, we redefine the set of best worlds relative to a body of information P
and ordering-source gc(w)—sel(P ,gc(w))—as follows. Note that worlds are ordered ac-
cording to the choices relative to gc(w) and P—i.e., the desires (members of gc(w)) that
are known (by the lights of P) to be satisfiable by a definite course of action.
(61) sel(P ,gc(w)) =
{v ∈
T
P | ∀u ∈
T
P : u≤ch(gc(w),P) v⇒ v ≤ch(gc(w),P) u}
We have at this point shaken the Monotonicity property. It is clearly not the case that a
world that counts as best relative to a set of desires gc(w) and body of information P will
count as best relative to the same set of desires and a more specific body of information
31. It would be interesting to implement this sort of idea probabilistically, so that desires could be ranked
(rather than simply admitted or eliminated) by an agent’s assessment of the likelihood that they will be fulfilled.
Although Yalcin (2007) provides some relevant background, the use of probabilistic methods in formal semantics
is fairly uncharted territory. I leave this to a future project.
32. It is their terminology, but they do not implement the idea in terms of a formal ordering-source semantics
for deontic modals, as we do here.
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P ′. A desire that does not count as a choice relative to a comparatively unspecific body
of information will often count as a choice relative to a comparatively specific body of
information, and it is choices, rather than mere desires, that are used to rank worlds.
To finish the implementation, we rewrite the satisfaction clause for the two-place de-
ontic operator O(·)(·) as follows.
(62) M, c,w LDLK O(φ)(ψ) iff
∀v ∈ sel(fc(w)∪ JφKM,c,gc(w)) :M, c,v LDLK φ
On this semantics, O(φ)(ψ) is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉 iff ψ is satisfied at the best—
according to the choices relative to fc(w)∪JφKM,c and gc(w)—φ-worlds compatible with
fc(w). The requirement conditions for two-place imperatives are left unchanged.
This is enough to block the proof given at the beginning of this section. Since the
apparatus here is very abstract, we will try to make it intuitive by applying it informally
to the problem case of Kolodny & MacFarlane (2008). Suppose the speaker desires that
all ten miners are saved. This desire does not count as a choice relative to the information
available in the basic context, since that information, by supposition, does not settle which
shaft the miners in, and, so, does not settle any definite way of achieving this desire. And
so this desire cannot be used to privilege worlds in which all ten miners are saved. So we
will not generally expect either O(⊤)(bl_A)∨O(⊤)(bl_B) [≈ ought bl_A∨ought bl_B)]
or O(⊤)(bl_A∨ bl_B) [≈ ought(bl_A∨ bl_B)] to come out true with respect to the basic
context. The desire does, however, count as a choice relative to the modal base aug-
mented with the proposition that the miners are in shaft A, and so we will generally expect
O(in_A)(bl_A) [≈ (if in_A)(ought bl_A)] to come out true.
This semantics saves the two-place analysis of the imperative operator from imme-
diate empirical difficulty by avoiding Monotonicity. This means, inter alia, that it cannot
help the wide-scoper. As the reader may easily verify, all of the wide-scoper’s problems
stem from foundational facts about the semantics of deontic logic, and none bear any con-
nection whatever to Monotonicity.
This will for the most part conclude our explicit discussion of conditional imperatives
in this paper, and we will simply take the two-place analysis of imperative and deontic
operators for granted throughout the rest of it. Although conditional imperatives will no
longer be a major topic of interest, the reader should be aware that by placing our focus
on two-place operators, we have essentially placed our focus on conditional imperatives,
and are treating unconditional imperatives as a special case. We turn our attention now to
possible treatments of the Ross Paradox in terms of deontic modal logic.
3.5 The Ross Paradox
The Ross Paradox may be thought to imperil any analysis of imperative logic in terms of
deontic modal logic, for two reasons. First, the following conditional is valid in the class
of all models for deontic modal logic.
(63) Oφ→O(φ∨ψ)
Second, it might be thought that this is the right result: if it ought to be that you post
the letter, then it ought to be that you post or burn it, i.e., It ought to be that you post
the letter does indeed entail It ought to be that you post or burn the letter. While it is
certainly possible to hear It ought to be that you post or burn the letter as expressing a free
choice permission to burn the letter, the free choice reading is demonstrably less salient
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than in the case of the disjunctive imperative Post or burn the letter.33 If that is right, then
the semantics for imperatives we have been developing will need to be modified; it will
predict that !φ !(φ∨ψ).
There is no really systematic way to evaluate intuitions about such cases. But whether
or not the intuitions are correct, we will show that there is no argument here, as such,
against treating imperative logic in terms of deontic logic. In this section, I sketch two
possible lines of response. The first—inspired by the so-called Montague-Scott or Neigh-
borhood Semantics treatment of the problem of logical omniscience—involves rejecting
the intuitions, maintaining the analysis of ! in terms of O, and revising the semantics for
deontic modal logic from the ground up, so that Oφ→ O(φ∨ψ)—or, more accurately,
O(π)(φ) → O(π)(φ∨ψ)—is not valid in the class of all models for the deontic modal
logic. The second involves accepting the intuitions, but adapting to them by formulating
a new analysis on which the imperative operator ! is not treated strictly in terms of the
deontic necessity operator O, but also in terms of the deontic permission operator P .
3.5.1 Neighborhood Semantics
Overview. Neighborhood semantics (a.k.a. Montague-Scott semantics34) is a non-relational
generalization of the relational (Kripke) semantics for modal languages. Neighborhood
models are standardly defined as follows.
(64) M= 〈W,N,V 〉
N : W 7→ 22W
N is a function from worlds to sets of propositions, where N(w) roughly yields the set of
propositions that are necessary (in whatever sense of necessity we are interested in using
the logic to model) at w. Neighborhood semantics alters the relational semantics for a
generic modal formulaφ as follows. Let M= 〈W,N,V 〉 be a neighborhood model.
(65) M,w  φ iff JφKM ∈N(w)
As a function from worlds to sets of propositions, N is a good deal like the conversa-
tional backgrounds (modal bases and ordering-sources) of which we have been making
use throughout the paper. But its role in the semantics is quite different: rather than being
treated as a universal over accessible (best) worlds, the necessity modal simply checks to
see if the proposition expressed by its prejacent is a member of the set of propositions
necessary at a world. Because closure conditions on N are entirely flexible, neighborhood
semantics has an easier time modeling phenomena like the non-closure of knowledge or
belief under logical consequence than the relational semantics.
Application. We have at the ready a natural candidate to play the role of the neighbor-
hood function in our semantics—the erstwhile ordering-source. Let M = 〈D,W,C,V 〉.
The obvious way of extending neighborhood semantics to the basic deontic language is as
33. Interestingly, changing the modal to may seems to reverse some people’s intuitions (and theoretical opin-
ions). Aloni (2007), for example, gives a semantic account of free choice permissions in cases where may scopes
over a disjunction, but a pragmatic account in cases where must scopes over a disjunction. The asymmetry is
unappealing, but I won’t try to directly resist it.
34. See Chellas (1980) for relevant references and background. The idea for using neighborhood semantics
to handle the Ross Paradox originates with Segerberg (1990), and the analysis presented here is heavily indebted
to that paper.
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follows:
(66) M, c,w  Oφ iff JφKM,c ∈ gc(w)
How might we extend this basic idea to the more complicated deontic language LDLK?
The following semantics naturally suggests itself.
(67) M, c,w LDLK O(φ)(ψ) iff
∀v ∈ sel(fc(w)∪ JφKM,c,gc(w)) : JψKM,c ∈ gc(v)
Informally,O(φ)(ψ) is satisfied inM at 〈c,w〉 iffψ is desired at the best—according to the
choices relative to fc(w)∪ JφKM,c and gc(w)—φ-worlds compatible with fc(w). On this
semantics, the ordering-source plays a dual role: while it still functions as an ordering-
source role on worlds, in addition, it directly tells us what sorts of things are required
with respect to every world. The ordering-source plays, in the terminology of Segerberg
(1990), the role of a “command system”—a semantic device designed “to keep track of
the commands issued [or, in our setup, issuable] by the authority” Segerberg (1990: 204).
Some notation will make our life easier, while also bringing out the parallels with
neighborhood semantics as traditionally conceived. We define a “genuine” neighborhood
function GM,c : W 7→ 22
W×2W as follows:
(68) GM,c = λw.{〈JφKM,c,JψKM,c〉 | M, c,w LDLK O(φ)(ψ)}
It follows from this definition that:
(69) M, c,w LDLK O(φ)(ψ) iff 〈JφKM,c,JψKM,c〉 ∈GM,c(w)
The semantic clause for imperative formulae will remain as before. Most of the work
will go into axiomatizing the deontic side of the logic in the appropriate way. To that end,
we put forward the following minimal list of deontic axioms for LDLK :
(70) O(φ)(ψ)→¬O(φ)(¬ψ) [D]
(71) (O(π)(φ)∧O(π)(ψ)) →O(π)(φ∧ψ) [A]
D is a minimal consistency requirement on commands. The logician of content will regard
the Aggregation axiom A as a reasonable “stand-in” for O(π)(φ→ ψ) → (O(π)(φ) →
O(π)(ψ)) [K].35 As Segerberg writes about a similar axiom, “This condition reflects the
fact that when an authority issues commands, then he or she or it means for them all to
be obeyed” (Segerberg 1990: 220). She will, on the other hand, regard neither K nor
NEC—i.e.:  φ ⇒ O(π)(φ)—as desirable additions to the axiomatization.
The case against K: suppose it is required that: you either don’t post the letter (¬φ),
or you either FedEx or burn it (ψ∨χ)—i.e., it is required that: ¬φ∨ (ψ∨χ). Suppose it is
also required that you do post the letter (and that burning entails failure to post).36 Should
35. Strengthening A to a biconditional A+ is out of the question, for two reasons:
• Since φ∧ (¬φ∨ψ)≡ φ∧ψ, O(pi)(φ∧ψ)≡O(pi)(φ∧ (¬φ∨ψ)). Then by A+, we have O(pi)(φ∧
ψ) O(pi)(¬φ∨ψ), and therefore !(pi)(φ∧ψ)  !(pi)(¬φ∨ψ). This is as problematic as the Ross
inference.
• A+ entails K. Proof: suppose A+ and that both O(pi)(φ→ ψ) and O(pi)(φ) are satisfied in M at
〈c,w〉. By A+,O(pi)((φ→ ψ)∧φ) is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉, in which case—since (φ→ψ)∧φ≡
φ∧ψ—O(pi)(φ∧ψ) is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉. By A+, O(pi)(ψ) is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉.
36. There is, I admit, something odd about this constellation of requirements. The first requirement (¬φ∨
(ψ∨χ)) seems to grant permissions (to fail to post, and to burn) that the second takes away. But it is not an
oddness that the view on offer is able to leverage in a defense of K. The view on offer can only explain failure of
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it follow that that you should either FedEx or burn it? Not, I should think, for the logician
of content pursuing the neighborhood semantics resolution of the Ross Paradox: endorsing
stit(¬φ∨(ψ∨χ)) (Either don’t post it, or FedEx or burn it!) and stit φ (Post it!) intuitively
does not commit an agent to endorsing stit(ψ ∨χ) (FedEx or burn it!). Endorsing K is
evidently not consonant with this intuition. The case against NEC is straightforward: we
will not want to predict commands like Torture your little brother, or don’t as everywhere
required.
Particular axiomatizations of the logic will enforce certain conditions on GM,c (and
thereby restrict the class of neighborhood models for the logic). The axioms we have
chosen (D and A) require the following conditions on GM,c(w), respectively. Let M =
〈D,W,C,V 〉 and choose w ∈W , c ∈ C.
(72) a. If 〈JφKM,c,JψKM,c〉 ∈GM,c(w), then 〈JφKM,c,J¬ψKM,c〉 /∈GM,c(w).
b. If 〈JπKM,c,JφKM,c〉 ∈GM,c(w) and 〈JπKM,c,JψKM,c〉 ∈GM,c(w),
then 〈JπKM,c,Jφ∧ψKM,c〉 ∈GM,c(w).
It is evident that we do not, in the axiomatization we have offered, have anything like
general closure under logical consequence:
(73) If 〈p,q〉 ∈GM,c(w) and 〈p,r〉 ∈GM,c(w), then 〈p,s〉 ∈GM,c(w), for s⊇ q∩r.
We have only very circumscribed closure under logical consequence, of the sort required
by the Aggregation axiom. This is, of course, sufficient to block the Ross Paradox.
There are, however, drawbacks, the most significant of which is a failure to say any-
thing about the permissive content of imperatives. The source of the Ross Paradox is the
felt free choice permissions of a disjunctive imperative. Neighborhood semantics for im-
peratives is motivated by this intuition, but tries to do it justice by circumscribing closure
conditions on the neighborhood function. It is not clear what explanans has to do with ex-
planandum. Or, to put it differently, if circumscription of closure conditions is warranted,
then it is warranted in virtue of the permissive content of disjunctive imperatives. A logic
in which that dimension of imperative content is explicitly represented would provide a
more satisfying account of the intuitions behind the Ross Paradox than one in which it is
not.
The failure to explicitly represent permissive content manifests in predictive gaps.
Recall the pair (21a) and (21b), repeated here, which we took tenatively to motivate a
semantic resolution of the Ross Paradox:
(74) a. ?Post or burn the letter. But you may not burn it!
b. ?Post or burn the letter. But do not burn it!
If this data motivates a semantic resolution of the Ross Paradox, then such a resolution
ought to have something to say by way of explaining the data. The neighborhood semantics
resolution of the Ross Paradox explains only the failure of !(π)(φ) to imply !(π)(φ∨ψ),
and does so by appeal to lack of closure of GM,c under logical consequence (cf. 73). The
absence of a closure property cannot be leveraged to explain the oddness of “synchronic”
cancellation constructions. Nor can it be leveraged to explain the oddness of “diachronic”
cancellation constructions, of the sort we used to argue against axiomatizing the neighbor-
hood semantics with K.
Worse, losing K means automatically committing ourselves to a logic of the sort we
entailments, by appeal to lack of certain conditions on the neighborhood function. Because permissive content
is not built into the semantics, the view has nothing to say about inconsistencies in permissive and command
content.
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saw Castaneda arguing for in §2.3 (recall argument pattern 17). This means not gener-
ally being able to draw an imperative conclusion which is weaker (in terms of what it
requires) from imperative premises which are together stronger.37 While this is certainly a
reasonable logic, there is also, we argued, a reasonable logic of content which counts the
argument in (17) valid. We are thus faced with a dilemma: either endorse K (in which
case, in the context of a neighborhood semantics, we predict a close relative of the Ross
inference valid), or reject K (in which case, we are unable to characterize a logic in which
the argument in (17) is valid). Both horns are rather unappealing.
We now move on to consider a treatment of the Ross Paradox that is conservative
with respect to the semantics for deontic logic we have been developing, on which the
relevant work is done by positing explicit permissive content, rather than by fiddling with
the semantics for the O operator.
3.5.2 Permission Analyses
Understanding imperatives as having content along two dimensions—a requiring dimen-
sion (its command content) and a permitting dimension (its permission content)—is a use-
ful way of thinking about imperative content, particularly in connection with the Ross
Paradox. So-called permission analyses of the disjunctive imperative !(φ∨ψ) are distin-
guished by (i) endorsing such a two-dimensional analysis of imperative content and (ii)
holding that the permissive content of !(φ∨ψ), on one reading, expresses permissions
both to see to it that φ and to see to it that ψ.
The most rigorous development of a permission analysis is found in an excellent recent
paper by Maria Aloni (Aloni 2007). Aloni’s idea is to understand the imperative operator
in terms of a single, complex modal operator that expresses requirement of φ∨ψ and free-
choice permission to fulfill this requirement by securing the truth of either disjunct, which
we represent schematically as mayF (φ∨ψ). The idea that imperatives express free-choice
permissions, by itself, only gets us a little way to a solution, however, since the paradox of
free-choice permission—very roughly, the problem of how to explain why mayF (φ∨ψ),
on a salient interpretation, implies both may φ and may ψ—is, as already noted, a vexing
puzzle in its own right.
Alternative Semantics. The key to Aloni’s analysis is an idea borrowed from recent
work on the semantics and pragmatics of questions (see especially Aloni & van Rooy
2002). We understand disjunctions as being associated with (“inducing”) alternatives. Al-
ternatives in turn serve as the objects of higher-order intensional or dynamic operators. In
the case of questions, we have a dynamic question operator which adds alternatives to a list
of topics under consideration (“at issue”) in a dialogue; roughly, if φ is on the list of top-
ics, then whether or not φ is an issue of interest in the dialogue. A polar (yes/no) question
?(φ∨ψ)♯38 fails to induce genuine alternatives (which we model as a singleton alternative
set {φ∨ψ}, the contents of which the question operator adds to the conversational topic
list). A choice-presenting question ?(φ♯ ∨ψ♯) presents both φ and ψ as issues of interest;
its alternative set is given as {φ,ψ}. An illustration: (75) is ambiguous between (76a)
37. In this respect, the resulting logic will bear some similarity to that of Kenny (1966) (see §2.4). This is not
to say the logic will be, like Kenny’s, nonmonotonic. The neighborhood logic requires that an imperative conclu-
sion be at least as strong as some non-empty subset of premise imperatives, and this will make the corresponding
entailment relation monotonic. Kenny’s logic requires that an imperative conclusion be at least as strong as the
entire premise set; this is what is responsible for its nonmonotonicity.
38. Superscripts indicate placement of focal stress. On the semantic relationship between focus and salient
alternatives in such linguistic phenomena as ellipsis resolution and presupposition see, e.g., Charlow (2008c);
Rooth (1992).
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(polar) and (77a) (choice-presenting).
(75) Do you like Rori or Uni?
(76) a. (...Rori or Uni)♯? [≈ ?(φ∨ψ)♯]
b. Yes/no.
(77) a. ...(Rori)♯ or (Uni)♯? [≈ ?(φ♯∨ψ♯)]
b. *Yes/no.
When stress is unfocused (76a), a single issue (whether φ∨ψ) is under discussion, and a
yes/no answer is appropriate. When stress is focused (77a), there are two topics of interest
(whether φ, whether ψ). Without elaboration: yes/no fails to answer the question.
Aloni (2007) suggests analyzing the imperative operator as a bi-dimensional require-
ment/ permission modal over alternatives induced by its complement. Informally, the al-
ternatives induced by the complement of the imperative operator represent permitted ways
of complying with the command (Aloni 2007: 87). Imperatives whose complements in-
duce genuine alternatives expressly permit multiple modes of compliance. Choice offering
readings of disjunctive imperatives are associated with non-singleton alternative sets; no-
choice readings are not.
Aloni’s actual implementation is complex (and, we will see, may be significantly sim-
plified). She introduces a higher-order extension of a first-order deontic language—one
distinguished by its use of propositional quantification—to serve as the imperative object
language, in which logical forms are given. The logical form of a genuine alternative-
inducing disjunction is given as ∃p(p∧ (p = φ∨ p = ψ)) (to be read: something holds,
either φ or ψ) and that of a non-alternative-inducing disjunction as ∃p(p∧ p = φ∨ψ) (to
be read: something holds, namely φ∨ψ). There are various methods of generating a set
of alternatives, alt(π) (where π is a formula in the object language), from such logical
forms,39 but they will not be our concern here. Free choice readings of disjunctive imper-
atives are analyzed as in (78a), no-choice readings as in (78b). The imperative operator is
defined in terms of modals and alternative sets (79).
(78) Analysis of imperatives.




b. ∇(φ1, ...,φn) := [P ](φ1, ...,φn)∧O(φ1∨ ...∨φn)
c. [P ](φ1, ...,φn) := Pφ1∧ ...∧Pφn
(80) Definitional identities.
a. !∃p(p∧ (p= φ∨p= ψ)) := (Pφ∧Pψ)∧O(φ∨ψ)
b. !∃p(p∧p= φ∨ψ) := P (φ∨ψ)∧O(φ∨ψ)
A free choice permission sentence mayF (φ∨ψ) is analyzed with the logical form [P ]alt(∃p(p∧
(p = φ∨ p = ψ))), i.e., Pφ∧Pψ. Free choice disjunctive imperatives are thus analyzed
in terms of free choice permissions and no-chice requirements: they express that either
disjunct is permitted, at least one required.40 We have already discussed why this blocks
39. For a baroque method, see Aloni (2007: 72-5). For something a bit less baroque (but also less general)
that relies only on tweaking of the assignment function for propositional variables, see Charlow (2008a).
40. For epistemic may, Aloni’s proposal is equivalent to the much-discussed proposal of Zimmermann (2000),
which analyses disjunctions as conjunctions of epistemic possibilities, rendering mayF (φ∨ψ) as 3e(3eφ∧
3eψ). Where Aloni’s analysis comes into its own is disjunctions scoped under deontic may—something for
which Zimmermann has no story.
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the Ross Paradox.
Integrating the two-place treatment of deontic and imperative operators is a matter of
construing ∇ as having a restriction argument, and allowing the restriction to percolate
downward.
(81) a. !(φ)(ψ) :=∇(φ)(alt(ψ))
b. ∇(φ)(ψ1, ...,ψn) := [P ](φ)(ψ1, ...,ψn)∧O(φ)(ψ1 ∨ ...∨ψn)
c. [P ](φ)(ψ1, ...,ψn) := P (φ)(ψ1)∧ ...∧P (φ)(ψn)
Simplification. Given that there is no real explanation of when the use of (78a) in a for-
mal representation of a disjunctive imperative is preferable to (78b), it is not quite clear
what Aloni’s complication of the object language ultimately accomplishes. We might in-
stead try an account that left the object language as before, while “associating” disjunctive
imperatives directly with one or other of their proposed deontic logical forms. This would
have to be done in a particular way. We do not want, for example, to associate formulae
of LPIK with multiple logical forms in LDLK—one for a free choice or no-choice interpre-
tation, as the case may be—for two reasons. First, and more critically, we do not wish
to make the interpretation of an imperative formula in LPIK indeterminate. This is ex-
actly what association with multiple logical forms will accomplish. One tangible benefit
of Aloni’s analysis is the banishment of ambiguity from the “imperative” object language.
Second, we do not want to give imperative formulae non-imperative logical forms at all.
Modal analyses of the imperative do not have to be eliminativist.41 We can give require-
ment conditions for imperative formulae in terms of satisfaction-conditions for deontic for-
mulae, without holding that, for example, the imperative operator is literally any species
of deontic operator (cf. §3.3).
We will present an analysis in a similar spirit as Aloni’s that avoids recourse to an op-
ulent object language, while avoiding both interpretative indeterminacy and eliminativism
about imperative logic. The crucial work is done by assuming that context determines
salient alternatives for a disjunctive imperative. We will not complicate the context param-
eter any further, although a realistic treatment of how salient alternative sets are generated
for disjunctive imperatives in natural language would have to pay attention to features of
context that we are not attempting to represent in our model theory, focus values especially.
Instead, we look to the ordering-source and modal base to determine salient alternatives.
Disjunctive imperatives receive free choice interpretations by default; no choice interpre-
tations are invoked only in contexts where the modal base provides decisive information
about what is permissible in view of the desires of the speaker.
For technical reasons having to do with the mechanics of the two-place imperative op-
erator, we define salient alternatives for imperative formulae of LPIK , rather than formulae
of LP, doing so inductively, as follows.
(82) a. altM,c,w[!(π)(p)] = p
b. altM,c,w[!(π)(¬φ)] = ¬φ
c. Given φ = !(π)(ψ1 ∨ ...∨ψn), let optM,c,w(φ) =
{ψi |
T
fc(w) * JP (π)(ψi)KM,c and
T
fc(w)* J¬P (π)(ψi)KM,c}
If optM,c,w(φ) 6= ∅, altM,c,w(φ) = optM,c,w(φ)
Otherwise, altM,c,w(φ) = φ∨ψ
41. Strictly speaking, there are two ways for an imperative logic to be eliminativist. One, by defining imper-
ative formulae as non-imperative formulae. Two, by identifying satisfaction-conditions for imperative formulae
with those of non-imperative formulae. Aloni’s account is eliminativist in both ways, as is Schwager’s. Avoiding
the incredulous stare seems to require both an autonomous imperative object language and denying that impera-
tives have satisfaction-conditions at all.
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Genuine alternatives are induced by default by a disjunctive imperative !(π)(φ∨ψ), absent
information that settles the question of the permissibility of φ or ψ (if π) independently.
This is a crude way of generating salient alternatives, but it will do for our purposes. We
finish the simplification by revising the requirement conditions for imperatives to incorpo-
rate salient alternatives.
(83) If φ = !(π)(ψ) (for π, ψ ∈ LP):
M, c,wLPIK φ iff M, c,w LDLK ∇(π)(altM,c,w(φ))
Simplicity has its virtues. This account is no less explanatory than Aloni’s, which explains
the difference between free choice and no-choice interpretations of disjunctive imperatives
by appeal to properties of their salient alternatives, without giving any account of when
certain salient alternatives are generated over others. This account does at least as well—
indeed, better, insofar as we provide a precise (if crude) account of how alternative sets
are generated—and meanwhile avoids purposeless complication of the object language.
We also avoid the above-mentioned indeterminacy of interpretation with respect to LPIK :
no difference in logical form is associated with free choice and no-choice interpretations,
and both are handled with a single clause of the semantics. Requirement conditions for
disjunctive imperatives will depend on facts about context, but we have been committed to
this from the beginning.
It is worth noting in closing that our differences with Aloni are not merely method-
ological. On account of her modal eliminativism about imperative logic, Aloni does not
elect (as we do) to utilize an imperative object language in which requirement conditions
for disjunctive imperatives can vary with facts about context. Because of this, she (along
with any modal eliminativist who endorses a permission analysis of the Ross Paradox)
cannot do full justice to the Ross Paradox. Consider the paradox in its original form.
(84) !φ 6 !(φ∨ψ)
The account we have given predicts something very close in form to this:
(85) !(φ)(ψ) 6 !(φ)(ψ∨π)
We have defined imperative entailment in terms of preservation of modal satisfaction in
all models and at all context-world pairs. Because there are contexts in which the modal
base does not provide decisive information about what is permissible, there are obviously
models M and context-world pairs 〈c,w〉 such that M, c,w  ∇(φ)(ψ), but M, c,w 2
∇(φ)(ψ∨π).
The best a modal eliminativist can do is say that the LDLK logical form associated
with a free choice interpretation of !(φ)(ψ ∨π) is not entailed by the LDLK logical form
of !(φ)(ψ). (But, of course, we knew that already, de re anyway.) The Ross Paradox is
explained away as a side-effect of coarse-grainedness in the formal imperative language—
its inability to effectively represent the differences between the relevant logical forms.
Insofar, then, as we are inclined not to endorse an error theory about the Ross Paradox, we
will be inclined to reject the modal eliminativist’s analysis of it.
How do we do with the problems for the neighborhood semantics account of the Ross
Paradox? The oddness of synchronic cancellation constructions is explained by appeal
to the default permissive content of the disjunctive imperative. So long as Post or burn
the letter! (on the default interpretation) is required in M at 〈c,w〉, it cannot be the case
that Do not burn the letter! is also required in M at 〈c,w〉. The permission expressed
by the former is simply inconsistent with the command content of the latter. Similarly
for diachronic cancellation constructions: Either don’t post the letter, or FedEx or burn it!
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expresses, on the default interpretation, a permission that it is inconsistent with Post the
letter!. These imperatives cannot both be required in M at 〈c,w〉. FedEx or burn it! fol-
lows from them only in the degenerate sense that everything follows from a contradiction.
Insofar as logicians of content do not wish to commit agents who endorse imperatives ex-
pressing inconsistent permissions and commands to endorsing everything, they can require
that, for an argument form to be valid, there be at least one model and context-world pair
in which all the premise imperatives are required.
Note that, on this tack, we still have K for deonticO. This means we can, if we please,
endorse the validity of (17).42 What we cannot endorse is an imperative analogue of K:
(86) If M, c,w !(π)(φ→ ψ) and M, c,w !(π)(φ), then M, c,w !(π)(ψ).
But this is a natural consequence of understanding imperative operators as bi-dimensional—
!(π)(ψ) may express a permission with which !(π)(φ) is inconsistent. In cases where it
does not (such as 17), the argument from !(π)(φ→ ψ) and !(π)(φ) to !(π)(ψ) is generally
predicted good.
3.6 Conclusion
The object of this section was to devise a logic of content for a formal imperative language
in terms of a relatively standard model theory for deontic languages. We did this, and
showed that, suitably amended, it could be extended to a palatable analysis of conditional
imperatives and the Ross Paradox. In the next section, we shift our focus to dynamic
logics of planning. The desiderata for such logics remain fairly constant: we will pursue a
semantics in terms of the model theory for a deontic modal language, and argue that it too
can handle conditional imperatives as well as the Ross Paradox. Shifting to more powerful
dynamic and deontic object languages will introduce extra complexity to our project (while
also bringing some rewards), but our overarching target—developing a model theory for a
formal imperative language that hews closely to the model theory for a deontic language—
will remain basically the same.
4 DYNAMIC DEONTIC LOGIC OF ACTION
Dynamic accounts of the imperative come in two distinct flavors. Both are, at first pass,
most consonant with the motivations that underlie logics of planning. First, there are ac-
counts of how imperatives govern the planning behavior of agents, where the notion of
government is understood in a static sense. Imperatives are seen to govern planning be-
havior via embodying constraints on the way an agent may interact with her surroundings
at a given point in time (rather than via effecting changes on the agent’s planning behav-
ior). Despite employing a static (i.e., synchronic) notion of government, such accounts are
nevertheless dynamic, in the important sense that they view imperatives as constraining the
ways agents may effect transitions between “states” of the world and are most naturally
implemented with a Propositional Dynamic Logic of Action (PDLA), in which (i) we have
an object language that is capable of representing actions and of expressing claims about
how actions affect the world; (ii) actions are typed as relations between states of the world.
42. A thorny issue: supposing φ→ ψ abbreviates ¬φ∨ψ, we have it that the premise imperatives of (17)
are default inconsistent. stit: if you read the book, you come see me expresses by default a permission (not
to read the book) that is inconsistent with stit: you read the book. This does not seem right, which pushes us
toward a language in which (i) φ→ ψ does not abbreviate ¬φ∨ψ, (ii) φ→ ψ and ¬φ∨ψ are truth-functionally
equivalent in non-imperative contexts, but (iii) not generally intersubstitutable in imperative contexts, on account
of the syntactic sensitivity of the method of salient alternative generation mechanism, which has disjunctions as
alternative-presenting by default, implications not.
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The PDLA approach will be the focus of this section of the paper.
Second, there are accounts of the imperative that are dynamic in the sense of Groe-
nendijk & Stokhof (1991); Veltman (1996). Such accounts are in the business of modeling
the obligation-imposing function of imperatives. They also regard imperatives as govern-
ing planning behavior, but give the notion of government a dynamic (diachronic) gloss:
imperatives govern planning behavior by effecting diachronic changes on an agent’s plans,
rather than by embodying synchronic constraints on an agent’s planning behavior. Such
accounts are not necessarily semantic in character—indeed, the most prominent example
of such in the linguistics literature style themselves as pragmatic accounts of the context
change potentials of imperative utterances. As we shall see, however, there is a natural way
of leveraging imperative context change potentials for the sake of formulating a genuine
Dynamic Semantics for the Imperative (DSI). We will tackle these issues in the subsequent
section of the paper.
As we will also see, and pace Portner (2008), there is no reason to see these dis-
tinct conceptions of imperative dynamics as standing in any sort of opposition to one an-
other. Accounts in the vein of PDLA model something worth modeling, as do accounts
in the vein of DSI. What’s more, it’s clear that the phenomena they are in the business of
modeling—synchronic and diachronic constraints on planning behavior, respectively—are
closely interrelated. I take this to motivate the development of formal apparatus that can
fill the theoretical needs of both kinds of dynamic account. Trying to do justice to this
motivation will be an important theme of the remainder of the paper.
4.1 Language
We begin by complicating our imperative and deontic object languages, so that both are
capable of talking about actions and their effects on the world.43 There are good reasons
for doing this, in the context of a logic of planning. The structure of planning is prima facie
distinct from the structure of desiring. Desires provide goals. Planning is reasoning about
how an agent may act to achieve those goals. In representing planning, it is useful, then,
to have an object language that is capable of talking about actions. Planning also involves
reasoning about the consequences of actions on an agent’s future planning: agents often
engage in reasoning at a given time t how certain courses of action will introduce con-
straints on their behavior at a later time t′, in view of the various hypothetical constraints
on planning behavior that are in force at t. In representing this facet of planning, it is use-
ful to have an object language that is capable of stating which formulas of the imperative
language (corresponding to future constraints on planning) are in force at later states of
the world, supposing the execution of some course of action from the present state of the
world. It is also, of course, useful for our object language to be capable of representing, at
least crudely, some kind of temporality—minimally, some sort of distinction between an
agent’s plans for the “present” (and the constraints impinging on her planning at present)
and an agent’s plans for different points in the future (and the constraints impinging on her
planning at different points in the future). The language we define in this section is capable
of all this, and more.
43. In designing the language and giving its semantics, we follow Segerberg (1990) closely, although there are
some crucial differences. For example: (i) Segerberg allows imperative formulae to be embedded under the scope
of Boolean operators, and we do not; (ii) Segerberg utilizes a monadic imperative operator, handling conditional
imperatives in terms of Boolean →, while we continue to insist on a dyadic imperative operator. Corresponding
differences manifest in the semantics.
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4.1.1 The Imperative Language LILA
We first augment the alphabet, so that it consists of:
(87) Alphabet.
The Boolean propositional language LP.
A dyadic imperative operator !(·)(·)
An action operator δ
A modular modal operator [ · ]
The regular operations + and ;
We construct a set of terms TILA recursively.
(88) TILA is the smallest set such that:
If φ ∈ LP, then δφ ∈ TILA.
If α, β ∈ TILA, then α;β ∈ TILA.
If α, β ∈ TILA, then α+β ∈ TILA.
Terms are the action expressions of the language. As before δφ is interpreted as the action
of seeing to it that φ. Roughly, α;β designates the complex action of performing α then
β, while α+β designates the complex action of performing at least one of α or β. The
imperative language of action LILA is defined recursively as follows.
(89) Definition of LILA.
If φ ∈ LP, then φ ∈ LILA
If φ ∈ LP and α ∈ TILA, then !(φ)(α) ∈ LILA
If α ∈ TILA and φ ∈ LILA, then [α]φ ∈ LILA.
Nothing else in LILA.
Two comments about this new language. First, the left argument of the imperative operator
continues to function as a restriction argument, while the right argument is now filled by an
action, rather than a proposition. This is a natural amendment: imperatives command (and
permit) actions in certain situations. Second, the language comes stocked with an infinite
supply of dynamic modal operators {[α] | α ∈ TILA}. The modal formula [α]φ is to be
read as in all the states accessible by executing α, φ. Note that dynamic modal operators
can have imperative complements. This fact will be of considerable use to us in giving a
semantics and pragmatics for complex imperatives of the form !(φ)(α;β).
4.1.2 The Deontic Language LDLA
To build this language, we replace the two-place imperative operator !(·)(·) with a two-
place deontic necessity operator O(·)(·) in the alphabet. The recursive definition of the
language is unchanged, except for the replacement of the imperative clause with a cor-
responding clause for O(·)(·), and a clause allowing Boolean combinations of arbitrary
formulas of LDLA (which we do not bother stating).
(90) If φ ∈ LDLA and α ∈ TILA, then O(φ)(α) ∈ LDLA.
Note that the prohibition on imperative formulas occurring in restrictor position is not
extended to the deontic language: deontic formulas may function as restriction arguments
for O.
This requires modifying the set of terms for LDLA—TDLA—specifically, it requires
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allowing actions to be made out of arbitrary formulas of the language.
(91) TDLA is the smallest set such that:
If φ ∈ LDLA, then δφ ∈ TDLA.
If α, β ∈ TDLA, then α;β ∈ TDLA.
If α, β ∈ TDLA, then α+β ∈ TDLA.
Clearly, there is no one-one mapping from TILA to TDLA—expressions like δ!(π)(δφ) are
not terms of TILA, while expressions like δO(π)(δφ) do count as terms of TDLA.
4.2 Models and To-Do Lists
We complicate models to accommodate the extra complexity of the languages.
(92) M= 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉
D, W , V are typed as before.
A⊆ 2W×W is a set of actions (relations on states).
∆ : 2W 7→ A corresponds to the denotation of δ.
C ⊆D×D×I×T , where I = {i | i⊆W}, T = {t | t⊆A}
There are two changes worth noting. First, we add an algebra of actions for the sake of
interpreting the practical part of our language (and a function mapping from propositions
into this algebra). Actions are typed as relations on states. Conceiving of the elements of
the universe as states of the world, rather than “whole” worlds, is conceptually perhaps
significant, but mathematically insignificant. Doing so allows us to build a sort of tempo-
rality into the logic—actions are understood to relate prior states of the world to posterior
states of the world, which will frequently differ in the formulas they satisfy. This enhances
the logic’s realism, while avoiding the complexities of temporal logic.
Second, we will be provisionally replacing the conversational backgrounds of the ear-
lier models with simpler entities: world-invariant sets of worlds (rather than functions
from worlds into sets of propositions) in the case of the modal base; world-invariant sets
of actions, in the case of the ordering-source. For our purposes, letting the modal base
be a world-invariant set of worlds, rather than a genuine Kratzer-ian conversational back-
ground is harmless. Letting the ordering-source be a world-invariant set of actions turns
out to be less innocuous, but has a temporary dialectical justification—something close to
it is a casual assumption in recent work on the pragmatics of imperatives (see, e.g., Isaacs
& Potts 2003; Portner 2004, 2008; Potts 2003), and we will want to show why it needs to
be discarded.44
Because our focus has shifted away from speaker commitments to planning (addressee
constraints), we need to reconceive the context parameter of the semantics.
(93) A context c ∈ C = 〈sc,ac, ic, tc〉
ic ∈ I is the relevant information (modal base) in c
tc : D 7→ I is a function from individuals to their To-Do Lists in c
To-Do Lists are glossed in different ways in the contemporary literature on the pragmat-
ics of imperatives. Ninan (2005) (following Portner 2004), for example, conceives them
as sets of intentions (in our setup, sets of intended actions).45 Portner (2008), on the
44. See §4.10 for further discussion of these points.
45. Or, more accurately, sets of public intentions—propositions such that it is Common Ground in c that an
individual intends to fulfill them. This difference is unimportant for our purposes here.
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other hand, glosses them as sets of actions to which an individual is committed.46 Ni-
nan’s gloss falters on the fact that To-Do Lists have an action-constraining role to play
in our modeling; it is not clear how an agent’s actual intentions are supposed to constrain
her planning, if at all (cf. the classic discussion of “bootstrapping” in Bratman 1987).
Portner’s gloss does better—an agent’s commitments clearly generate constraints on her
planning—although the intended sense of “commitment” is unclear and ripe for idiosyn-
cratic interpretation. I propose a more minimal understanding of To-Do Lists for present
purposes, along the lines of the “command sets” of Segerberg (1990). To-Do Lists just are
sets of requirements on the agent’s planning. They do not generate constraints; they just
are constraints. Further development of the formal apparatus will clarify what is meant by
this.
4.3 Semantics for Action Formulas
Satisfaction conditions for Boolean formulas are trivial and we omit them here. In giving
the semantics for action formulas,47 we begin by extending the interpretation function
J·KM,c (mapping from pieces of the relevant language to their intensions, relative to a
model M and context c) to cover terms of our languages. Let M= 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be
a model and c a context in C. Then:
(94) a. JδφKM,c = ∆JφKM,c
b. Jα+βKM,c = JαKM,c∪ JβKM,c
c. Jα;βKM,c = JαKM,c ◦ JβKM,c
Note: Φ◦Ψ = {〈w,v〉 |∃u : 〈w,u〉 ∈Φ∧〈u,v〉 ∈Ψ}. We lay down a statement of satisfac-
tion conditions for the “action-representing” parts of LILA and LILA simultaneously, saving
the semantics for imperative and deontic formulae until we have a bit more apparatus in
place. Let M= 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model, c a context in C, and w a state in W . Then:
(95) M, c,wLILA/LDLA [α]φ iff
∀v : 〈w,v〉 ∈ JαKM,c ⇒M, c,vLILA/LDLA φ
We will want to enforce the following conditions on the ∆ operation. Let P ⊆W .
(96) a. If 〈w,v〉 ∈ ∆P , then v ∈ P .
[Equivalent to axiomatizing with [δφ]φ]
b. If, for any v, 〈w,v〉 ∈ ∆P ⇒ v ∈ P ′,
then 〈w,u〉 ∈ ∆P ⇒ 〈w,u〉 ∈ ∆P ′.
[Equivalent to axiomatizing with [δφ]ψ→ ([δψ]π→ [δφ]π)]
As is easy to check, we have the following formulae valid in the class of all models for the
logic.
(97) a. [α+β]φ↔ [α]φ∧ [β]φ
[α+β always terminates in a φ-state iff both α and β do]
b. [α;β]φ↔ [α][β]φ
[α;β always terminates in a φ-state iff every α-accessible state w is such that
every state β-accessible from w is a φ-state]
46. Portner demurs from giving a realistic treatment of action, choosing to use properties as stand-ins for
actions in his account. As we see, modeling certain phenomena about the imperative requires something a bit
more subtle.
47. This part of the semantics is simply lifted from Segerberg (1990: 206-9).
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4.4 Conditions on Models
Before giving the semantics for the “difficult” parts of our languages, we want to make sure
that the models—their To-Do List parameters, in particular—are well-behaved. We will
restrict the class of models for our languages to those satisfying the minimal conditions
put forward in this section. Let M= 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model, c = 〈sc,ac, ic, tc〉 be
a context in C, and d be an arbitrary individual in D. We first require that constraints never
conflict with one another.
(98) If Φ1 ∈ tc(d) and Φ2 ∈ tc(d), then Φ1∩Φ2 6= ∅ [CON]
While an agent can have incompatible desires, we suppose that planning constraints of the
sorts enforced by imperatives must be consistent with one another.48
Additionally, we require that any non-absurd action on a To-Do List at a context be
available—possible, that is to say, given the context-relevant information. There are two
ways to enforce the intuition behind this requirement.
(99) If Φ ∈ tc(d) and Φ 6= ∅, then, for some 〈w,v〉 ∈Φ, w ∈ ic [AV1]
(100) For some w ∈ ic, v: if Φ ∈ tc(d) and Φ 6= ∅, then, 〈w,v〉 ∈Φ [AV2]
We temporarily regard information states as supplying the relevant possible input states
for an agent’s action. (As we see in §4.7, it is somewhat more perspicuous to regard them
as supplying information about more than possible input states.) AV1 has it that an action
cannot occur on a To-Do List if the information rules out the possibility of it being per-
formed. For example, an agent cannot bound by a constraint to maintain φ unless some
input states are φ-states. AV2 is a strengthening of AV1: it has it that every action on the
To-Do List is simultaneously executable at some state compatible with the c-relevant infor-
mation. AV2, then, amounts to a global realism constraint on To-Do Lists (or, alternatively,
an ideality constraint on modal bases): constraints must be simultaneously satisfiable with
respect to the information at the context. AV2 is plausible. Supposing for now that con-
straints on To-Do Lists reliably generate corresponding obligations—i.e., true descriptions
of obligation—and that obligations aggregate, this is a natural assumption to make. So we
will make it.49
We might contemplate adding one of the following two closure conditions:
(101) If Φ1 ∈ tc(d), Φ2 ∈ tc(d), and Φ1∩Φ2 ⊆Φ3, then Φ3 ∈ tc(d) [CL1]
(102) If Φ1 ∈ tc(d), Φ2 ∈ tc(d), then Φ1∩Φ2 ∈ tc(d) [CL2]
CL1 requires, inter alia, that To-Do Lists are closed under intersection, union, and arbitrary
expansion (so it is stronger than CL2). CL1 entails, inter alia, that constraints on planning
both distribute and aggregate (as, e.g., in 103a and 103b), while CL2 entails that they
aggregate (as, e.g., in 103b).
(103) a. If Jδ(φ→ ψ)KM,c ∈ tc(d) and JδφKM,c ∈ tc(d), then JδψKM,c ∈ tc(d)
b. If JδφKM,c ∈ tc(d) and JδψKM,c ∈ tc(d), then Jδ(φ∧ψ)KM,c ∈ tc(d)
48. Because, as we shall soon see, To-Do Lists are in the business of directly generating obligations for an
agent, CON amounts to a To-Do List analogue of the D axiom: Oφ→¬O¬φ.
49. As we will be using To-Do Lists as ordering-sources for deontic formulas of our new deontic object
language, AV2 is also a strengthened version of the Limit Assumption. Instead of merely requiring that there be
best worlds in the modal base, AV2 will require that there be ideal worlds—worlds compatible with the execution
of every constraint—in the modal base. Again, while this would not be plausible for a bouletic ordering-source
(in view of incompatible desires), it is plausible for an ordering-source constituted by binding constraints.
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It is natural to have the following set of intuitions about these conditions. Thinking ahead,
and exploiting the sorts of intuitions that Segerberg (1990) uses to motivate his above-
discussed restrictions on Command Systems, we might object to CL1, on the grounds that,
down the line, there is reason to expect it to cause difficulty for attempting a resolution the
Ross Paradox. We might also endorse CL2, on the grounds that the constraint on planning
that imperatives enforce intuitively ought to aggregate. These intuitions presuppose that
To-Do Lists have no role to play in a planning semantics for imperatives, besides being
devices for keeping track of requirements on agents. The presupposition is, as we are
about to see, inapt. And as we see a bit later on: (i) our preferred resolution of the Ross
Paradox in this framework cares naught about closure conditions on To-Do Lists (§4.11);
(ii) CL2 is unnecessary to secure the desired results about aggregation of obligations and
constraints on planning. CON and AV2 are sufficient to get a semantics for the deontic
and imperative action languages going. Simplicity, when available, is a virtue, and we will
stick with them for the moment.
We begin building such a semantics now. Note that the analyses presented in the
subsequent few sections are only a first pass, and modifications will have to be made
to accommodate conditional imperatives, the Ross Paradox, and “higher-order” types of
imperative. As in our discussion in the prior half of the paper, we will introduce these
modifications piecemeal, as the occasion demands.
4.5 Orderings on Transitions
In shifting our interest from a logic of content to a logic of planning, we also implicitly
shifted the sort of deontic modality we would be interested in modeling. For most of
this paper, we have been interested in a kind of bouletic deontic modality—obligation in
the view of the desires of a potential issuer of an imperative. In formulating a logic of
planning, it is natural to shift our attention to obligation in view of the constraints that bear
on an agent’s planning.
Going with what has worked for us, this naturally means allowing To-Do Lists to
fill the semantic role we have allowed speaker-related bouletic ordering-sources to play.50
Since To-Do Lists are typed differently than ordering-sources—the former being sets of
relations onW , the latter sets of subsets ofW—the appropriate extension is not immediate.
We first use To-Do Lists to define a preorder on W ×W . The resulting ordering
is on inter-state transitions, rather than worlds. Let c be an arbitrary context, and d an
arbitrary individual. (Implicitly, these definitions are all with respect to a model, but we
will continue to economize on notation by suppressing this.)
(104) 〈v,v′〉 ≤tc(d) 〈u,u′〉 iff
{Φ ∈ tc(d) | 〈u,u′〉 ∈Φ} ⊆ {Φ ∈ tc(d) | 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ}
A transition 〈v,v′〉 is at least as good as a transition 〈u,u′〉 with respect to a To-Do List
tc(d) iff for every action Φ in tc(d) of which 〈u,u′〉 is a transition, 〈v,v′〉 is a transition of
Φ.
In a logic of action, it is most natural to treat modals as quantifiers over inter-state
transitions, rather than states simpliciter. In this vein, we define the domain of the deontic
necessity modal with respect to a set of input states (information-state) p, set of output
50. Portner (2008) is, to my knowledge, the first (i) to notice the natural connection between To-Do Lists
and the interpretation of certain commitment-describing root modals, and (ii) to propose accounting for this
connection by utilizing To-Do Lists as the ordering-sources for such modals.
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states q, and To-Do List tc(d)—min[p× q,≤tc(d)]—as follows.
(105) min[p× q,≤tc(d)] is the set of all 〈v,v′〉 ∈ p× q such that:
∀〈u,u′〉 ∈ p× q : 〈u,u′〉 ≤tc(d) 〈v,v
′〉 ⇒ 〈v,v′〉 ≤tc(d) 〈u,u
′〉
The best state-to-state transitions 〈v,v′〉 with respect to a set of input states p, output states
q, and To-Do List tc(d) are those such that (i) their input state is a relevant possible input
state (i.e., v ∈ p); (ii) their output state is a possible output state (i.e., v′ ∈ q); (iii) for any
other transition 〈u,u′〉 satisfying (i) and (ii), either 〈u,u′〉 is strictly worse (with respect to
tc(d)) than 〈v,v′〉, or they are equally good.
We give two passes at stating satisfaction conditions for deontic formulas of LDLA
utilizing this setup: one that explicitly restricts the set of transitions from which best tran-
sitions are drawn to nomologically admissible transitions (equivalently: explicitly restricts
the set of possible output states, relative to a body of law), and one which does not.
4.6 Explicitly Restricted
We explicitly define a notion of possible output states, relative to a set of possible input
states. Let nomL,d ⊆W ×W be the set of transitions that are nomologically admissible
for an agent d, according to some body of law L (perhaps encoding information about the
laws of nature, causal limitations of the agent, etc.). Roughly, if 〈v,v′〉 ∈ nomL,d, then the
agent can effect a transition to v′, provided she finds herself in v.51 We define the set of
relevant possible actions for d—the set of actions whose input states are possible relative
to an information state p and the relevant body of law—as follows:
(106) rel(p,d) = (p×W )∩nomL,d
Our first pass at stating satisfaction conditions for deontic formulae of LDLA is as follows:
(107) M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α) iff
min[rel(ic∩ JφKM,c,ac),≤tc(ac)]⊆ JαKM,c
O(φ)(α) is satisfied in a model M at a context-world pair 〈c,w〉 iff all the best (with
respect to ac’s To-Do List) transitions from φ-states in ic to possible output states (states
to which ac can effect transitions from the φ-states in ic) are transitions of α.
An illustration will be useful. Let M= 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model, c ∈ C, and let:
• W = {w1, ...,w6}
• JφKM,c = {w1,w3,w5} (φ-states indicated by circled nodes)
• ic = {w1,w2,w3,w5} (indicated with straight arrows)
• tc(ac) be the closure of {{〈w2,w4〉,〈w3,w4〉,〈w5,w4〉,〈w6,w4〉}} under the con-
ditions on To-Do Lists specified above (squiggly arrows diagram T tc(ac))
51. It would be good to say something precise about the character of the body of law and how the body of law
restricts the set of available actions for an agent, but doing so is very difficult.
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Suppose w4 is nomologically accessible from each of w1, w3, w5 (but they are not acces-
sible from each other), so that rel(ic∩ JφKM,c,ac) = {〈w1,w4〉,〈w3,w4〉,〈w5,w4〉}. Then
O(φ)(α) is true in M at 〈c,w〉 iff min[{〈w1,w4〉,〈w3,w4〉,〈w5,w4〉}]⊆ JαKM,c. But the
best transitions are precisely those labeled on the last graph (recall, squiggly arrows dia-
gram
T
tc(ac)): 〈w3,w4〉 and 〈w5,w4〉. Since 〈w5,w4〉 /∈ JαKM,c, O(φ)(α) is false in M
at 〈c,w〉.
4.7 Implicitly Restricted
The nomological accessibility semantics is interesting and potentially useful, which is why
we have taken time to formulate it: it provides a way to integrate, in an explicit way,
information about the causal structure of the world into the semantics for statements of
obligation. Given that we have nothing to say about the relevant body of law, however, it
is a complication to no immediate benefit. The semantics for deontic formulae we develop
henceforth will be an extension of the semantics given in this section.
Since we are ultimately understanding deontic operators as universal quantifiers over
transitions, it is profitable to reconceive the modal base ic as a set of transitions, rather
than states. Let M = 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model. We re-type the C parameter and the
modal base, as follows:
(108) C ⊆D×D×I×T ,
where I = {i | i⊆W ×W}
(109) A context c ∈ C = 〈sc,ac, ic, tc〉
ic ∈ I is the relevant information (modal base) in c
Information states are thus reconceived as encoding information both about the possible
current states of the world and the causal structure of the world. If 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic, then, for
all that is known by the lights of the c-relevant information, the current state of the world
is v, and v′ is a possible successor-state of v. Information states are treated as embodying
information about the current state of the world and what sorts of changes to the world
are possible to effect. This change requires a trivial reformulation of the AV constraints
on models. The new constraints will motivated in the same way as AV. Regarding AV1*:
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actions must be possible with respect to the relevant information. And regarding AV2*:
actions must be simultaneously executable with respect to the relevant information.
(110) If Φ ∈ tc(d) and Φ 6= ∅, then, for some 〈w,v〉 ∈Φ, 〈w,v〉 ∈ ic [AV1*]
(111) For some 〈w,v〉 ∈ ic: if Φ ∈ tc(d) and Φ 6= ∅, then, 〈w,v〉 ∈Φ [AV2*]
We give our second pass at stating satisfaction conditions for deontic formulae of LDLA:
(112) M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α) iff
min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)]⊆ JαKM,c
O(φ)(α) is satisfied in a model M at a context-world pair 〈c,w〉 iff all the best (with
respect to ac’s To-Do List) transitions in ic having φ-states as inputs are transitions of α.
4.8 Semantics for Imperatives
Now that we have something like a fully-formed semantics on the table, we may formu-
late requirement conditions for imperative formulas of LILA. We continue our practice of
giving requirement conditions for imperative formulas in terms of satisfaction conditions
for deontic formulas. Let M = 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model, c a context in C, and w a
state in W . Then:
(113) M, c,wLILA !(φ)(α) iff M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α)
4.9 Further Conditions on Models
We may obtain interesting sub-logics by further constraining models. Some worth consid-
ering:
(114) If Φ ∈ tc(ac), then Φ⊆ ic [NT]
(115) If Φ ∈ tc(ac), then ic ⊆Φ [KE]
(116) If Φ ∈ tc(ac), then {w′ | ∃w : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆ {w′ | ∃w : 〈w,w′〉 ∈Φ} [KE1]
(117) If Φ ∈ tc(ac), then {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈Φ} [KE2]
Each has an air of plausibility, but only one is a reasonable addition to our standing set of
constraints. Since we are working with a rather non-standard apparatus, it will be useful
to talk through all of them. We discuss them in sequence.
4.9.1 Non-Triviality
Condition NT is a non-triviality requirement on transitions of actions on To-Do Lists: they
cannot suggest inter-state transitions whose possibility is ruled out by the c-relevant infor-
mation. Non-triviality requirements have a degree of plausibility about them, especially in
the context of a logic of planning: a To-Do List should not be able to suggest a transition
that the agent is unable, by the lights of the available information, to execute. Neverthe-
less, we should tread carefully. First, NT has questionable motivation. Although we might
loosely speak of agent’s executing transitions between states, it is important to realize that
what an agent actually executes is an action. The transition is the side-effect of the exe-
cution of an action, just as the transition to a new memory state is the side-effect of the
execution of computer’s execution of a program. Insofar as the non-triviality intuition ex-
erts any real pull, then, it concerns actions: actions must be executable by the light of the
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information available at the context; there are no trivial (non-executable) programs on an
agent’s To-Do List. But AV1* and AV2* already succeed in accommodating this incarna-
tion of the intuition. Less abstractly, we know that in the dynamic (diachronic) context,
information acquisition regularly shrinks the set of transitions compatible with the relevant
information, while adding nothing new to the constraints impinging on the agent’s plan-
ning (although it does frequently impact an agent’s planning about how to satisfy prior
constraints). Modeling how information acquisition impacts planning is difficult without
an account on which agents might somehow satisfy a non-triviality requirement “on the
fly.” Without some reconception of certain parameters of the semantics, information ac-
quisition will regularly bring an agent into violation of NT. This will require either an
adjustment in her To-Do List (but why should the set of constraints that structure planning
be altered by information acquisition?) or an addition of states to ic (but why should in-
formation acquisition regularly be accompanied with inexplicable information leakage?).
4.9.2 Knowledge of Executability
Conditions KE, KE1, and KE2 are reminiscent of the condition on ordering-sources stated
in our previous discussion of monotonicity (§3.4.5). Each is an attempts to formalize the
intuition that actions on To-Do Lists must be known to be executable, by the lights of
the c-relevant information. According to KE, no action Φ ∈ tc(ac) is such that there is
a transition compatible with the c-relevant information that is not a transition of Φ. Ac-
cording to KE1, no action Φ ∈ tc(ac) is such that there is an output state compatible with
the c-relevant information that is not an output state of Φ. According to KE2, no action
Φ ∈ tc(ac) is such that there is an input state compatible with the c-relevant information
that is not an input state of Φ.
KE turns out to be untenable in our system: it implies that M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α)
iff ic ∩ (JφKM,c×W ) ⊆ JαKM,c. That is to say: α is obligatory (supposing φ) iff α is
knowably executable (supposing φ).
Proof. ⇐ is immediate. So suppose M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α).
Then min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)]⊆ JαKM,c.




tc(ac)∩ ic = ic.
Then, by def. of min, min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)] = ic∩ (JφKM,c×
W ).
So ic∩ (JφKM,c×W )⊆ JαKM,c.
Informally, then, KE has it that any action that is possible for the agent to take, by the lights
of the available information, conditional on whatever, will satisfy all of the constraints
binding on her at c. This evidently trivializes the action-guiding role that To-Do Lists are
conceived to have in planning. Similarly, KE1 has it that any informationally possible
action will fulfill all of the constraints binding on the agent at c; there is no informationally
possible way for the agent to go wrong.
KE2 does a fine job enforcing knowable executability of actions on To-Do Lists, pro-
vided we understand the modal base in the correct way. KE2 has it, roughly, that any
possible way for the current state of the world to be is a way does not rule out the perfor-
mance of any action on the agent’s To-Do List. This means understanding the modal base
as having a dual role: as representing epistemic uncertainty about the current state of the
world and nomological uncertainty or possibility about the future state of the world (rather
than epistemic uncertainty about nomological possibility): if 〈w,v〉 ∈ ic, then for all the
information available at c, w might be the current state of the world, and v is nomologically
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accessible (given the relevant laws) fromw. On this understanding of the modal base, KE2
together with AV1* suffice to secure knowable executability in the relevant sense. KE2
has it that the agent is, by the lights of the information about the current state of the world,
in a position to execute any action on her To-Do List. AV1* has it that, for any action on
an agent’s To-Do list, it is nomologically possible for her to fulfill that action’s purpose;
whatever the current state w of the world, should she choose to execute any action on her
To-Do List in w, she can expect that execution to terminate in a new state of the world in
which that action is fulfilled.
It is important to note that KE2 cannot play the same role in a PDLA as our restriction
of ordering-sources for deontic modals to sets of choices (knowably actionable desires).
Recall that the latter restriction was used to secure a non-monotonicity property for the
set of best worlds. If all actions in the ordering-source-like To-Do List are antecedently
required to be knowably executable, shrinking the modal base ic will not alter the mem-
bership of the To-Do List. Let ic′ ⊆ ic be an arbitrary restriction of the modal base.
Proof. Suppose that KE2 and that Φ ∈ tc(ac).
Then {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈Φ}.
Since ic′ ⊆ ic, {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic′} ⊆ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆
{w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈Φ}.
Augmenting the context with information does not, by the lights of KE2, affect whether
an item on a To-Do List is knowably executable. So KE2 cannot be used to secure non-
monotonicity. Nevertheless, the assumption of KE makes non-monotonicity superfluous
in the semantics. Unless the action described by save all ten miners is knowably exe-
cutable, in the sense specified by KE2, it cannot appear on a To-Do List, and cannot serve
to privilege transitions that terminate in its execution. (In case the action is knowably ex-
ecutable, then we should want claims like you ought to either block A or block B to come
out true regardless.) While this sort of treatment is implausible for speaker-given bouletic
ordering-sources (it is possible to desire something without knowing how to fulfill your
desire), it seems acceptable for To-Do lists. If you are genuinely constrained to perform
some action, it ought to be known that the world will allow you to execute it, should you
attempt to.52
4.10 Contingency
While it may seem like we have a working PDLA semantics for both qualified statements
of obligation (in view of imperative constraints) and conditional imperatives, the unfor-
tunate truth is that we have nothing of the sort. The function of a conditional impera-
tive (if φ)(stit ψ) is to embody constraints on an agent’s planning in input-states satis-
fying φ. Similarly, the function of qualified statement of constraint-governed obligation
(if φ)(ought ψ) is to make a statement about what constraints require in input-states sat-
isfying φ. But according to the semantics we have given for conditional imperatives and
52. In spite of my breezy tone, the territory is very thorny, and the discussion here cannot do it justice. It is,
in fact, important for the semantics to have access to something like non-monotonicity in the case of conditional
commands, although for something like the opposite of the reasons of Kolodny & MacFarlane (2008). Namely
(and rather astonishingly): restricting ic to ic′ can make actions that were knowably executable with respect to ic
fail to be knowably executable with respect to ic′ . Pursuing this topic would unfortunately involve a complication
of the semantics that would muddy the waters later on. Things are going to get fairly technical—the simpler the
apparatus, the easier it will be to follow what’s going on. So we bracket it, with the hope of pursuing it in further
research.
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conditional statements of constraint-governed obligation, the function of these construc-
tions is something else entirely—a conditional imperative embodies a categorical, or non-
contingent, constraint on an agent’s planning behavior, while a conditional statement of
constraint-governed obligation makes a claim about an agent’s categorical obligations, her
obligations come what may.
Recall the statement of satisfaction conditions in item (112) for an arbitrary deontic
formula in the deontic language of action O(φ)(α), repeated here.
(118) M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α) iff
min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)]⊆ JαKM,c
Note the non-occurrence of the index variablew in the statement of satisfaction-conditions:
the values of the relevant parameters—the modal base ic and ordering-source tc(ac)—are
both fixed at the context c, and cannot be shifted by shifting the index of evaluation. Sup-
posing that M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α), it follows immediately that M, c,v LDLA O(φ)(α),
for all v ∈W . There are no contingently true statements of obligation—statements of the
form O(φ)(α) such that they are satisfied in some worlds (with respect to a model and a
context) and not in others. Because of the equivalence between satisfaction-conditions for
deontic formulas of LDLA and requirement-conditions for imperative formulas ofLILA, this
infects the semantics for imperatives, in a slightly altered fashion: commands are always
categorically required (i.e., with respect to every point of evaluation).
I take it as a datum there are contingently true statements of obligation (and contin-
gently required commands), and, further, that this is precisely what conditional statements
of obligation (and conditional imperatives) are in the business of expressing. The formula
O(φ)(α) expresses that the best φ-initial transitions are transitions of α, i.e., that the ex-
ecution of α is required should one find oneself in a φ state from which such a transition
is executable, i.e., that O(⊤)(α) is satisfied in every φ state from which such a transition
is executable, although not necessarily at the original point of evaluation. This intuition
is, I think, especially grabbing for the logician of planning. If every φ-initial transition τ
where the agent meets all of the constraints on her action is a transition of α, then the agent
may reasonably take herself as required to perform α, if she finds herself in a position to
execute τ .
The model theory we have formulated is inadequate to this task, and we will devote
some amount of effort to revising it. The basic problem is building index-dependence into
the To-Do List.53 But this is not a simple matter of construing To-Do Lists as Kratzer-
ian conversational backgrounds, so that tc(ac) : W 7→ 2A (although we will end up doing
this). While doing so makes the semantics compatible with contingent obligation and
contingent requirement, it will not reliably predict that M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α) implies
M, c,v LDLA O(⊤)(α), for all v such that 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)].
4.10.1 Building in Index-Sensitivity
We begin by re-typing To-Do Lists roughly as conversational backgrounds, so that tc(ac) :
W 7→ 2A. Informally, To-Do Lists will be reconceived as functions from worlds to sets
of constraints binding at those worlds (“contingent constraints” for short).54 We begin
at ground level, with models. With this machinery on the table, we will churn quickly
53. While the modal base ought to be made index-dependent, that does not help with the problem here. Let
inic designate {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} (the set of inputs to ic). A well-behaved modal base—one obeying Re-
flexivity (w ∈ inic (w)) and Euclideanness (if v ∈ inic (w), then inic (w)⊆ inic (v)) constraints—is, for practical
purposes, index-invariant. Together, Reflexivity and Euclideanness entail: if v ∈ inic (w), inic (w) = inic (v).
See Gillies (2008) for a proof.
54. To-Do Lists are thus typed in the same way as the Command Systems of Segerberg (1990).
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through our “axiom” system, figuring out how to rewrite our constraints on models to
accommodate the new apparatus. Formally, let M = 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model, with
all parameters except C (and all parameters of C save T ) typed as in §4.7.
(119) C ⊆D×D×I×T ,
where T = {t | t : D 7→ {l | l : W 7→ 2A}}
(120) A context c ∈ C = 〈sc,ac, ic, tc〉
Requirements on models are restated as follows, with informal glosses appended.
(121) If Φ1 ∈ tc(d)(w) and Φ2 ∈ tc(d)(w), then Φ1∩Φ2 6= ∅ [CON*]
[If Φ1 and Φ2 are constraints at w, Φ1 and Φ2 are compatible.]
(122) For some 〈w,v〉 ∈ ic: if Φ ∈ tc(d)(w) and Φ 6= ∅, then, 〈w,v〉 ∈Φ [AV2**]
[Constraints at w are simultaneously executable, by lights of ic.]
(123) If Φ ∈ tc(ac)(w), then {v | ∃v′ : 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆ {v | ∃v′ : 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ} [KE2*]
[Contingent constraints are knowably executable, by lights of ic.]
Concerning AV2**, it may be implausible to think that contingent constraints that hold at
states that are incompatible with ic’s picture of the current state of the world should always
be realizable, by the lights of ic. Since (on account of reflexivity of the modal base—see
fn53) we will only be interested in evaluating deontic formulas at states of evaluation that
are compatible with the modal base’s picture of the current state of the world, we can avoid
the implausibility (and lose nothing of any importance) by holding that tc(d)(w) is defined
just in case w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic}. This gets around the problem, such as it is.
There are two natural ways to utilize our new To-Do Lists in giving a satisfactory
semantics for deontic formulas of LDLA: treating them as ordering-sources (and giving an
ordering-source semantics) and, equivalently (given certain natural constraints on To-Do
Lists), treating them neighborhood functions (and giving a neighborhood semantics). I
will sketch each way in brief.
4.10.2 Sensitive Ordering-Source Semantics
Defining an index-relative preorder on transitions and set of good-enough transitions is
only a matter of extending prior definitions, and I will spare the reader repetition. We set
forth new satisfaction conditions for deontic formulas—first, the general case, second, the
special case where the restriction argument of O is vacuous.
(124) M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α) iff
min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)]⊆ JαKM,c
(125) M, c,w LDLA O(⊤)(α) iff
min[ic,≤tc(ac)(w)]⊆ JαKM,c
The change to satisfaction-conditions is minimal—most of the work having gone into mak-
ing the ordering-source index-sensitive. Note that the LDLA version of K is LDLA-valid (by
the lights of the ordering-source semantics) in the class of all models for the language.
(126) O(π)(δ(φ→ ψ))→ (O(π)(δφ)→O(π)(δψ)) [K]
Proof. SupposeM, c,w LDLA O(π)(δ(φ→ψ)) andM, c,w LDLA O(π)(δφ).
Then each best-at-w π-initial transition is a transition of both δ(φ→ ψ)
and δφ, and thereby of δψ.
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While the semantics is, as it stands, compatible with contingent obligation (and con-
tingent requirement), we have work to do to secure the desired prediction: M, c,w LDLA
O(φ)(α) should implyM, c,v LDLA O(⊤)(α), for all v such that 〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩(JφKM,c×
W ),≤tc(ac)(w)]. But this can be achieved by adding a minimal further constraint on To-Do
Lists—one which would not have been possible on the original treatment of To-Do Lists
as index-insensitive. (We save discussion of this constraint for §4.10.3.)
(127) If min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(d)(w)]⊆ JαKM,c, then
if 〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(d)(w)], JαKM,c ∈ tc(d)(v).
Informally, if the best transitions in a set of transitions i, relative to tc(d)(w), are tran-
sitions of α, then α is a contingent constraint, in force at every input-state of every best
transition.55 It is fairly easy to show that (127) secures the desired result.
Proof. We suppose that M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α).
Then min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(d)(w)]⊆ JαKM,c.
Then, if 〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(d)(w)], JαKM,c ∈ tc(d)(v).
Suppose 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic ∩ (JφKM,c ×W ),≤tc(d)(w)]. Then JαKM,c ∈
tc(d)(v).
By AV2**, ∃〈u,u′〉 ∈ ic : 〈u,u′〉 ∈Φ, for each Φ ∈ tc(d)(v).
Then ∀〈t, t′〉 ∈ min[ic,≤tc(d)(v)] : 〈t, t′〉 ∈Φ for each Φ ∈ tc(d)(v).
So 〈t, t′〉 ∈ JαKM,c, for any 〈t, t′〉 ∈min[ic,≤tc(d)(v)].
So, M, c,v LDLA O(⊤)(α).
4.10.3 Sensitive Neighborhood Semantics
Alternatively, we can state an index-sensitive neighborhood semantics for deontic formulas
of LDLA, utilizing To-Do Lists more or less as neighborhood functions.
(128) M, c,w LDLA O(φ)(α) iff
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : JαKM,c ∈ tc(ac)(v)
(129) M, c,w LDLA O(⊤)(α) iff
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic,≤tc(ac)(w)] : JαKM,c ∈ tc(ac)(v) iff
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈
T
tc(ac)(w)∩ ic : JαKM,c ∈ tc(ac)(v)
Informally, O(φ)(α) is satisfied in M at 〈c,w〉 iff α is a contingent constraint holding
at all the best φ-initial transitions. As with our earlier pass at a neighborhood semantics
(§3.5.1), the To-Do List still plays a role in selecting best transitions, but, additionally,
directly tells us what sorts of constraints are in force at each state.
All that is needed to establish equivalence between the neighborhood and ordering-
source formulations of the semantics is the addition of a further minimal constraint on
To-Do lists.
(130) If ∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(d)(w)], JαKM,c ∈ tc(d)(v), then
min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(d)(w)]⊆ JαKM,c.
Note that this condition is simply the converse of (127). Taken together, (127) and (130)
amount to to endorsing a limited indifference condition on obligations: an agent has a
conditional obligation at w just in case the unconditional obligation is in force at every
55. There is no way to express this constraint in the object language, for reasons I will not go into here.
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point v such that (i) v satisfies the relevant condition and (ii) v allows execution of each of
the constraints binding on her at w. To be a bit impressionistic, on this picture, we have it
that obligations are both contingent and coarse. Contingent because they may, of course,
vary between points of evaluation. Coarse because having a conditional obligation at w
means having the unconditional obligation at all states that satisfy the relevant condition
and do not vary in the actions an agent can, in view of the information at her disposal,
execute from them.
4.11 Incorporating Permission
In §3.5.1, we argued against neighborhood semantic resolutions of the Ross Paradox, on
the grounds that their failure to explicitly represent permissive content led to explanatory
gaps. We have proposed a sort of neighborhood semantics for LDLA (and indirectly LILA),
but not on the grounds that it provides any sort of satisfactory resolution of the Ross Para-
dox (indeed, we will see presently that it does not). The virtue of neighborhood semantic
treatments—and the source of my interest in them—is their intuitiveness and theoretical
simplicity, especially in the case of constraint-describing deontic formulas and constraint-
expressing imperative formulas, as well as the nice fit the neighborhood semantics will
have with imperative dynamics (see §5.3). A deontic formula O(φ)(α) (and imperative
formula !(φ)(α)) is satisfied (required) just in case α appears on the agent’s To-Do List,
in every φ-state where the agent is in a position to meet every applicable constraint.
The semantics, as it stands, rendersO(π)(δφ)→O(φ)(δφ+δψ) valid in every model.
Proof. Suppose that M, c,w LDLA O(π)(δφ).
Then min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)]⊆ JδφKM,c.
Note that JδφKM,c ⊆ Jδφ+ δψKM,c.
So, min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)]⊆ Jδφ+ δψKM,c
So, M, c,w LDLA O(π)(δφ+ δψ).
It thus predicts that !(π)(δφ) LILA !(π)(δφ+ δψ). That is to say, it predicts the Ross
Paradoxical inference—its LILA representation, anyway—valid.
But that is fine, so far as it goes. The apparatus we have developed is flexible, and
is, suitably modified, capable of making the reverse prediction—doing so, moreover, by
having imperatives play both constraining and permitting roles in planning behaviors of
agents. We will suggest two ways of modifying the semantics here. The first is in roughly
the same vein as the alternative semantics for disjunctive imperatives developed in §3.5.2.
The second makes use of alternatives in representing the permissive role of imperatives,
but introduces a novel formal setup—namely, a complication of the context parameter
with a device for explicitly represents the rights or practical entitlements of individuals—
to integrate them into the semantics.
4.11.1 Alternative Semantics
We might well treat “disjunctive” action-terms as inducing alternatives, along the lines
of the account developed in §3.5.2. We would define salient alternatives for imperative
formulae of LILA, doing so recursively as follows.
(131) a. alt[!(π)(δφ)] = δφ
b. alt[!(π)(α1; ...;αn)] = alt[!(π)(α1)]; ...;alt[!(π)(αn)]
c. alt[!(π)(α1 + ...+αn)] = alt[!(π)(α1)], ...,alt[!(π)(αn)]
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A few comments about this.
i. We let action-terms function as salient alternatives, rather than formulas.
ii. We assume that a no-choice interpretation of a disjunctive imperative (if π)(stit(φ∨
ψ)) will be assigned the LILA logical form !(π)(δ(φ∨ψ)). Free choice interpre-
tations are mapped to the LILA logical form !(π)(δφ+ δψ).
This is intuitive: no-choice interpretations have (if π)(stit(φ∨ψ)) suggesting a
single means of compliance if π (i.e., δ(φ∨ψ)), while free-choice interpretations
have it suggesting two means of compliance if π (i.e., both δφ and δψ). Since
we use distinct logical forms to handle the relevant interpretations, rather than
allowing context to decide an extra-logical set of salient alternatives, we no longer
require that salient alternatives be relativized to models, contexts, and worlds. (It
is, I think, a nice side effect of our adopting a formal imperative language capable
of representing actions that we can do things this way.56)
iii. Finally, we interpret !(π)(α1; ...;αn) as inducing an ordered sequence of alterna-
tives alt[!(π)(α1)]; ...;alt[!(π)(αn)]. What this amounts to will emerge in a bit.
Only note that it does not amount to introducing ordered-sequences into either of
our object languages.
We proceed to define relevant permission operators [℘], [P ], and P in the deontic
language. We introduce an abbreviation to make notation less cumbersome: if A is a list
of actions β1, ...,βn, then let
L
A = β1 + ...+βn. To appropriately define [℘], we require
some way of talking about which formulas hold true in the best worlds meeting some
condition or other (which we had lost upon moving to our new languages). We therefore
augment the object languages with a modular restrictable dynamic modal operator V·W·(·),
such that if α is an action term of the relevant language, π is a non-imperative formula of
the relevant object language, and φ is any formula of the relevant object language, then
VαWπ(φ) is a formula of the relevant object language. We give this modal operator the
following semantics.
(132) M, c,w LDLA/LILA VαWπ(φ) iff
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩(JπKM,c×W )∩JαKM,c,≤tc(ac)(w)] :M, c,v′ LDLA/LILA φ
VαWπ(φ) says the best π-initial executions of α yield a state satisfying (requiring) φ. Some
facts worth noting about this new operator. Clearly, the relevant instance of K is valid in
the class of all LDLA models.
(133) VαWπ(φ→ ψ)→ (VαWπ(φ)→ VαWπ(ψ)) [K#]
We note that the following formula is also valid in the class of all LDLA models. Note: we
use 0 to denote the vacuous action, so that J0KM,c =W ×W .
(134) V0Wπ(φ)↔O(π)(δφ)
Proof. M, c,w LDLA V0Wπ(φ) iff
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] :M, c,v
′ LDLA φ iff
56. To note, then set aside: our objection of §3.5.2 to Aloni (2007)’s approach to the Ross Paradox—that it
is eliminativist about imperative logic and attributes the Ross Paradox to undesirable coarseness in the impera-
tive object language—does not apply to the account we give here. Obviously, our account is non-eliminativist.
Further, LILA is fine-grained enough to represent the differences between free- and no-choice interpretations of
disjunctive imperatives. LDLK is not, but that is not the object language we are using at the moment.
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min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)]⊆ JδφKM,c iff
M, c,w LDLA O(π)(φ).
Note that this result does not hold generally, i.e., we do not have that, for all substitutions
of action terms for α, VαWπ(φ)↔O(π)(δφ).
We use our new operator to define the critical permission operator [℘].
(135) Permissions in LDLA.
a. [℘][π][A1 ; ... ; An] :=
[P ](π)(A1)∧ ...∧V
L
A1 ; ... ;
L
An−1Wπ([P ](⊤)(An))
b. [P ](π)(α1, ...,αn) := P (π)(α1)∧ ...∧P (π)(αn)
c. P (π)(α) := ¬O(π)(α)
[℘][π][A1; ...;An] says, roughly, that any action in A1 is okay if π; and any ideal π-initial
execution of any action in A1 yields a state in which any action in A2 is okay; and ... ; and,
finally, any ideal π-initial execution of any action in A1, then any action in A2, then ..., then,
finally, any action in An−1 yields a state in which any action in An is okay. Informally,
[℘][π][A1; ...;An] expresses trickling down of permissions through an ordered sequence of
alternatives, provided that initial permissions are executed in accordance with planning
constraints.
To illustrate, consider the complex imperative !(π)(α1 +α2;β1 +β2) (read: if π, do
either α1 or α2, then do either β1 or β2). Our definitions yield the following.
• alt[!(π)(α1 +α2;β1 +β2)] := α1,α2 ; β1,β2.
• [℘](π)(α1,α2 ; β1,β2) := [P ](π)(α1,α2)∧Vα1 +α2Wπ([P ](⊤)(β1,β2)) :=
P (π)(α1)∧P (π)(α2)∧Vα1 +α2W
π(P (⊤)(β1)∧P (⊤)(β2))
Informally, [℘](π)(α1,α2 ; β1,β2) expresses that α1 and α2 are permitted if π, and that, in
all the situations that can be accessed via a good enough (by the lights of the To-Do List),
π-initial execution of α1 or α2, β1 and β2 are permitted (simpliciter). This seems like
the right result. Here we are beginning to see some real benefits to adopting languages of
action—we can model permissions of arbitrarily complex, temporal imperative construc-
tions, and track how permissions trickle down to subsequent situations, contingent on an
agent’s behavior in antecedent situations.
To connect this to the Ross Paradox, we need to connect salient alternatives to re-
quirement conditions for imperatives. We do this by redefining the ∇ operator, and revise
requirement conditions for imperatives, as follows.
(136) ∇(π)(A1 ; ... ; An) :=





(137) If φ = !(π)(α):
M, c,wLILA φ iff M, c,w LDLA ∇(π)(alt(φ))
Clearly, this setup makes the right predictions about the most basic version of the Ross
Paradox: we easily predict that !(π)(δφ) 6LILA !(π)(δφ+ δψ). !(π)(δφ+ δψ) is required
at M in 〈c,w〉 only when we have P (π)(δψ) satisfied at M in 〈c,w〉. Clearly, though, for
some M and 〈c,w〉, M, c,w  !(π)(δφ) and M, c,w 2LDLA P (π)(δψ). And so we have
it that !(π)(δφ) 6LILA !(π)(δφ+ δψ).
This solution is readily extendable to arbitrarily complicated versions of the Ross
Paradox. As an illustration: we automatically predict that !(π)(α1 +α2;β1) 6LILA !(π)(α1 +
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α2;β1 +β2). The latter imperative expresses a permission to perform β2, supposing ad-
missible (by the lights of the To-Do List) execution of α1 +α2 in a π-initial state. The
former imperative does not. So !(π)(α1 +α2;β1) 6LILA !(π)(α1 +α2;β1 +β2).
Note that if we had chosen to endorse LC*, we would now have a contradiction on
our hands. Suppose M, c,w LILA !(π)(δφ). Then, by the ordering-source semantics
stated in §4.10.2, we have that ∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : JδφKM,c ∈
tc(ac)(v). Let 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)]. LC* has To-Do Lists closed
under arbitrary expansion, so that JδφKM,c ∪ JδψKM,c ∈ tc(ac)(v). So Jδφ+ δψKM,c ∈
tc(ac)(v). So, by the neighborhood semantics stated in §4.10.3, M, c,w LILA !(π)(δφ+
δψ). But then !(π)(δφ)LILA !(π)(δφ+ δψ) after all!
The benefits of this approach speak for themselves. Nevertheless, there is a downside.
While we have a device in the formal apparatus for keeping track of constraints introduced
on an agent’s planning behavior over time (the To-Do List), we have no such device for
keeping track of rights or entitlements. Such a device is inessential for handling the Ross
Paradox, but rather useful for modeling the changes in an agent’s planning behavior intro-
duced by a commanding authority: authorities impose constraints, but also grant freedoms.
We will introduce it now, show that it can handle the Ross Paradox—indeed, give a resolu-
tion equivalent to the one just developed—but save an account of its role in the pragmatics
of imperatives for later.
4.11.2 Explicitly Representing Rights
The relevant modification of the apparatus is simple and intuitive. We introduce a “dual”
parameter to an agent’s To-Do List: a Rights List. The function of a Rights List is to keep
track of the actions an agent is entitled to perform at different states of the world. The
notion of a right or entitlement is related to, but, significantly, not exhausted by, the notion
of an action an agent is not constrained not to perform. An agent has a right to perform an
action, roughly, just in case an authority has granted her such a right. While every right of
an agent will correspond to an action the agent is not constrained not to perform, not every
action the agent is not constrained not to perform will correspond to a right of an agent.
Let M= 〈D,W,A,∆,C,V 〉 be a model. We re-type the C parameter in the expected way.
(138) C ⊆D×D×I×T ×T
(139) A context c ∈ C = 〈sc,ac, ic, tc,rc〉
rc : D 7→ {l | l : W 7→ 2A} is a Rights List function for c
Rights, naturally, are allowed to vary according to index in the same way as constraints.
Intuitively, rc(d)(w) will yield a set of actions—contingent rights—for an agent d at state
w.
Derivative Rights Lists. Rights Lists are built up from an entity we will refer to as a
Derivative Rights List (DRL). A DRL r−c is characterized in terms of To-Do lists (whence
their “derivative” moniker).
(140) r−c (d)(w) =df {Φ | Φ /∈ tc(d)(w)}
DRLs, then, give the set of actions an agent is not constrained not to perform at an index
of evaluation. A property of DRLs worth noting:
(141) If Φ1 ∈ r−c (d)(w), then Φ1∩Φ2 = ∅ implies Φ2 /∈ tc(d)(w)
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Suppose for reductio that Φ1 ∈ r−c (d)(w), Φ1∩Φ2 = ∅ and Φ2 ∈ tc(d)(w). Because To-Do
Lists are closed under arbitrary expansion, and because Φ2 ⊆Φ1, we have Φ1 ∈ tc(d)(w).
But then, by (140), Φ1 /∈ r−c (d)(w). Contradiction. Informally, this means that actions
appearing on DRLs are always compatible with each of the constraints binding on an
agent at w. And because To-Do lists are closed under intersection, this in turn implies that
every action on an agent’s DRL at w is compatible with simultaneous fulfillment of all of
the constraints binding on an agent at w.57
This setup allows us to state a neighborhood semantics in terms of DRLs for per-
mission formulas of LDLA. Recall the neighborhood semantics of §4.10.3, which yields a
statement of satisfaction conditions for permission formulas in terms of To-Do Lists:
(142) M, c,w LDLA P (φ)(α) iff
∃〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : JαKM,c /∈ tc(ac)(v)
Given (140)’s definition of the DRL, the following conditions are equivalent.
(143) M, c,w LDLA P (φ)(α) iff
∃〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : JαKM,c ∈ r−c (ac)(v)
The resolution of the Ross Paradox proposed in the prior section can be rendered in
this setup, by giving a neighborhood semantics for [℘][π][A1 ; ... ; An] in terms of DRLs:
(144) M, c,w LDLA [℘][π][A1 ; ... ; An] iff
• α ∈ A1 ⇒∃〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩(JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : JαKM,c ∈ r−c (ac)(v) &
• α ∈ A2 ⇒∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JπKM,c×W )∩ J
L
A1KM,c,≤tc(ac)(w)] :










∃〈u,u′〉 ∈ min[ic,≤tc(ac)(v′)] : JαKM,c ∈ r−c (ac)(u)
Non-derivative Rights Lists. We introduce Non-derivative Rights Lists (NDRLs) here,
saving application and elucidation for later on (§5.4). NDRLs are conceived as restrictions
of DRLs:
(145) If Φ ∈ rc(d)(w), then Φ ∈ r−c (d)(w).
We introduce several constraints on NDRLs.
(146) If Φ ∈ tc(d)(w), then Φ ∈ rc(d)(w) [CR]
(147) If Φ1 ∈ rc(d)(w), then Φ1∩Φ2 = ∅ implies min[ic,≤tc(d)(w)]* Φ2 [NON]
CR has it that contingent constraints are also contingent rights—items on the To-Do list
count as rights of the agent. NON (mnemonic for not obligated not) has it that an agent’s
rights at w are not contradicted by contrary obligations at w (cf. fn57).
57. This is not to say that if JαKM,c ∈ r−c (d)(w), thenM, c,w LDLA P (⊤)(α). (This is, then, the source of
a disanalogy between DRLs and To-Do lists.) If JαKM,c ∈ r−c (d)(w), it is the case that
T
tc(d)(w) * JαKM,c .
But it still may be the case that T tc(d)(w)∩ ic ⊆ JαKM,c. Perhaps the only ideal transitions, by the lights of
ic, are transitions of JαKM,c. We could get around this by letting r−c (d)(w) =df {Φ∩ ic | Φ /∈ tc(d)(w)}. This
would require that, if JαKM,c ∈ r−c (d)(w), then
T
tc(d)(w)∩ ic∩ JαKM,c 6= ∅.
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NDRLs are constrained in some of the same ways as To-Do Lists, with some impor-
tant differences. We will not generally expect them to obey Rights List versions of LC*,
CON*, or AV2*. (The same, incidentally, goes for DRLs.)
(148) If Φ1 ∈ rc(d)(w), Φ2 ∈ rc(d)(w), and Φ1∩Φ2 ⊆ Φ3, then Φ3 ∈ rc(d)(w) [LC-
R]
(149) If Φ1 ∈ rc(d)(w) and Φ2 ∈ rc(d)(w), then Φ1∩Φ2 6= ∅ [CON-R]
(150) For some 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic: if Φ ∈ tc(d)(w) and Φ 6= ∅, then, 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ [AV2-R]
Concerning LC-R, an agent can have, for example, a right to post the letter and a right
to not post the letter, but no agent has a single right to both post and not post the letter.
Similar considerations tell against requiring Rights Lists to meet constraints CON-R and
AV2-R: agents may naturally have freedoms (though not obligations) that are impossible
to simultaneously execute.
Analogues of the AV** and KE* constraints are more reasonable. We will also require
that NDRLs be closed under arbitrary expansion of actions (EX-R).
(151) If Φ ∈ rc(d)(w) and Φ 6= ∅, then, for some 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ, 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic [AV1-R]
(152) If Φ ∈ rc(d)(w), then {v | ∃v′ : 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆ {v | ∃v′ : 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ} [KE2-R]
(153) If Φ1 ∈ rc(d)(w), then if Φ1 ⊆Φ2, Φ2 ∈ rc(d)(w) [EX-R]
AV1-R requires that an agent has a right to α only if α is possibly executable, while KE2-
R requires that rights be knowably executable. AV-R is a natural constraint to impose,
given the relationship we will seek to codify between rights and LDLA statements of per-
mission: permissibility implies possibility with respect to the modal base. KE-R is less
intuitive, but still rather natural: an agent has freedom to perform α only if α is knowably
executable. Adopting KE-R makes NON superfluous (cf. again fn57). EX-R is a desirable
closure constraint on NDRLs and allows us to state a satisfactory version of the dynamic
entailment relation (§5.5).
Unlike DRLs, NDRLs do not have a role to play in the static semantics for permission
formulas of our language. While every right is a permission, every permission is not
necessarily a right. Their use is essentially dynamic—they will be used to keep track of
rights introduced by authorities, in order to constrain the course of dynamic update. We
return to this subject in §5.4.
4.12 Temporal Phenomena
As we’ve hinted, logics of action really come into their own with temporal imperative
constructions. In this section, we explore several kinds of temporal phenomena about the
imperative and show that the analysis we have been developing is well-suited to handling
them.58
58. The problem of accounting for temporal imperative phenomena obviously also arises for the logician of
content. While our motivation for adopting a logic capable of expressing facts about actions and their impact on
the world was to account for the constraints on planning behavior enforced by imperatives, this fact suggests that
we might use a logic of action to represent speaker commitments. I make a gesture at unified logic of content and
planning in §4.13.
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4.12.1 Ordered Commands
Instructions and commands are often order-sensitive. Your souffle´ might well fail to rise if
you happen to mistake the instruction in (154a) for the instruction in (154b).
(154) a. Whip the egg whites, then fold them into the custard. [stit φ then ψ]
b. Whip and fold the egg whites into the custard. [stit(φ∧ψ)]
The logic we have been developing is, if course, well-suited to representing the difference
between (154a) and (154b), assigning them the following LILA representations, respec-
tively.
(155) a. !(⊤)(δφ;δψ)
b. !(⊤)(δ(φ∧ψ)) [or, perhaps, !(⊤)(δ¬φ+ δ¬ψ)]
Since ∆(JφKM,c)◦∆(JψKM,c)*∆(Jφ∧ψKM,c) and ∆(Jφ∧ψKM,c)*∆(JφKM,c)◦∆(JψKM,c),
there is no semantic relationship to speak of between these formulas of LILA. This is a de-
sirable feature for an imperative logic to exhibit, and it is all but automatic in the PDLA
setup we have been using. So far as I can tell, the only way for a logic to mimic this
result, without going in for the representation of action in the object language, is to make
the object language explicitly temporal, rather than merely implicitly temporal—to intro-
duce devices for talking directly about precedence, quantification over times (as we will
see below), and the like. It is a virtue of the PDLA approach that we can represent rather
complicated temporal phenomena with a rather minimal object language.
4.12.2 Temporal Constraints on Models
Because we have not yet laid down either object language axioms for ordered commands
or corresponding conditions on To-Do Lists, our treatment of ordered commands is, as
it stands, incomplete. We remedy this deficiency now, endorsing the following set of
conditions on To-Do Lists. Let Ψ be an any restriction of ic. Then:59
(156) If min[Ψ,≤tc(d)(w)]⊆Φ1 ◦Φ2, then min[Ψ,≤tc(d)(w)]⊆Φ1
[Equivalent to axiomatizing with O(φ)(α;β)→O(φ)(α)]
(157) If min[Ψ,≤tc(d)(w)]⊆Φ1 ◦Φ2 and 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[Ψ∩Φ1,≤tc(d)(w)],
then min[ic,≤tc(d)(v′)]⊆Φ2
[Equivalent to axiomatizing with O(φ)(α;β)→ VαWφ(O(⊤)(β))]
(158) If min[Ψ,≤tc(d)(w)]⊆Φ1 and 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[Ψ∩Φ1,≤tc(d)(w)]⇒
min[ic,≤tc(d)(v′)]⊆Φ2, then min[Ψ,≤tc(d)(w)]⊆Φ1 ◦Φ2
[Equivalent to axiomatizing with (O(φ)(α)∧VαWφ(O(⊤)(β)))→O(φ)(α;β)]
Endorsing condition (156) means we predict !(φ)(α;β)LILA !(φ)(α)—correctly it seems,
from the standpoint of a logic of planning. The constraint on planning enforced by !(φ)(α;β)
at a state w requires the performance of α, then β. So it requires, inter alia, the per-
formance of α at w. Endorsing condition (157) means predicting that !(φ)(α;β) LILA
VαWφ(!(⊤)(β)). If the performance of α, then β, is required at w if φ, then in the best φ-
initial states where α is performed, β is required. This too is intuitive. Finally, endorsing
(158) means we predict that !(φ)(α),VαWφ(!(⊤)(β))LILA !(φ)(α;β). If α is required, if
φ, and all the best φ-initial executions of α yield states where β is required, then effect, α
59. These conditions on To-Do Lists are adaptations of conditions on Command Systems given by Segerberg
(1990: 210).
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then β is required if φ.60
Ordered commands, in conjunction with this set of reasonable temporal constraints on
models, have interesting consequences for axiomatizing the logic, one of which we note
here. Consider the following axiom for the dynamic operator V·W·(·).
(159) V0Wπ(V0Wπ(φ)→ φ) [TR]
TR says that in all the best π-initial transitions: if all the best π-initial transitions satisfy
φ, then φ. As such, it reads like an apparent LDLA analogue of the familiar deontic axiom
OU: O(Oφ→ φ) (it ought to be that, if φ is required, then φ). Not only does TR read like
OU: it yields similar consequences together with the K# axiom for V·W·(·), repeated here.
(160) VαWπ(φ→ ψ)→ (VαWπ(φ)→ VαWπ(ψ)) [K#]
OU together with the K axiom for the standard deontic language O(φ→ ψ) → (Oφ→
Oψ) implies OOφ→ Oφ. Similarly, note that the validity of TR, together with K#, im-
mediately implies the validity of CD4.
(161) V0Wπ(V0Wπ(φ))→ V0Wπ(φ) [CD4]
Nevertheless, while OU is a reasonable axiom for the standard deontic language, the pos-
sibility of ordered commands tells decisively against axiomatizing our semantics with TR:
TR implies thatO(⊤)(0;β)→O(⊤)(β) is a universal validity—and thus that !(⊤)(0;β)LILA
!(⊤)(β).
Proof. Suppose TR is valid and M, c,w LDLA O(⊤)(0;δψ).
Then min[ic,≤tc(ac)(w)]⊆ J0KM,c ◦ JδψKM,c.
Let 〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic,≤tc(ac)(w)]. By (157), min[ic,≤tc(ac)(v′)]⊆ JδψKM,c.
Then M, c,v′ LDLA O(⊤)(δψ). By (134),M, c,v′ LDLA V0W⊤(ψ).
But then ∀〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic,≤tc(ac)(w)] :M, c,v′ LDLA V0W⊤(ψ).
So M, c,w LDLA V0W⊤(V0W⊤(ψ)).
Since TR is valid, CD4 is too.
So it follows that M, c,w LDLA V0W⊤(ψ).
Finally, by (134), M, c,w LDLA O(⊤)(δψ).
This is backwards. An agent whose planning behavior is constrained by the imperative
!(⊤)(0;β) should not necessarily look to perform β presently: the imperative prescribes
performance of β only upon occasion of the agent’s prior fulfillment of her present obliga-
tions.61
4.12.3 Stable Commands
There is a felt difference between what I will term ephemeral commands—commands
whose influence on an agent’s planning lapses upon fulfillment—and stable commands—
60. These results hold in the more complicated permission semantics for imperatives outlined in §4.11. We
will simplify our discussions by suppressing some of the apparatus when it has no direct bearing on the matter at
hand.
61. I note that we are also perhaps able to justice to Castaneda’s intuitions about argument (17). If we represent
the argument as having the form [α](!(⊤)(β)), !(⊤)(α) / !(⊤)(β), we see that the argument indeed comes out
invalid, although not quite for the reasons that Castaneda happened to articulate.
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commands whose influence on planning persists through instances of compliance.
(162) a. Buy groceries on Sunday! [stit φ]
b. Always buy groceries on Sunday! [always stit φ]
Intuitively, an ephemeral command stit φ is in force at w just in case all the To-Do
List-preferred-at-w transitions terminate in a φ-state. By contrast, a stable command
always stit φ is in force at w just in case all the To-Do List-preferred-at-w transitions ter-
minate in a φ-state w′ such that all the To-Do List-preferred-at-w′ transitions terminate in
a φ-state w′′ such that... Our semantics, suitably adapted, is well-equipped to handle this
intuitive semantic difference. Ephemeral commands stit φ are associated with the LILA
formula !(⊤)(δφ). That is to say, ephemeral commands are handled as garden-variety
imperative constructions in our imperative object language; no additional machinery is
required for their analysis.
Stable commands are trickier, but ultimately tractable, given a suitable extension of the
machinery. It is natural, in view of the intuitive meaning of stable commands, to associate
the stable command always stit φ with an infinitary formula !(⊤)((δφ)⋆) (where ⋆ is the
Kleene Star).62 Alternatively, choosing to hew to finitary object languages, it would be
natural to analyze always stit φ in terms of !(⊤)(δφω), where ω is a finitary operation on
action-terms, characterized as follows.
(163) If α ∈ TILA/DLA, then αω ∈ TILA/DLA.
(164) JαωKM,c = Jα⋆KM,c = (JαKM,c)∗, where R∗ is the ancestral of R.
Equivalently, we may analyze always stit φ in terms of dynamic modal operators: always stit φ
is associated with V0ωW⊤(!(⊤)(δφ)).63 Without getting into the details (see Segerberg
(1994) for those), the semantics yields the following requirement conditions for this for-
mula (the permission aspect being redundant, we ignore it for the sake of simplicity):
(165) M, c,wLILA V0ωW⊤(!(⊤)(δφ)) iff
M, c,wLILA V0W
⊤k(!(⊤)(δφ)), for all k ∈N iff












′)∩ ic ⊆ JδφKM,c &
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈
T
tc(ac)(w) ∩ ic : ∀〈u,u′〉 ∈ tc(ac)(v′) ∩ ic :
T
tc(ac)(u
′) ∩ ic ⊆
JδφKM,c &...
These are precisely the requirement conditions envisioned above for stable commands.
The envisaged contrast between ephemeral and stable commands (as with the contrast
between order-sensitive and order-insensitive commands) has interesting consequences for
axiomatizing the deontic side of the logic. Consider the following LDLA analogues for
the D4 axiom of standard deontic logic, Oφ→ OOφ, which enforces transitivity of the
62. For a proper treatment of an infinitary propositional dynamic logic with the Kleene Star, see, e.g.,
Segerberg (1994).
63. Thus always is interpreted in the simplest case as a scope-taking dynamic modal operator V0ωW⊤(·). In
cases of conditional stable commands—e.g., (55a)—the restriction argument of the operator may be something
other than ⊤.
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But there is a problem with these axioms. The former (and, so, the latter) implies that
obligations (and thereby commands) never lapse: commands that are in force at w remain
in force at the terminal state of each w-preferred execution of them.
Proof. SupposeM, c,wLDLA O(π)(δφ).
Then M, c,wLDLA O(π)(δO(π)(δφ)).
So ∀〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩(JπKM,c×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : 〈v,v′〉 ∈ JδO(π)(δφ)KM,c .
But then M, c,v′ LDLA O(π)(δφ).
But it is the essence of ephemeral commands to lapse upon fulfillment. It follows that
these axioms must be treated as anathema in a logic that represents the distinction between
ephemeral and stable commands as we choose to here. As was the case with the LDLA
analogue of OU, this is somewhat surprising. The failure of relatively standard axioms of
SDL to carry over to our system is principally a consequence of the temporality implicitly
built into the logic.
4.13 Rapprochement and Transition to Update Semantics
The semantics for imperatives developed in this section of the paper has it that impera-
tives express both constraints on and permissions for certain kinds of planning behavior
of a subject of authority (what we have been referring to as an “addressee”) at a context.
Specifically: an imperative is required (or in force) at a context just in case the To-Do List
of the subject of authority—the set of constraints that impinge on her planning behavior—
satisfies a certain complex relation—the most sophisticated statement of which was to be
found in (137)—with respect to the information that is relevant at the context. As such, it
is most natural to regard it as an implementation of the motivations that underlie a logic
of planning. While natural, however, the choice is unforced. Resisting the choice will
reveal a way in which a single formalism can serve as an implementation of the intuitions
that underlie both logics of content and logics of planning. It also provides a nice way
of connecting the ostensibly static PDLA framework we have been laboring to develop to
an update semantics for imperatives: these too are also, to an extent, two sides of what is
roughly the same coin.
The logic of content developed in the prior section of the paper proceeded from the
intuitions that (i) imperative logic should be normative for endorsement by an authority,
and (ii) what constrains endorsement of an imperative the agent’s desires, together with
the information at a context in which the agent is an authority—the issuer or “speaker”.
This led us to develop a logic of imperatives in terms of a deontic modal logic designed
to track when imperatives were suitable expressions of the authority’s desires, in light of
the relevant information, and when they were not. But there are other options. Indeed, a
To-Do List semantics can capture both of the intuitions underlying a logic of content.
The To-Do List semantics understands imperative logic in terms of practical or plan-
ning content: imperatives express constraints on an agent’s planning in a situation (as well
64. Transitivity is usually viewed as a desirable property of a deontic accessibility relation. See Chellas (1980)
for a defense (with reservations) and Vorobej (1982) for an lucid argument against those reservations.
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as permissions). As such, it seems almost essentially subject- (rather than authority-) or
addressee- (rather than speaker-) oriented. But, of course, constraints on her subject’s plan-
ning (as well as the occasional freedom) are precisely what an authority seeks to impose
with an imperative. Put differently, the object of the authority’s endorsement is naturally
understood as being exactly what the logic of planning regards as the practical content
of the imperative: the constraints on and permissions for a subject’s planning that it ex-
presses. Rather than identifying the content of an imperative with an expression of the
desires of the authority, we might just as well identify it with its practical content. An au-
thority intuitively should endorse an imperative just when its practical content is a suitable
expression of her desires (although there is, at this juncture, nothing demanding explicit
representation of her desires in the logic). One imperative follows from another just when
endorsing the practical content of the latter commits an authority to endorsing the practical
content of the former. It would seem, then, that logics of content and logics of planning
express different, yet formally compatible, perspectives on the very same phenomenon.
Logics of content take as their subject matter the will of the authority as it concerns the
plans of the subject, while logics of planning take as their subject matter the plans of the
subject in light of the will of the authority.
Since there is no reason to think that a single formalism cannot do justice to both per-
spectives, it make sense to compare logics that emanate from these different perspectives
(whereas formerly we would have regarded them as incommensurable). As we’ve seen,
the logic of planning, such as it is, that we developed in this section of paper handles a
range of interesting phenomena about the imperative that the logic of content, such as it
was, developed in the paper’s prior section could not. This constitutes a strong reason for
preferring the former, and for discarding the latter.
This is all pretty vague, so let us try to fill in the sketch a bit. (A bonus: doing so will
give us a nice lead-in to our discussion of update semantics.) Let us understand the static
content of a non-modal imperative formula π in a context c (with respect to model M) as
the characteristic function χc(π) : T 7→ {0,1} of a set inadχc(π) of inadmissible To-Do
Lists—those mapped to 1 by χc(π)—for an addressee.65 What I have in mind is, ignoring
permission for sake of simplicity, something like the following:
(168) Where w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic}:
inadχc(!(φ)(α)) = {τc,ac : W 7→ 2A | min[ic ∩ (JφKM,c ×W ),≤τc,ac(w)] *
JαKM,c}
The formula !(φ)(α) expresses a function χc(!(φ)(α)) according to which a To-Do List
for the addressee τc,ac is admissible just in case at any input state w compatible with
the relevant information, τc,ac(w) yields an obligation to perform α in the best φ-initial
situations. Informally, !(φ)(α) expresses a constraint on a subject’s To-Do List: a To-
Do List counts as admissible just in case, from its vantage, α is required if φ. Suppose
we understand requirement conditions for imperatives as relative to To-Do Lists directly,
rather than indirectly (via contexts). Then we have inadχc(!(φ)(α)) being just the set
of To-Do List functions τc,ac such that M, τc,ac ,w LILA !(φ)(α), for any input state w
compatible with the relevant information.
The notion that imperative formulas of LILA might be treated as expressing such char-
acteristic functions is a useful one for reconciling logics of content and logics of planning.
Issuers of imperatives (authorities) might be represented as expressing some sort of pro-
65. Eric Swanson calls this sort of approach—on which the semantic value of a formula is typed as the
characteristic function of a set of inadmissible types of cognitive state—“constraint semantics.” See Swanson
(2008a) for an short development of the idea, and Swanson (2006: Ch. 2) for a detailed outline of a constraint
semantics for a fragment of natural language.
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attitude toward such a function: an attitude of endorsement or approval of that function—
or, more precisely, that function’s representation of the normative state of play. Endorsing
such a function commits an authority to endorsing another just when the pre-defined imper-
ative entailment relation holds between the relevant formulas. Such functions might also
be thought to constrain the planning apparatus of their addressees: an agent whose plan-
ning apparatus fails to be representable with an admissible To-Do List—a To-Do List not
in inadχc(π)—violates the constraint expressed by the imperative formula. To be coopera-
tive, she must assimilate it, by modifying her To-Do List so that it is no longer describable
as inadmissible, by the lights of inadχc(π).
The connection of static content to update semantics is apparent: update semantics
could be understood as stemming from the impulse to model this sort of assimilation.
Supposing that an authority uses an utterance to express endorsement of a characteristic
function χ and that her subject’s antecedent planning apparatus is not representable with
an admissible, by the lights of χ, To-Do List, being cooperative will entail modifying her
To-Do List, so that it becomes so representable. Assigning update potentials—functions
from cognitive states into updated cognitive states of the same type—to formulas of our
language is thus treated as a matter of describing a function that maps inadmissible cogni-
tive states into suitable admissible ones (and describing what the updated states look like),
and admissible cognitive states into themselves. We now turn our attention to this task.
5 DYNAMICS AND DYNAMIC SEMANTICS
The central problem in giving a pragmatic/dynamic analysis of imperatives is accounting
for their peculiar force—their essentially performative character. In principle, it is possible
to examine this question without either (i) committing oneself to a definite view about the
update (or context change) potential of imperative formulas or (ii) trying to leverage a
view of update potentials to define dynamic analogues of static notions of satisfaction,
requirement, entailment, etc. Addressing the questions in which we are interested does,
however, require that we do both.
Our study of imperative dynamics begins in a rather different place from most recent
work on the subject. We have a complex apparatus already in place, and, rather than tearing
it down and building it up piecemeal, we will simply presuppose a good deal of it as we
build a dynamics for imperatives. This has its advantages—a complicated apparatus turns
out to be capable of handling many facts about the pragmatics of imperatives that simpler
accounts struggle with. Nevertheless, as will become clear, in spite of large differences in
apparatus, the basic intuition behind our account is a familiar one: the performative force
of imperatives will be accounted for by construing them as in the business of updating the
To-Do Lists of their addressees.
This section is structured around building a dynamics for imperatives that secures
certain desiderata that an analysis of imperatives’ performative force ought to have. Sub-
sections are generally devoted to accounting for one desideratum in particular. Once a
reasonably adequate apparatus for handling the relevant dynamic phenomena is in place,
we move on to define a dynamic analogue of requirement conditions (and imperative en-
tailment) for imperative formulas. We close with a comparison of our dynamic system
to the static system developed in the prior section and a polemic of sorts against recent
attempts to marginalize non-dynamic semantic approaches to the imperative.
5.1 Performative Force
Before beginning in earnest, it is important to state in a reasonably precise way (1) what it
is we mean when we say that an imperative (or, more precisely, an imperative utterance)
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has performative force and (2) the properties a formal analysis should exhibit in order to
count as a satisfactory account of this phenomenon. Regarding (1), I take it that by claim-
ing that imperatives have performative force, we mean that utterances of imperatives in
natural language (of the sort that we use imperative formulas of the imperative object lan-
guageLILA to represent) (i) function to introduce some species of obligation or requirement
on their addressees, and (ii) fulfill this function reliably. Regarding (2), it would therefore
seem that providing a satisfactory analysis of imperative force will require modeling im-
perative discourse in our formal system—in particular, devising a dynamic formal system
that is suited to representing the impact of utterances in natural language on a discourse.
I will suppose that the best way to do this is by defining new interpretations for formulas
in the imperative object language—update potentials—which take a context as input and
return an updated context as output. An assignment of update potentials to formulas of the
language succeeds insofar as it represents imperative utterances as reliably imposing the
relevant requirements and obligations on their addressees.
What does it mean to say that imperative utterances reliably impose requirements
and obligations on their addressees? I propose we cash this out by representing imper-
ative utterances as affecting the truth-values of deontic formulas—in particular, causing
certain descriptions of obligation go from false (at the prior context) to true (at the up-
dated context)—and requirement-values of imperative formulas—in particular, making it
the case that certain imperatives go from failing to be in force (at the prior context) to
being in force (at the updated context). That is to say: updating a context according to
an imperative reliably yields a new context in which certain deontic statements are true
and certain imperatives are in force. The formal import for the dynamic semantics is this:
we will seek to define an update potential for the imperative that reliably alters contex-
tual parameters relevant to evaluating whether relevant deontic formulas are satisfied and
imperative formulas are in force.
Concretely: suppose that I am ordered to write a paper about imperatives at a context
c. Then updating c with the order should yield a new context c∗ where, inter alia, I must
(in view of the constraints impinging on my planning) do so and the imperative Write a
paper about imperatives!—or, rather, the LILA representation we assign to it—is in force.
It is, at the same time, clearly possible that, at the prior context c, I needn’t do so, since, at
c, I haven’t been told to. A bit more formally: suppose !(φ)(α) is uttered at c, and let c∗ be
c updated with !(φ)(α). When update succeeds, a good account of imperative dynamics
should yield the following predictions.
(169) c∗ O(φ)(α), although, possibly, c 1 O(φ)(α)
(170) c∗  !(φ)(α), although, possibly, c 1 !(φ)(α)
Three notes on notation. (i) Since we have finished toying around with the object lan-
guages, we will avoid clutter by avoiding labeling the symbols for satisfaction, require-
ment, and entailment relations in the metalanguage, except where necessary. (ii) Since our
focus is now on contexts, we can (and will) generally leave the role of models implicit,
without any loss of information. (iii) We use a new semantic relation, , to denote validity
in a context—i.e., satisfaction or requirement with respect to all of the possibilities relevant
at the context: c  φ shall abbreviate either ∀w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} :M, c,w  φ or
∀w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} :M, c,w φ, as context will make clear.
It is important to note that (169) and (170) can come apart, on account of the per-
missive dimension of imperatives: the practical content of an imperative is not, we have
argued, exhausted by an expression that so-and-so action is required in so-and-so situa-
tion, but will often—e.g., in the case of choice-offering disjunctive imperatives—involve
an expression of permission that cannot be “derived” from the command content of the
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imperative. For now, however, we will focus on the introduction of requirements and
constraints—predicting (169)—rather than permissions, saving a discussion of the permis-
sive dimension of imperative force for a bit later on. We will build our dynamic analysis
in two steps. The first will focus on obligation introduction, the second on permission
introduction. Putting the pieces together yields an account that predicts (170).
As already noted, validating any of the relevant facts demands defining dynamic
notions—in particular, a update potential for imperative formulas of the imperative ob-
ject language—that predict them. Insofar as obligations are concerned, there are two (and
only two) parameters of the context that are relevant to deciding whether or not an imper-
ative or deontic formula is validated there—the contextual modal base and the contextual
ordering-source (To-Do List). To yield the desired prediction, an update potential for the
imperative must operate on one (possibly both) of these parameters.
5.2 Updating ic
We have given a bit of the game away in making it clear that we would be endorsing
an update potential for the imperative that operates on the ordering-source (or parameters
related to the ordering-source). But there is, to be sure, nothing crazy about thinking that
the performative force of imperatives is to be accounted for in terms of the addition of
information to the modal base. Indeed, for a modal analysis of the imperative, alteration of
the modal base is a natural place to start: imperatives might, for example, add the semantic
value of an obligation-describing modal to the modal base.66
A toy implementation of this basic idea for the imperative object language LILA. We
define update potentials for the non-modal fragment of LILA.67 We will have !(φ)(α) alter-
ing the modal base by adding the information in JO(φ)(α)Kc to update ic’s representation
of the current state of the world. Non-imperative formulas will simply add the information
they express about the current state of the world to ic. Let ‖·‖M be a function from formu-
las of LILA into functions from contexts of M into contexts of M (we will hereafter omit
mention of models), and model a context c as before: as the ordered tuple 〈sc,ac, ic, tc〉
(ignoring non-derivative rights lists for now). The relevant updates will be given as fol-
lows:
(171) Where φ does not contain an imperative:
c‖φ‖= c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ = sc, ac∗ = ac, tc∗ = tc
• ic∗ = ic∩ (JφKc×W )
(172) c‖!(φ)(α)‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ = sc, ac∗ = ac, tc∗ = tc
• ic∗ = ic∩ (JO(φ)(α)Kc×W )
This approach, should it succeed, would have two clear virtues. First, of course, it predicts
automatically that c∗  O(φ)(α). And, second, it makes clear how handling the static
semantics of imperatives in terms of the semantics of deontic modals might be connected
to a theory of imperative force. Performative force is achieved (putatively) by adding the
semantic value of the deontic formula whose satisfaction conditions give the imperative’s
requirement conditions to the modal base’s depiction of the present state of the world.
66. Schwager, for her part, seems to understand performative force in terms of update of the Common Ground:
imperatives update contexts by adding the information about the ordering-source (in her case, the speaker’s
desires) to the Common Ground (see Schwager 2006: 10). It is not clear from her presentation what information
about the desires of the speaker has to do with performative force.
67. One immediate problem with this approach is that there is no clearly sensible way of defining update
potentials for formulas of the form [β](!(φ)(α)) or VβWpi(!(φ)(α)). But I won’t harp on this here.
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While we were dubious that the non-integrability of a static semantics for imperatives
with a theory of imperative force constituted any real objection to such a semantics (§3.3),
we can appreciate the point that such integrability is a praiseworthy (if not obligatory)
feature of a semantics.
There are, however, empirical and conceptual difficulties. Empirically, we do not
have an account of performative force, because while we have an account that reliably
predicts that obligations are in force at the updated context, this comes at the expense of
a genuine account of obligation introduction. Consider a schematic case. We begin by
making explicit some assumptions that we have to this point left implicit: (i) contexts are
properly understood as “inhabitants” of worlds, so that a context c supplies information
about the world wc locating c;68 (ii) updating the modal base parameter of the context
does not alter the state in which c is located; (iii) modal bases are realistic, in the sense
that wc ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic}. The assumption that wc 2 O(φ)(α) leads immediately
to contradiction.
Proof. Let wc 2 O(φ)(α). Since wc∗ = wc, wc∗ 2 O(φ)(α). But, by
supposition, wc∗ ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic∗}. So c∗ 1 O(φ)(α). Con-
tradiction.
But it should, of course, be possible that wc 2O(φ)(α).
This leads into the conceptual difficulties with the view, which are twofold. First, it is
strange for !(⊤)(α) to update ic by, in effect, inducing the presupposition thatα is required.
It is entirely ordinary to suppose that at ic it is presupposed that the subject is under no
obligation to perform α—i.e., c  ¬O(φ)(α), which implies that wc 2 ¬O(φ)(α). Imper-
atives are in the business of introducing new obligations (and perhaps also canceling prior
presuppositions about obligations), including (indeed, perhaps especially) obligations an-
tecedently presupposed not to be in place. But in any case where c  ¬O(φ)(α), updating
ic with !(⊤)(α) will land us in broken context, with an empty modal base. Second, the
pragmatic force of an assertion that π is usually modeled as an addition of the information
that π to a modal base’s representation of the state of the world (Stalnaker 1978, 2002).
But this is precisely how the proposal under consideration construes the performative force
of an imperative. The distinction between assertive force—the sort of force traditionally
associated with modal base update—and performative force is blurred.
The empirical and conceptual difficulties for this approach to imperative dynamics
make a strong case for a different tack. We begin to develop one in the following section.
5.3 Updating tc
Another option—the one we will pursue—is to construe imperatives as To-Do List (ordering-
source) updaters.69 Rather than defining update potentials exclusively for the non-modal
fragment of the imperative object language, we define update potentials for all of LILA.
68. This is a natural and useful assumption. Others that make it include Isaacs & Potts (2003); Potts (2003).
We have left this implicit in the interest of formal simplicity: the world parameter of a context is semantically
idle.
69. Isaacs & Potts (2003); Mastop (2005); Portner (2004, 2008); Potts (2003); Veltman (2008) are the major
references for this type of view in contemporary linguistics. The overall shape of the view given here is most
indebted to the formulation in Portner (2008). Giving originality its due, Segerberg (1990)’s notion of an action-
guiding Command System is quite similar to the contemporary notion of a To-Do List (although Segerberg
does not himself attempt to give an account of imperative dynamics). Indeed, the account he builds around the
notion of a Command System is rather more sophisticated than contemporary accounts, in that it (i) construes
the relevant parameter as sets of actions, rather than propositions, properties, or the like; (ii) is aware that the
parameter has a central role to play in giving an account of the Ross Paradox; and (iii) is adaptable to handling
temporal phenomena about the imperative, of the sort we examined above.
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That is to say, ‖ ·‖M :LILA 7→ {f | f : C 7→ C} is a total function defined for every formula
of LILA.
The easiest way of doing this properly requires a small modification in our under-
standing of To-Do Lists, somewhat along the lines of the neighborhood semantics given
in §3.5.1. We allow proposition-action pairs to occur on a To-Do List with respect to an
index of evaluation, with the following interpretation:
(173) 〈p,Φ〉 ∈ tc(d)(w)⇔∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (p×W ),≤ tc(d)(w)] : Φ ∈ tc(d)(v)
The “presence” of 〈p,Φ〉 on a To-Do list at w means that the To-Do List at the initial state
of each best-from-w p-initial transition contains Φ.70 Note the following consequence of
this definition: we may, in effect, replace the ordering-source semantics for deonticO with
a straight neighborhood semantics.
(174) c,w  O(φ)(α) iff 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w)
Proof. c,w O(φ)(α) iff (by the neighborhood semantics of §4.10.3)
∀〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKc×W ),≤tc(ac)(w)] : JαKc ∈ tc(d)(v) iff
〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w)
(175) c  O(φ)(α) iff ∀w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} : 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w)
Proof. Immediate from definition of .
We proceed to define update potentials for formulas of LILA as follows. Informal
explanations are appended after each definition, as well as a short proof that the proposed
update potentials secure the desired results about performative force.
5.3.1 Non-Imperative Formulas
Update with ordinary formulas is still treated as restriction of the modal base.
(176) Where φ does not contain an imperative, c‖φ‖ is as defined in (171).
5.3.2 Imperative Formulas
It is fairly easy to define update with an imperative formula !(φ)(α) so that the updated
context validates O(φ)(α). We do so as follows.
(177) c‖!(φ)(α)‖ is defined iff tc∗(ac) (defined below) satisfies CON*, AV2**, KE2*.
When defined, c‖!(φ)(α)‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ = sc, ac∗ = ac, ic∗ = ic
• tc∗(d) = tc(d), for all d 6= ac
• tc∗(ac) = tc(ac) [w / tc(ac)(w)∪{〈JφKc,JαKc〉}],
for all w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic}
Update is undefined when it would yield an broken To-Do List.71 When update is defined,
ac’s updated To-Do List function is such that for any state w over which it is defined, w
70. If the reader finds this confusing, imagine To-Do Lists on which proposition-action pairs occur as distinct
from “actual” To-Do Lists—those containing only actions—and treat the former as a construction built out of the
latter, or vice versa.
71. CON*, AV2**, and KE2* are understood to apply to “atomic” actions, not proposition-action pairs.
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contains 〈JφKc,JαKc〉. I.e., the initial state v of any best-from-w, φ-initial transition is such
that ac’s To-Do List at v contains JαKc. We have the following result.
(178) c‖!(φ)(α)‖ O(φ)(α), when c‖!(φ)(α)‖ is defined
Proof. Immediate given (174), (175), ic∗ = ic, Jφ/αKc∗ = Jφ/αKc.
5.3.3 Basic Dynamic Formulas
The formula [β](!(φ)(α)) expresses a restricted command: conditional on the performance
of β, the subject is required to perform α if φ. We thus define update with the dynamic
modal formula [β](!(φ)(α)) so that the updated context validates [β](O(φ)(α)).
(179) c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ is defined iff tc∗(ac) satisfies CON*, AV2**, KE2*.
When defined, c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ = sc, ac∗ = ac, ic∗ = ic
• tc∗(d) = tc(d), for all d 6= ac
• tc∗(ac) = tc(ac) [v / tc(ac)(v)∪ {〈JφKc,JαKc〉}], v ∈ {v | ∃w : 〈w,v〉 ∈
ic∩ JβKc}
ac’s updated To-Do List function is such that for any state v that is the terminal state of
an ic-compatible transition of β, ac’s To-Do List at v contains 〈JφKc,JαKc〉. For all other
states not satisfying this condition, the value of the function is unchanged. The function of
the modal operator [β] is, in effect, to shift the context (by shrinking the modal base to the
set of β-transitions) and update the result with !(φ)(α). We thus have the following result.
(180) c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖  [β](O(φ)(α)), when c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ is defined
Proof. Again immediate given (174), (175), ic∗ = ic, Jφ/α/βKc∗ = Jφ/α/βKc,
and the semantics of [β].
5.3.4 Complex Dynamic Formulas
The formula VβWπ(!(φ)(α)) expresses a doubly restricted command: the subject is re-
quired to perform α if φ, supposing a good-enough, φ-initial execution of β. We thus
define update with VβWπ(!(φ)(α)) so that the updated context validates VβWπ(O(φ)(α)).
(181) c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ is defined iff tc∗(ac) satisfies CON*, AV2**, KE2*.
When defined, c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ = sc, ac∗ = ac, ic∗ = ic
• tc∗(d) = tc(d), for all d 6= ac
• tc∗(ac) = cl
n[tc(ac)], the result of executing cl[·] on tc(ac) n times,
where n is the smallest k such that clk[tc(ac)] = clk−1[tc(ac)].
cl[tc(ac)] =df tc(ac) [v′ / tc(ac)(v′)∪{〈JφKc,JαKc〉}],
for all v′ ∈ {v′ | ∃w∃v : 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JπKc×W )∩ JβKc,≤tc∗ (ac)(w)]}
This definition has it that ac’s updated To-Do List function is such that for any state v′ that
is the terminal state of an ic-compatible, π-initial, best-at-w transition of β (for some w
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compatible with ic), ac’s To-Do List at v′ contains 〈JφKc,JαKc〉. We will prove this.
(182) Claim. Let w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic∗}. Then:
〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∗ ∩ (JπKc∗ × W ) ∩ JβKc∗),≤tc∗ (ac∗ )(w)] ⇒ 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈
tc∗(ac∗)(v
′)
Proof. Let 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∗∩ (JπKc∗ ×W )∩ JβKc∗),≤tc∗ (ac∗ )(w)].
We know that for all u′ such that for some w,u ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈
ic∗}, 〈u,u′〉 ∈min[ic∗∩(JπKc∗×W )∩JβKc∗ ,≤tc∗ (ac∗ )(w)] implies 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈
tc∗(ac∗)(u
′), unless cl[tc∗(ac∗)] 6= tc∗(ac∗), which is impossible.
Since w,v ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic∗} and 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∗∩ (JπKc∗ ×
W )∩ JβKc∗),≤tc∗ (ac∗ )(w)], the claim follows.
It follows that:
(183) c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖  VβWπ(O(φ)(α)), when c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ is defined
Proof. Again immediate given (174), (175), ic∗ = ic, Jφ/π/α/βKc∗ =
Jφ/π/α/βKc and the semantics of VβWπ .
5.3.5 Conceptual Virtues
To sum up: our definitions of update potentials for formulas of LILA predict that, when
updates are defined, updating a context with an imperative formula of any stripe reliably
introduces the proper sorts of obligations on their subjects. But this is not all. A nice addi-
tional bonus: construing imperative formulas or formulas containing imperative formulas
as To-Do List updaters predicts that and explains how imperative and “assertive” force—
the sort of force associated with updating a context with a non-imperative formula of the
language—are distinct. A formula (or, more precisely, an utterance thereof) has assertive
force (may be used assertively) just in case its update potential operates on the informa-
tional parameter of the context, imperative force just in case its update potential operates
on the action-guiding parameter. Understanding imperative dynamics in terms of update
of the modal base founders on this distinction.
As we noted above, one putative virtue of the imperatives-as-modal-base-updaters ap-
proach is that there is a real (indeed, obvious) connection between the static semantics and
the theory of imperative force. The account on offer shares this property. Let us generalize
the idea of constraint semantics (§4.13) to formulas of LILA besides those instantiating the
form !(φ)(α). We associate a formula π of LILA with a functionχc(π) : T 7→ {0,1} of a set
characterizing the set inadχc(π) of inadmissible To-Do Lists—To-Do Lists that fail to val-
idate π. (Note on notation: τc,ac  π iff π is required at every w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic},
if we utilize τc,ac as the ordering source.)
(184) inadχc(π) = {τc,ac : W 7→ 2A | τc,ac 1 π}
Let π be any formula of LILA that is or contains an imperative. In every case, the update
potential defined above for π does nothing more (and nothing less) than to ensure that a
post-update To-Do List validates π. That is to say: when tc(ac) /∈ inadχc(π), c‖π‖= c; and
when tc(ac) ∈ inadχc(π), c‖π‖= c∗, where tc∗(ac∗) /∈ inadχc(π). Genuine, non-vacuous
update is triggered when, and only when, τc,ac is inadmissible at c—i.e., τc,ac 1 π.72 In
72. All these facts are easy to verify from things proved in the prior section. I will not bother with the proofs.
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a nutshell: the static side of the semantics supplies synchronic constraints on To-Do Lists,
while the dynamic side models diachronic satisfaction of these constraints.
5.4 Permissive Force
We understand the permissive force of imperatives73 as being roughly conceptually anal-
ogous to their obligation-imposing force: utterances of imperatives in natural language
(of the sort represented with formulas of LILA) function to confer rights, freedoms, or
entitlements on their addressees, and they fulfill this function reliably. The implementa-
tion of this idea, however, will differ significantly from our implementation of the cor-
responding intuition about obligation-imposing force. To illustrate: while the fact that
c  ¬O(φ)(α) is no obstacle, per se, to having it be the case that c‖!(φ)(α)‖  O(φ)(α),
the fact that c  ¬P (φ)(α) certainly ought to be an obstacle to having it be the case that
c‖!(φ)(α)‖  P (φ)(α). While imperatives can cancel prior permissions—within certain
bounds (which we will explore below)—we will suppose that the permissions they express
must not conflict with prior obligations.74 So, the technical sense in which imperatives
introduce rights is distinct from the sense in which they introduce obligations: they do
not alter the truth-values of deontic formulas that describe the permissions they express.
Indeed, if a context c is updatable with an imperative formula, the permissions that the
formula expresses must already be in force at c. There is, nevertheless, an obvious sense
in which imperatives confer or introduce rights that their subjects did not have before. It is
just that, given our assumptions, we cannot cash this intuition out in terms of alteration of
contextual parameters with an aim to establishing the truth of relevant permission formu-
las. Instead, I suggest we cash it out in terms of addition to a Non-Derivative Rights List
(cf. §4.11.2).
Very roughly: we will conceive of a NDRL function for an individual d, rc(d), as
a function from worlds to sets of actions that the agent has been granted permission to
perform in those worlds (rights, entitlements, freedoms). Actions that an agent has been
granted permission to perform are distinguished from merely permissible actions: an ac-
tion is permissible just in case the relevant deontic formula of LDLA expressing that the
action is permissible is true. An action is a right just in case the relevant deontic formula
of LDLA expressing that the action is permissible is true, and, additionally, it occurs on the
agent’s NDRL. NDRLs, then, characterize sets of privileged permissions at a world. Im-
peratives, which are in the business of granting permissions, are conceived as adding the
permissions they express to an agent’s rights. The function of an NDRL is, as intimated
above, essentially dynamic: the update semantics uses them to check whether updating the
context with an imperative formula would conflict with any of the agent’s rights. While
imperatives can cancel permissions, we will assume that they cannot cancel rights. Update
with an imperative is rejected whenever either (i) the imperative attempts to cancel any
of the subject’s rights or (ii) the updated NDRL function for the subject would fail to sat-
isfy any of the constraints introduced on NDRLs in §4.11.2, repeated here for convenient
reference.
(185) If Φ ∈ rc(d)(w), then Φ ∈ r−c (d)(w) = {Φ | Φ /∈ tc(d)(w)}.
(186) If Φ ∈ tc(d)(w), then Φ ∈ rc(d)(w) [CR]
(187) If Φ1 ∈ rc(d)(w), then Φ1∩Φ2 = ∅ implies min[ic,≤tc(d)(w)]* Φ2 [NON]
73. This topic has received next to no attention in recent work on the formal pragmatics of imperatives. Aloni
(2007), of course, is interested in permissive content, but fails to connect this to a theory of permissive force.
Veltman (2008) is a pleasant exception. Although I believe that our accounts begin from similar intuitions about
permissive force, the formalisms do not have anything in common.
74. This actually seems, to me, to require that cP (φ)(α), although I won’t actually make this assumption.
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(188) If Φ ∈ rc(d)(w) and Φ 6= ∅, then, for some 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ, 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic [AV1-R]
(189) If Φ ∈ rc(d)(w), then {v | ∃v′ : 〈v,v′〉 ∈ ic} ⊆ {v | ∃v′ : 〈v,v′〉 ∈Φ} [KE2-R]
(190) If Φ1 ∈ rc(d)(w), then if Φ1 ⊆Φ2, Φ2 ∈ rc(d)(w) [EX-R]
While NDRLs will play no direct role in the static interpretation of deontic modals, they
function as the background against which future imperative utterances or grantings of per-
mission may be tested for acceptability. To put it somewhat grandiosely, the permissive
force of imperatives is understood in terms of the grant of a sort of Berlin-ian nega-
tive right: a freedom to resist certain further kinds of instructions or constraints on her
will. Implementing this idea will require redefining updates for imperative or imperative-
containing formulas of the language. We begin with imperative formulas.
5.4.1 Imperative Formulas
As before, the easiest way of defining the updates requires allowing proposition-action
pairs to occur on an NDRL with respect to an index of evaluation, with the following
interpretation:
(191) 〈p,Φ〉 ∈ rc(d)(w)⇔∃〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (p×W ),≤ tc(d)(w)] : Φ ∈ rc(d)(v)
The presence of 〈p,Φ〉 on an NDRL at w means that the NDRL at the initial state of
each best-from-w p-initial transition contains Φ. We note the following two facts about
permission formulas that follow from this definition. (Note also that their converses do
not.)
(192) 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ rc(ac)(w)⇒ c,w  P (φ)(α)
(193) ∀w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic} : 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ rc(ac)(w)⇒ c  P (φ)(α)
Because we are explicitly representing rights, we resume assuming that a context c
contains a parameter that defines Rights List functions—functions from worlds to sets of
actions—for individuals. Substantively, the changes to updates are twofold. First, we will
complicate the definedness constraints for updates—in addition to requiring that the up-
dated To-Do Lists be admissible, we will require that (i) the permissions expressed by
the imperative not conflict with any prior obligations and (ii) updated NDRLs be admis-
sible. Undefinedness is, speaking roughly, the dynamic reflex of the inability to incor-
porate an imperative without revising prior constraints and obligations. Second, we will
have imperatives updating the Rights List function of the subject of the imperative. Let
c= 〈sc,ac, ic, tc,rc〉 be a context. Update potentials for basic imperative formulas !(φ)(α)
whose salient alternatives, alt(!(φ)(α)), are given by A1; ...;An, are given as follows. (If
the reader is hazy on alternatives and the [℘] permission operator, see §4.11.1.)
(194) c‖!(φ)(α)‖ is defined iff
• tc∗(ac) satisfies CON*, AV2**, KE2*
• c 1 ¬[℘][φ][A1; ...;An]
• rc∗(ac) satisfies CR, NON, AV1-R, KE2-R, EX-R
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(195) If defined, c‖!(φ)(α)‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗ ,rc∗〉
• sc∗ , ac∗ , ic∗ , and tc∗ as defined in §5.3.2
• rc∗(d) = rc(d), for all d 6= ac
• rc∗(ac) is defined stepwise. Select w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic}.
We execute the following changes to rc(d).
• If α ∈ A1, let rc∗(ac)(w) = rc(ac)(w)∪{〈JφKc,JαKc〉〉}
• If α ∈ A2 and 〈v,v′〉 ∈ min[ic∩ (JφKc×W )∩ J
L
A1Kc,≤tc∗ (ac)(w)],










let rc∗(ac)(v′) = rc(ac)(v′)∪{〈W,JαKc〉〉}
Rinse, later, repeat, for all w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ ic}.
This is a complicated definition, but only two things are really going on. First, To-Do Lists
are updated exactly as before. Second, by defining the update to the NDRL as we do (as
well as by enforcing that updated NDRLs satisfy CR, NON, AV1-R, KE2-R, and EX-R)
we ensure that c∗  [℘][φ][A1; ...;An], whenever update is defined. The proof of this fact
is omitted, but is obvious enough from the semantics for [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] together with
(192) and (193). Three things to note about NDRL update:
i. (170) is immediate: if defined, c‖!(φ)(α) ∇(φ)(alt(!(φ)(α))), so c‖!(φ)(α) 
!(φ)(α).
ii. Choice-offering “disjunctive” imperatives of arbitrary complexity introducing gen-
uine rights (and rather complicated conditional rights) corresponding to the rele-
vant “disjuncts” (cf. §4.11). This will be handy for avoiding a dynamic version
of the Ross Paradox when defining a dynamic analogue of the static entailment
relation .
iii. The granting of rights strengthens the definedness constraints for updating the
context: in view of NON, only constraints that are consistent with the exercise of
preexisting rights at a world may be added to an agent’s To-Do List at that world.
In defining updates for more complicated imperative formulas, some shorthand will
be useful. If i⊆ ic, then we let rc(ac)±i [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] be the result of altering rc(ac)
by executing the above procedure on each w ∈ {w | ∃w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ i} and leaving rc(ac)
otherwise unchanged.75 We note, without proving, the following property of NDRL up-
date.
(196) If [℘][φ][A1; ...;An]  [℘][φ][B1; ...;Bm], then
Φ ∈ rc(ac)±i [℘][φ][B1; ...;Bm](w) implies Φ ∈ rc(ac)±i [℘][φ][A1; ...;An](w)
Informally, (196) follows from the fact that rc(ac)±i [℘][φ][A1; ...;An](w) differs from
rc(ac)(w) only with respect to the addition of actions that [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] says is permit-
75. Although we are not concerned with performatives with only permissive interpretations (grants of permis-
sion and the like), it is natural to think they could be handled in terms of updating an NDRL with a [℘] formula
using the ± operation.
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ted at w. If [℘][φ][B1; ...;Bm] expresses a permission at w, then that permission is a weak-
ening of a permission that [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] expresses holds at w, since [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] 
[℘][φ][B1; ...;Bm]. The claim then follows by the closure of NDRLs under arbitrary expan-
sion (EX-R).
5.4.2 Basic Dynamic Formulas
We redefine updates for formulas of the form [β](!(φ)(α)), where alt(!(φ)(α))= A1; ...;An,
so that the updated context validates [β]([℘][φ][A1; ...;An]).
(197) c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ is defined iff
• tc∗(ac) satisfies CON*, AV2**, KE2*
• c 1 [β](¬[℘][φ][A1; ...;An])
• rc∗(ac) satisfies CR, NON, AV1-R, KE2-R, EX-R
(198) When defined, c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ , ac∗ , ic∗ , and tc∗ as defined in §5.3.3
• rc∗(d) = rc(d), for all d 6= ac
• rc∗(ac) = rc(ac)±iβ [℘][φ][A1; ...;An], where iβ = {v | ∃w : 〈w,v〉 ∈ ic ∩
JβKc}
Essentially the same operation on the context is performed in this case as in the case of
basic imperative formulas—alteration of the NDRL is simply restricted to states that are
accessible from some possible initial state by the execution of β. The following conse-
quences are immediate.
(199) c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖  [β]([℘][φ][A1; ...;An]), when c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ is defined
(200) c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖  [β](!(φ)(α)), when c‖[β](!(φ)(α))‖ is defined
5.4.3 Complex Dynamic Formulas
Finally, we redefine the update potential for VβWπ(!(φ)(α)), where alt(!(φ)(α))= A1; ...;An,
so that the updated context validates VβWπ([℘][φ][A1; ...;An]).
(201) c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ is defined iff
• tc∗(ac) satisfies CON*, AV2**, KE2*
• c 1 VβWπ(¬[℘][φ][A1; ...;An])
• rc∗(ac) satisfies CR, NON, AV1-R, KE2-R, EX-R
(202) When defined, c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ = c∗ = 〈sc∗ ,ac∗ , ic∗ , tc∗〉
• sc∗ , ac∗ , ic∗ , and tc∗ as defined in §5.3.4
• rc∗(d) = rc(d), for all d 6= ac
• rc∗(ac) = rc(ac)±ipi/β [℘][φ][A1; ...;An],
where iπ/β = {v′ | ∃w∃v : 〈v,v′〉 ∈min[ic∩(JπKc×W )∩JβKc,≤tc∗ (ac)(w)]}
Once again, the relevant update is restricted, in this case to terminal states of π-initial
transitions of β that are best with respect to the updated To-Do List tc∗(ac), from the
vantage of some w that is compatible with c’s picture of the current state of the world. The
following consequences of this definition are again immediate.
(203) c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖  VβWπ([℘][φ][A1; ...;An]), when c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ is de-
fined
(204) c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖  VβWπ(!(φ)(α)), when c‖VβWπ(!(φ)(α))‖ is defined
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5.4.4 Conceptual Virtues Redux
Let’s sum up the attractive features of this system. We predict that:
• When updates are defined, updating a context with an imperative formula of any
stripe reliably introduces both the proper sorts of obligations and rights—most
significantly, precisely the sorts of rights that appear be granted by arbitrarily
complex choice-offering imperatives—on their subjects.
• There is a distinction between performative, permissive, and assertive force. We
can, moreover, explain precisely what this difference amounts to, by appeal to
different pieces of the semantic and pragmatic apparatus. Assertive force consists
in update of the modal base. Imperative force consists in update of a To-Do List.
Permissive force consists in the granting of negative rights—rights to resist future
attempts to constrain a subject’s behavior—which we model with the alteration
of an NDRL.
Since we have incorporated permissions, we are able to give a fully general formu-
lation of a constraint semantics for the imperative language. This is worth doing for two
reasons: (i) it reveals the connection between the static account we spent most of the
paper developing and our dynamic account of imperative force, but additionally (and in-
terestingly) (ii) it reveals an irreducibly dynamic aspect of the account which cannot be
expressed simply by listing formulas of either the imperative or deontic object languages
that must be validated in order for update to be vacuous. We associate an arbitrary impera-
tive or imperative-containing formula π of LILA with a function χc(π) : (T ×T ) 7→ {0,1}
of a set characterizing the set inadχc(π) of inadmissible To-Do List/NDRL pairs.
(205) inadχc(π) = {〈τc,ac ,ρc,ac〉 | τc,ac 1 π or ρc‖π‖,ac 6= ρc,ac}
A pair 〈τc,ac ,ρc,ac〉 is inadmissible in case either τc,ac or ρc,ac is inadmissible. Update is
triggered at a context c just in case either the subject’s To-Do List or NDRL is inadmissi-
ble. As before, To-Do Lists are inadmissible if and only if they fail to validate π (if and
only if τc‖π‖,ac 6= τc,ac). There is, however, no corresponding static-semantic condition
for inadmissible NDRLs: since NDRLs play no direct role in the static semantics, we are
unable to state an equivalent formulation of the necessary and sufficient condition on in-
admissible NDRLs (that ρc‖π‖,ac 6= ρc,ac) in terms of the static semantics. To illustrate:
let π = !(φ)(α), and let alt(π) = A1; ...;An. Even when c validates [℘][φ][A1; ...;An], it
is often the case that rc(ac)±i [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] 6= rc(ac). Rights are finer-grained than
permissions: while every right is a permission, not every permission is a right. Being
granted a right induces changes in parameters of the context that cannot be fully char-
acterized in terms of the validity of certain formulas in either the deontic or imperative
object languages. While updating a context with π always (when defined) yields a context
that validates [℘][φ][A1; ...;An], inadmissible NDRLs cannot be characterized in terms of
failure or their corresponding context to validate [℘][φ][A1; ...;An].
In short, incorporating permission into the dynamics means giving up the pleasant
generalization with which we concluded §5.3.5—that the dynamic side of our account
models diachronic satisfaction of synchronic constraints on contextual parameters that can
be characterized using the static semantics. Constraints on To-Do lists can still be glossed
in this way, but constraints on NDRLs cannot. I do not, to be sure, want to portray this as
any sort of loss. There is still a genuine connection between the static semantics and the
theory of imperative force, and I take it that this is a real virtue of the semantics. It turns
out, moreover, that there is an interesting dimension of imperative dynamics—grants of
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permission—that doesn’t reduce to imperative statics. But this, I think, is all to the good:
the dynamic semantics we give in the following section will be genuinely dynamic, not a
mere notational variant of the static semantics.76
5.5 Dynamic Satisfaction and Entailment
We have defined the dynamic interpretation function ‖ · ‖ for every formula of LILA. This
is the most difficult step in defining a dynamic satisfaction/requirement relation—the rest
is standard, and can be presented quickly.77 A formula φ of LILA is satisfied by a context
c—c ⋐ φ—just in case c already bears the information that φ (if φ is non-imperative)
or updating with φ imposes no new constraints and confers no new rights on ac (if φ is
imperative). Just in case, that is to say, updating c with φ leaves the context as before.
(206) c⋐ φ iff c‖φ‖= c
Note that neither of the following relationships hold between dynamic⋐ and static .
(207) c  φ implies c⋐ φ
(208) c⋐ φ implies c  φ
This is not, of course, surprising in the case of non-imperative formulas of LILA. Truth of φ
at c does not imply presupposition that φ at c, nor vice versa. Things are different, however,
if we restrict our attention to imperative φ: we find that (208) holds, although (207) does
not. Regarding (207): this might be thought surprising, since if an imperative φ already is
in force at c—c  φ—one might expect that updating the context with φ would leave the
context as before. But we know better: the permissions expressed by φ may be in force at
c, yet not counts as rights there. Regarding (208): this is an immediate consequence of our
general result that c‖φ‖ φ, when φ is imperative and c‖φ‖ is defined.
Dynamic entailment in LILA is also standard. A list φ1, ...,φn of formulas entails
ψ—φ1, ...,φn ⋐ ψ—just in case updating a context with φ1, ...,φn always (when defined)
yields a context that satisfies/requires ψ.
(209) φ1, ...,φn ⋐ ψ iff, for all c: c‖φ1‖...‖φn‖ is defined implies c‖φ1‖...‖φn‖⋐ ψ
Note the following similarity between the dynamic and static entailment relations: an
imperative formula entails another just in case the former’s command content and permis-
sive content are each at least strong as the latter’s. Consider any two imperative formulas
!(φ)(α) and !(φ)(β) such that alt(!(φ)(α)) = A1; ...;An and alt(!(φ)(β)) = B1; ...;Bn. The
claim receives the following formal statement.
(210) !(φ)(α) ⋐ !(φ)(β) iff O(φ)(α)  O(φ)(β) and [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] 
[℘][φ][B1; ...;Bn]
Proof. We suppose that the relevant updates are all defined. Let c be any
context.
⇒: Suppose !(φ)(α) ⋐ !(φ)(β).
Then tc‖!(φ)(α)‖‖!(φ)(β)‖= tc‖!(φ)(α)‖, and rc‖!(φ)(α)‖‖!(φ)(β)‖= rc‖!(φ)(α)‖.
Then 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w) implies 〈JφKc,JβKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w).
76. The distinction between reducibly and irreducibly dynamic accounts is taken from von Fintel & Gillies
(2007).
77. Classic references for this sort of approach are Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991); Veltman (1996).
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Suppose c,w  O(φ)(α). Then, by (174), 〈JφKc,JαKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w).
So 〈JφKc,JβKc〉 ∈ tc(ac)(w).
Then, by (174), c,w O(φ)(β).
A similar argument shows that [℘][φ][A1; ...;An]  [℘][φ][B1; ...;Bn].
⇐: Let O(φ)(α) O(φ)(β) and [℘][φ][A1; ...;An]  [℘][φ][B1; ...;Bn].
To show: tc‖!(φ)(α)‖‖!(φ)(β)‖= tc‖!(φ)(α)‖ and rc‖!(φ)(α)‖‖!(φ)(β)‖= rc‖!(φ)(α)‖.
The latter follows immediately from (196).
As for the former, since c‖!(φ)(α)‖ O(φ)(α), c‖!(φ)(α)‖ O(φ)(β).
So, by (175) and the update potential for !(φ)(β), tc‖!(φ)(α)‖‖!(φ)(β)‖ =
tc‖!(φ)(α)‖.
Note that we have an analogue of this result for the static imperative entailment relation
, which follows from the analysis of static permissive content presented in §4.11.1.
(211) !(φ)(α)  !(φ)(β) iff O(φ)(α)  O(φ)(β) and [℘][φ][A1; ...;An] 
[℘][φ][B1; ...;Bn]
This is, in the static context, the fact we have exploited in order to address the Ross Para-
dox (and arbitrarily complicated versions thereof). The invalidity of the Ross inference is
explained by the fact that, e.g., !(φ)(α+β) generally has richer permissive content than
!(φ)(α). For one imperative to entail another, the permissive content of the former must
be at least as strong as the permissive content of the latter. The same explanation is what
accounts for dynamic invalidity of the Ross inference, in view of the above result.
So, while dynamic satisfaction of imperative formulas at a context does not reduce
to static validity at a context (in view of the falsity of (207) when φ is imperative), we
nevertheless find that dynamic entailment relations between imperative formulas never fail
to coincide with static entailment relations between them:
(212) !(φ)(α) ⋐ !(φ)(β) iff
!(φ)(α) !(φ)(β) iff
c  !(φ)(α) implies c  !(φ)(β), for arbitrary c
More generally, let π be an arbitrary formula of LILA embedding !(φ)(α)—a formula of
of either the form [β](...!(φ)(α)...) or VβWψ(...!(φ)(α)...)—and let π′ be the result of uni-
formly substituting occurrences of !(φ)(α) in π with !(φ)(β). It follows from the equiva-
lence of dynamic and static entailment relations between imperative formulas that π ⋐ π′
iff π π′.
We cannot, however, fully generalize the equivalence. That is to say, the following
does not generally hold for arbitrary formulas of LILA.
(213) φ1, ...,φn ⋐ ψ iff φ1, ...,φn  ψ
The equivalence does hold when all of φ1, ...,φn,ψ contain an imperative, as follows from
the generalization of (212) to arbitrary LILA embeddings of LILA imperatives. But it fails
to hold when a premise is non-imperative. We illustrate the point with a simple example:
(214) !(φ)(α),φ ⋐ !(⊤)(α), while !(φ)(α),φ 6 !(⊤)(α)
Proof that !(φ)(α),φ ⋐ !(⊤)(α).
Let c∗ = c‖!(φ)(α)‖‖φ‖, and suppose that φ is non-imperative.
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We know min[ic∗∩(JφKc∗×W ),≤tc∗ (ac∗ )(w)]⊆ JαKc∗ and ic∗ ⊆ JφKc∗×
W .
So it follows that ic∗ ∩ (JφKc∗ ×W ) = ic∗ . Then min[ic∗ ,≤tc∗ (ac∗ )(w)
]⊆ JαKc∗ .
So c∗  !(⊤)(α).
By contrast, we only have !(φ)(α),φ !(⊤)(α) if we “dynamicize” the static entail-
ment relation, so that information to the turnstile’s left is added to the modal base against
which the truth or requirement of the formula to the turnstile’s right is checked (roughly
along the lines of the dynamicization suggested toward the end of §3.2). As we noted in
§2.4, validating this argument form is extremely natural for an update semantic logic of
planning.78 It is less natural, but still potentially reasonable—depending on whether and
when it makes sense to use a dynamicized version of the static entailment relation—from
the point of view of a logic of content.
The reason validating this argument form is extremely natural for an update semantic
logic of planning points to a sense in which the update semantics given in this section
probably cannot be given a logic of content rationale. Update semantic accounts define
entailment in terms of vacuous update of an updater’s cognitive state (or contextual rep-
resentation thereof). From the point of view of the updater—the subject of authority, the
owner of the updated To-Do List—updating with the information that φ constrains the rel-
evant possibilities for the current state of the world to φ-possibilities. Subsequent update
with the imperative !(φ)(α) requires the subject to, in effect, add the action α to her To-Do
List at all the best φ-worlds. Subsequent to both updates: all the relevant possibilities for
the current state of the world are φ-possibilities, and the best ones of those demand α.
In view of her knowledge of present circumstances, compliance requires that the subject
perform α. Subjects are constrained to obey in view of their own information state. But
authorities are certainly not committed to prefer obedience in view of their subjects’ in-
formation state—though perhaps committed to prefer obedience in view of her own, the
possibility that the dynamicized entailment relation in §2.4 is designed to accommodate.
While updating a subject’s cognitive state with !(φ)(α) and φ may leave her with no choice
but to perform α, this is something an authority is not generally committed to endorsing
(if, suppose, her information should differ from that of her subject). I see no real way, then,
to give the subject-oriented update semantics developed in this section a logic of content
rationale.
5.6 Conclusion: For Pluralism in Imperative Logic
Theories of performative force, imperative or otherwise, are addressee-oriented: their
subject-matter is the effect of the use of some linguistic device on an addressee. Be-
cause of this, building an update semantics around a theory of imperative performative
force means, as we just saw, difficulties in accounting for the sense in which imperative
logic is supposed to be normative for an authority’s endorsement. Requiring that a seman-
tics for imperatives be an outgrowth of a dynamic theory of imperative performative force,
a` la Portner (2008), then, appears to mean automatically marginalizing a prima facie rea-
sonable, and certainly worthy of study, approach to the logic of imperatives—that which
is characteristic of logics of content.
78. This argument is a rough LILA analogue of argument forms (12), (13), and (17). There are less rough
analogues, but making the relevant points would involve introducing some complexities about representing future
tense indicatives in LILA that aren’t worth the trouble.
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More generally, I think that privileging dynamic semantic analyses of the imperative
over static treatments, along the lines developed in the major sections of this paper or other-
wise, involves marginalizing a collection of prima facie reasonable approaches to the logic
of imperatives. I see no compelling reason for this bias.79 Static logics of content attempt
to model the endorsements that an authority is committed to make at a given point in time,
while static logics of planning attempt to model the constraints on a subject’s planning
that are in force at a given point in time. For a wide array purposes, these things certainly
seem like they would be well worth modeling, and modeling them certainly seems to re-
quire embracing a static perspective on imperative semantics. Even insofar as we think
of imperative performative force as a (perhaps the) crucial aspect of the imperative—as
something that any semantic treatment of the imperative should say something about—we
have seen, at some length, that the static treatments of the imperative on offer do have
quite a lot to say on this subject, from the vantage of a constraint-semantic orientation.
Even where it proved impossible to characterize inadmissible NDRL pairs by appeal to
antecedent static validity of the relevant permission formulas, it is easy to see that NDRL
update is designed, in part, to enforce their posterior validity.
In short, a pluralistic attitude toward the semantics of imperatives is warranted. Marginal-
izing reasonable approaches is unwarranted and, moreover, methodologically suspect, in
particular for philosophers and linguists whose primary interest lies in the formal seman-
tics of natural language imperatives. This is an area of research to which relatively little
attention has been paid or progress made since the 1960s (although there are, of course,
a few notable exceptions), and into which contemporary methods in formal semantics are
only beginning to penetrate. We ought to save the worrying about who should be working
on what, at least until the number of recent papers in major journals outnumbers the fingers
on one hand.
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